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INTRODUCTION

[The] bureaucratic type of administrative organization [is]
. . . capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency . . . .1
For over half a decade, I have been writing about how and
why the institutions modern nation-states rely on to fend off
the threats––war, crime, and terrorism––that can erode their
ability to maintain order and compromise their viability as sovereign entities become ineffective when the threats migrate into cyberspace. In a succession of law review articles and books,
I refined my analysis of the essentially unprecedented challenges cybercrime, cyberterrorism and cyberwarfare pose for
law enforcement and the military. In Part II of this article, I
review that analysis, outlining the nature, causes, and likely
consequences of those challenges if they are left unchecked.
My goal here is to take this analysis to the next level: to go
beyond critiquing the efficacy of the current threat-control
structures2 and outline an alternative approach. I am, of
1. MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION
337 (Talcott Parsons ed., A. M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., First Free
Press Paperback Edition 1964) (1947).
2. I use the phrase “threat-control structures” to denote the institutional
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course, not the first to make such an attempt. As I explain in
Part III, law-makers, law-enforcers, and military personnel in
various countries have proposed, and/or are in the process of
implementing measures that are designed to modify the existing threat-control structures so as to improve their efficacy
against cyber-threats.
Part III’s description of these undertakings focuses primarily on efforts in the United States for two reasons. One is that I
am more familiar with United States law and United States
threat-control structures than I am with their correlates in
other countries. The other reason is that the United States’ arsenal of threat-control structures is larger and more complex
than the arsenals of most, if not all, other countries,3 which

arrangements a society relies upon to keep the threats that can erode social
order and undermine its viability in check. As I note above, the threats traditionally consisted of crime, terrorism, and war; as I explain in Part II, they
now also include cyber-variants of each threat, that is, cybercrime, cyberterrorism, and cyberwarfare. As Part II also explains, the threat-control structures contemporary societies rely on for this purpose so far consist of law enforcement agencies and personnel plus military agencies and personnel.
3. See, e.g., US Homeland Security & Defense Structure, HOMELAND
SECURITY RES. (Jan. 2010), http://www.homelandsecurityresearch.com/wpcontent/uploads/2009/12/US-HLS-HLD-Structure-2010.pdf (diagramming the
complex structure of the U.S.’ threat-control initiatives). This chart only displays the federal agencies that are involved in the United States’ threatresponse and control effort. See id. As such, it encompasses law enforcement
and military agencies, as well as agencies that engage in threat-control activities but do not fall neatly into either category, for example, the Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency. See id. Parts II and IV review the
challenges a bifurcated threat response structure create with regard to cyberthreat response and control.
In illustrating the relative difference in the size of United States
threat-response entities, I will focus only on law enforcement personnel; while
military personnel can, and do, play a role in addressing cyberwarfare, at the
least, the number of military personnel involved in this effort is limited, relative to the total number of military personnel. Compare Henry Kenyon, Army
Cyber Unit Expands as Fast as It Can, DEF. SYSTEMS (Feb. 25, 2011),
http://defensesystems.com/articles/2011/02/28/cyber-defense-army-cybercommand.aspx (noting that headquarters of United States’ new Cyber Command will “have a staff of more than 1,000 people when it is complete”), with
Def. Manpower Data Ctr., Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and By Country, U.S. DEP’T DEF. (Sept. 30, 2010),
http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/history/hst1009.pdf (showing the total U.S. active duty military personnel as of September 30, 2010 at
1,430,985 worldwide).
As to the size of U.S. law enforcement, in 2007, the “estimated 12,575
local police departments operating in the United States . . . employed approximately 463,000 full-time sworn personnel” plus “about 138,000” full-time civilian employees. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ
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suggests that the challenges it faces are likely to be more intractable than those that other countries confront.4 In other
231174, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2007 at 6 (2010); see also Sheriffs’ Offices, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT., http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?
ty=tp&tid=72 (last visited Sept. 28, 2012) (noting that in 2008, 3,063 sheriffs’
offices “had about 353,000 full-time employees, including 183,000 sworn officers”). A 2004 survey showed that the 49 “[p]rimary [s]tate” law enforcement
agencies, for example, highway patrol and state troopers, had 89,265 full-time
employees and 708 part-time employees. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 212749, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, at 2 (2007). And another roughly 60,000 officers
were engaged in law enforcement at the federal level. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 212750, FEDERAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, at 2 (2006). From these somewhat dated reports it
seems fair to estimate that state and local law enforcement agencies in the
United States employ over 750,000 officers. Compare this number with the
number of police in many countries. See, e.g. Police Officers, EUROSTAT,
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=crim_plce&lang=en#
(last updated June 3, 2012) (noting number of police officers in European
countries); Sworn Police Officers in Australia, AUSTRALIAN INST.
CRIMINOLOGY, http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/9/C/B/%7B9CB4A373-91D54773-A57C-26F6E298F91F%7Dcfi116.pdf (last modified July 3, 2009) (noting
45,201 full-time police officers in Australia in 2004–2005). But see China to
Unify Police Identity Card from Jan. 1, CHINA.ORG.CN, http://china.org.cn/
english/news/194799.htm (last updated Jan. 1, 2007) (noting “1.6 million police officers”).
As to complexity, the United States’ federal structure means the responsibility for law enforcement is shared by and/or parsed out among a series
of state, local and federal agencies. See, e.g., Paul Mysliwiec, The Federal
Death Penalty as a Safety Valve, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 257, 262 (2010) (“In
our system of dual sovereignty, the federal criminal code exists parallel to the
criminal codes of the several states, and . . . there is a great deal of overlap . . . .”). Many countries have a national police agency, which reduces, if it
does not eliminate, problems resulting from overlapping jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
James B. Jacobs & Dimitra Blitsa, Sharing Criminal Records: The United
States, the European Union and Interpol Compared, 30 LOY. L.A. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 125, 183 (2008) (“EU nations usually have a single national police department that has authority over local units throughout the country.”);
see also National Police Agency (NPA), FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS,
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/japan/npa.htm (last updated Oct. 12, 2000, 9:50
AM) (indicating that The National Police Agency of Japan is the central coordinating body for the entire police system); Responsibilities and Structure of
Public Security Agencies in China, MINISTRY PUB. SEC. CHINA,
http://big5.mps.gov.cn/SuniT/www.mps.gov.cn/English/index.htm (last visited
Oct. 8, 2012) (indicating that in China the Ministry of Public Security is in
charge of security nationwide). And, as Part III notes, most countries do not
have the rigid bifurcation between law enforcement and military initiatives
that is found in the United States.
4. As James Q. Wilson notes in his study of bureaucracy, government
agencies “view any interagency agreement as a threat to their autonomy.”
JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND
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WHY THEY DO IT 192 (2000). He points out that the “chief result of the [bureaucratic] concern for turf . . . is that it is extraordinarily difficult to coordinate the work of different agencies.” Id. Wilson notes that business bureaucracies “coordinate their actions by responding to market signals” and, where
appropriate, by “entering into explicit agreements . . . in which mutual material gain is the criterion for cooperation.” Id. “Government agencies, by contrast, view any interagency agreement as a threat to their autonomy.” Id.
They also “resist being regulated by other agencies.” Id. at 193.
Given all that, it is not surprising that many of the challenges noted above
arise from competition among agencies. See, e.g., Richard A. Martin, Book Review, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 367, 374 (1994) (reviewing ETHAN A.
NADELMANN, COPS ACROSS BORDERS: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF U.S.
CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT (1993)).
“Turf battles,” which often exist between law enforcement agencies in
the United States, become even more complicated overseas because
the number of agencies with potential jurisdiction over any particular
crime is much greater, and the goals of those agencies are often diverse. Thus, while a particular crime might be investigated in the
United States by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”), the Customs Service, and local authorities, overseas the same crime might also be investigated by the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the military
investigative services (the Naval Investigative Service, the Air Force
Office of Special Investigations, and the Military Police). Indeed, any
incident involving attacks on American citizens or American property
is often the subject of overlapping investigations by U.S. State and
Defense Department units, as well as traditional law enforcement
agencies of the U.S. Department of Justice. The problems which derive from the different goals of the agencies . . . present a continuing
dilemma that the United States has not resolved.
Id. (footnote omitted). The author’s observations on the turf battles that arose
in 1990s drug investigations apply with at least equal force to cybercrime investigations. See, e.g., Jeffrey Hunker, Editorial, Our Brave New Cyber World
It’s a Jungle Out There Let’s Hope the President’s New Cyber Czar Can Tame
the Proliferating Threats to our Security, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 7,
2009, at B1.
[O]ur efforts get muddled in an alphabet soup of agencies and plans.
Agencies responsible for pursuing cyber crime—just one aspect of
cyber security—include the Secret Service, the FBI, the Federal
Trade Commission and a special office in the Justice Department.
Meanwhile the National Security Agency has been fighting a turf battle with the Department of Homeland Security over who should “run”
the nation’s cyber-security efforts.
Id.; see also Bruce Reed & Marc Dunkelman, Op-Ed., Policing Our Cyberstreets, BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 21, 2009, at A13 (noting that in dealing with “cybercrime and cyberterrorism, competition and turf wars between bureaucracies . . . frequently stymie the implementation of workable solutions”); Ryan J.
Reilly, Federal Agents Say Turf Wars Have Negatively Affected Investigations,
MUCKRAKER
(May
9,
2011,
3:56
PM),
TPM
http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2011/05/federal_agents_say_turf
_wars_have_negatively_affec.php (“One-third of federal agents surveyed by a
government oversight agency have gotten into turf wars with other federal law
enforcement agencies during the course of an investigation. . . .”). See, e.g.,
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AUDIT REPORT 11–22,
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words, what is true for the United States is likely to be true for
other countries as well.5
THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S ABILITY TO ADDRESS THE
NATIONAL SECURITY CYBER INTRUSION THREAT at iv, 12–13 (2011), available
at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/FBI/a1122r.pdf (illustrating a recent example of how inter-agency rivalries undermine the United States response to
cyber-threats, noting the FBI’s failure to share threat information with other
law enforcement agencies).
The 9/11 attacks were unintentionally facilitated by a similar lack of
information-sharing. See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE
U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 78–80, 91–92, 355–56 (2004) [hereinafter
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT]. See James B. Perrine et al., Fusion Centers and
the Fourth Amendment: Application of the Exclusionary Rule in the Post-9/11
Age of Information Sharing, 38 CAP. U. L. REV. 721, 729 (2010), for a summary
of how and why information-sharing failed in the lead-up to the 9/11 attacks.
See STEVEN K. O’HERN, THE INTELLIGENCE WARS: LESSONS FROM BAGHDAD
207–56 (2008), for an analysis of how, and why, inter-agency lack of cooperation continues to impede intelligence collection and analysis in the post-9/11
world. Among other things, O’Hern notes that bureaucracies’ tendency to develop “stovepipes” impedes information-sharing and cooperation among agencies: “The term ‘stovepipe’ refers to the lack of sharing among intelligence organizations. In a stovepipe, intelligence is collected by an organization,
analyzed by the same organization, and passed up the chain to that organization’s higher headquarters––but not shared outside of the organization.” Id. at
211–12. He notes that stovepipes develop “for many reasons,” perhaps the
most important of which is that people work for “different organizations that
have different missions,” which can lead to a failure to share information “out
of hubris.” Id. at 213, 227. O’Hern explains that hubris arises because people
believe their organization “can do more with the information” than if they
share it with other organizations. Id. at 227.
Finally, as many have noted, bureaucracies are by nature risk-averse.
See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 4, at 69 (“[G]overnment organizations are especially risk averse because they are caught up in a web of constraints so complex that any change is likely to rouse the ire of some important constituency.”). It is therefore not surprising that agencies often suffer from a failure of
ambition. See, for example:
Government agencies also sometimes display a tendency to match capabilities to mission by defining away the hardest part of their job.
They are often passive, accepting what are viewed as givens, including that efforts to identify and fix glaring vulnerabilities to dangerous
threats would be costly, too controversial, or too disruptive.
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 352; see also RALPH PETERS,
BEYOND TERROR: STRATEGY IN A CHANGING WORLD 197 (2002)
(“[B]ureaucracies discourage risk-taking or excellence that does not match the
models of the past. The motto . . . is ‘Play it safe.’”).
5. For now and for the currently foreseeable future, this is most likely to
be true for countries that (1) are frequent targets of cyber-attacks and (2) rely
on the hierarchical response structures examined in Part II. As to the first factor, see, for example, TREND MICRO, THE BUSINESS OF CYBERCRIME: A
COMPLEX
BUSINESS
MODEL
2
(2010),
available
at
http://la.trendmicro.com/media/wp/cybercrime-business-whitepaper-en.pdf. See
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As Part III explains, these proposals appropriately focus on
remediating specific factors that contribute to the inefficacy
with which current United States threat-control structures confront cyber-threats. As Part IV explains, such an approach is
inadequate because it seeks to “update” systems that were developed to control threats that were simpler and more parochial
than the ones we confront now. I do not believe our existing
threat-control structures can be modified in ways that will
make them effective against the twenty-first century threats
many countries already confront, and most, if not all, will eventually confront.
Like others, I believe we need a new threat-control strategy: one that replaces the rigid, hierarchical structures on which
we currently rely with systems that mirror the lateral, networked structures that prosper in cyberspace.6 In Part V, I outline my thoughts as to how such a strategy could be structured
and implemented.
II. THREATS
As Part III explains, cybercrime, cyberterrorism, and
cyberwarfare differ from their real-world analogues in various
ways, which means that strategies devised to deal with the latter may not be effectual in dealing with cyber-threats. To un-

also Matt Liebowitz, ‘Oddjob’ Trojan Sneaks into Your Bank Account,
(Mar.
14,
2011,
2:14
PM),
NBCNEWS.COM
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41743730/ns/technology_and_sciencesecurity/t/oddjob-trojan-sneaks-your-bank-account (noting cybercriminals attacking targets “in the United States, Poland and Demark”).
6. As to the non-hierarchical nature of cyber-threats, see, for example:
“Few, if any, cyber-attacks occur in organizations with a formalized chain of
command. Instead, multiple members of an organization . . . create a cyberattack capability which is implemented on the decision of potentially different
members. The system lacks a true hierarchy of decision making.” Jonathan A.
Ophardt, Note, Cyber Warfare And The Crime Of Aggression: The Need For
Individual Accountability On Tomorrow’s Battlefield, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH.
REV. No. 3, ¶ 39. As to why hierarchical structures are not effective in dealing
with cyber-threats, see, e.g., CLAY WILSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32114,
BOTNETS CYBERCRIME, AND CYBERTERRORISM: VULNERABILITIES AND POLICY
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 30 (2007) (“Cybercrime requires less personal contact,
less need for formal organization, and no need for control over a geographical
territory[,]” all of which mean that online crime will tend to “emphasize lateral
relationships and networks instead of hierarchies.”); see also Reed Henry, Enterprise Threat and Risk Monitoring Delivers the Rewards Without the Risk,
DATABASE AND NETWORK J., Apr. 2010, at 18, available at 2010 WLNR
11316176 (“[a] loosely-coupled and . . . well-organised group of players a cyber
criminal can attack any size institution . . . .”).
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derstand why that is true, it is necessary to understand the distinctions between the traditional threat categories––crime, terrorism, and warfare––and how cyberspace erodes those distinctions.7 This Part addresses those issues.
A. REAL-SPACE
Crime, terrorism, and war and the distinctions between
each are reasonably well defined and reasonably stable in the
physical world. The definitional clarity and empirical stability
of the real-world threat categories is a function of two circumstances. One is that the categories evolved as pragmatic responses to the challenges territorially-based sovereign entities–
–city-states, empires, nation-states––must confront and overcome if they are to survive.8 The other circumstance is the fact
that these threats emerged in a physical environment that is
far less malleable, and therefore far less ambiguous than the
conceptual environment of cyberspace.9
Probably the greatest challenge societies confront is the
need to maintain order, both internally and externally.10 Order
is essential if the citizens of a society are to carry out the functions (e.g., procure food and shelter, reproduce) essential to ensure their survival and that of the society.11 As failed states
demonstrate, a society cannot survive if its members are free to
prey on each other in ways that undermine the level of order
needed to maintain a functioning society.12 To maintain order
internally, a society must ensure that its citizens are organized
and socialized in a fashion that lets them carry out essential
functions and that this internal order is not undermined by the

7. See SUSAN W. BRENNER, CYBER-THREATS: THE EMERGING FAULT
LINES OF THE NATION-STATE 13–23 (2009) [hereinafter CYBER-THREATS] for
more on the traditional threat categories. See also Susan W. Brenner, Toward
a Criminal Law for Cyberspace: Distributed Security, 10 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH.
L. 1, 5–64 (2004) [hereinafter Criminal Law for Cyberspace] (describing traditional threat categories).
8. See Criminal Law for Cyberspace, supra note 7, at 34–46. See also
WEBER, supra note 1, at 156 for a summary of the characteristics of the modern nation-state.
9. See Criminal Law for Cyberspace, supra note 7, at 50–53.
10. See id. at 9–11, 34–46.
11. See id.
12. See, e.g., Daniel Thürer, The “Failed State” and International Law,
836 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 731, 731–36, 740–42 (1999).
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disruptive activity of some citizens.13 To maintain order externally, a society must fend off encroachments and attacks by
other societies.14 To do this, a society must have trained personnel who are equipped with the weaponry they need to repel
external attacks.15
1. Rules
Societies use two sets of rules to maintain internal order.16
One consists of civil rules that define the basic structure of the
society. These rules deal with status (e.g., when people become
adults, which adults have which rights), property (e.g., who can
own property, how one acquires property), familial bonds (e.g.,
kinship, marriage, divorce) and other equally critical matters.17
Many civil rules are informal norms; most citizens internalize
the norms and that keeps their behavior within socially acceptable bounds.18 Other civil rules take the form of laws, the
enforcement of which falls to civil courts and civil litigation
(suits between individuals).19
Unlike other social species (e.g., ants, termites), humans
are intelligent and can therefore deliberately decide not to follow a rule.20 Most of the individuals in a society will not intentionally disobey the society’s civil rules, but some will.21 Societies use a second set of rules––criminal rules––to control
conduct that deliberately violates a society’s rules and challenges its ability to maintain order.22 These rules are intended
to discourage rule-violation by letting the state sanction those
who commit “crimes.”23
A crime consists of violating a rule––a law––that prohibits
certain conduct or causing certain “harm.”24 Murder, for example, prohibits causing the death of another human being; theft
13. See Criminal Law for Cyberspace, supra note 7, at 9–11.
14. See id.
15. In other words, the state monopolizes the use of force in order to control threats that can disrupt order. See WEBER, supra note 1, at 156.
16. The discussion in this Part is adapted from Criminal Law for Cyberspace, supra note 7, at 9–60.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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prohibits someone’s taking another person’s property without
her permission and with the intention to deprive her of it.25 As
these examples indicate, criminal rules often relate to matters
governed by civil rules; the prohibition against theft reinforces
civil rules that establish and define the parameters of property
ownership.26
Criminal rules discourage rule violations by proscribing
certain activity and by prescribing and inflicting sanctions on
those who engage in it.27 So if Jane murders John, the society
they belong to will convict her of murder and impose a sanction.
The primary purpose of sanctioning offenders is to deter them
from breaking more criminal rules; a secondary goal is to deter
others from following their example.28 The sanction presumably
deters enough would-be rule-violators to keep crime from undermining order in that society.29
This system assumes individuals commit crimes.30 That
assumption also applies to terrorism, which consists of committing what would otherwise be routine crime(s) for ideological
reasons.31 Criminals may commit crimes for financial reasons
(e.g., fraud, theft) or passion (e.g., anger, sex).32 The motive for
committing crimes is personal: I steal to benefit myself; I murder out of revenge.33 Terrorists commit crimes (e.g., killing peo-

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Distributed Security: Preventing Cybercrime, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 659, 662 (2005)
[hereinafter Distributed Security] (“[S]ocieties accept that they cannot eliminate it and so strive to control it.”).
30. See, e.g., Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Designing Bespoke Transitional Justice:
A Pluralist Process Approach, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (2010). This assumption
derives from the fact that, until recently, humans were the only “persons”
whose actions were recognized and governed by law. See, e.g., Anonymous No.
935, (1701) 88 Eng. Rep. 1518 (K.B.) (“A corporation is not indictable, but the
particular members of it are.”). And so far, humans seem to be the only “persons” who are committing cybercrimes and/or seem likely to commit cyberterrorism or engage in cyberwarfare. See, e.g., Joshua Davis, Web War One,
WIRED, Sept. 2007, at 162–69, 182–84.
31. See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, “At Light Speed”: Attribution and Response to Cybercrime/Terrorism/Warfare, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379,
386–89 (2007) [hereinafter At Light Speed].
32. See Criminal Law for Cyberspace, supra note 7, at 57 n.331.
33. See id.
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ple, damaging property) to promote an ideology.34 Since terrorists commit crimes (albeit for distinct motives), societies have
historically regarded terrorism as a type of crime.35
2. Territory
Historically, crime and terrorism were an internal phenomenon, i.e., both were committed within the territory of a
sovereign entity,36 such as a nation-state.37 The internal character of crime/terrorism was a function of necessity: In the realworld, it is physically impossible for a person to steal property
from someone in another country; the constraints of geography
and historic limitations of travel meant crime and terrorism
were domestic threats which could be addressed with local law
and local law enforcement agencies.38
War differs from crime and terrorism in two respects, one
of which is that it is a struggle between sovereign entities.39
While individuals wage war, warriors are merely implements;
the players are the nation-states engaged in a political struggle.40 War has been reserved for sovereign entities because only
they could summon the resources (manpower, weapons) needed
to wage war.41 Historically, individuals engaged in crime and
terrorism and nation-states engaged in war. Each category was
distinct: individuals did not “commit” war and sovereign entities did not “commit” crime or terrorism.42 The second respect
in which war differs from crime/terrorism is that war threatens
a society’s ability to maintain external order––to fend off attacks from hostile states and maintain the stable geographical
and political environment essential for its survival.43 War has
historically been an “outside” threat; crime and terrorism have
been an “inside” threat.44
34. See At Light Speed, supra note 31, at 386–89.
35. See id. at 386 n.40.
36. See, e.g., CYBER-THREATS, supra note 7, at 13–18, for the link between
territory and sovereignty. See WEBER, supra note 1, at 156, for a summary of
the characteristics of the modern nation-state.
37. See Criminal Law for Cyberspace, supra note 7, at 105–06.
38. See id. at 39–56.
39. See At Light Speed, supra note 31, at 402–04.
40. See Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Civilians in Cyberwarfare:
Conscripts, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1011, 1023 (2010).
41. See CYBER-THREATS, supra note 7, at 15–17.
42. See id. at 15–23.
43. See id.
44. See id.
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We saw above how societies developed rules that define
crime and terrorism. They also eventually developed rules that
defined war and set certain parameters on how it is to be conducted.45 These rules became the foundation of a strategy that
has been effective in controlling real-space threats.46 But as the
Parts below explain, both the rules, and their enforcement become problematic as threat activity migrates online.
B. CYBERSPACE
Cyberspace introduces a new variable into the threatcontrol calculus. As is explained below, by allowing activity to
be vectored through non-physical “space,” it creates opportunities for conduct that threatens a state’s ability to maintain internal and/or external order but (i) does not fit within the traditional threat taxonomy and (ii) diminishes the effectiveness of
the systems designed to control those threats.
1. Internal Threats
Cyberspace’s most significant contribution to the evolving
state of affairs noted above is that it eliminates the constraints
of the physical world and makes geography irrelevant: Cybercriminals can attack victims in other countries as easily as they
can target someone in their neighborhood.47 While we may not
have yet seen a verified incident of cyberterrorism, the same
will be true of it as well.48 This means cybercrime and cyberterrorism can be internal threats, external threats or a combination of both. It also means that it can be difficult or even impossible to accurately categorize an attack as cybercrime,
cyberterrorism, or cyberwarfare.49
Cyberspace also vitiates identity: cybercriminals and/or
cyberterrorists can be anonymous or assume false identities
with an efficacy that is impossible in the physical world, where
45. See, e.g., David Weissbrodt & Daniel H. Nesbitt, The Role of the United States Supreme Court in Interpreting and Developing Humanitarian Law,
95 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1372–73 (2011).
46. Control is all societies strive for. See Distributed Security, supra note
29, at 662.
47. See Criminal Law for Cyberspace, supra note 7, at 69–70.
48. See, e.g., CLAY WILSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32114, BOTNETS,
CYBERCRIME, AND CYBERTERRORISM: VULNERABILITIES AND POLICY ISSUES
FOR CONGRESS 7–9 (2008) (describing the 2007 Estonia cyber-attack).
49. See, e.g., id.
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one’s physical characteristics limit the number and nature of
identities he or she can assume.50 The elimination of physical
constraints and the masking or alteration of one’s identity
combine to erode the efficacy of the traditional law enforcement
model, which nation-states use to enforce their criminal laws.51
The model is based on the premise that societies can maintain internal order by having law enforcement officers react to
completed crimes and/or acts of terrorism.52 It assumes police
will apprehend the perpetrators, who are charged, tried, and
sanctioned; this, as noted above, is presumed to control crime
by discouraging the perpetrators and others from following
their example.53
Since it evolved to deal with crime, which is subject to the
physical constraints of the real-world, this model assumes local
crime, local perpetrators and a physical crime scene.54 Police
officers use these characteristics of crime to identify and apprehend perpetrators; as we all know, it is exceedingly difficult
to commit a physical crime without leaving trace evidence at
the scene (and perhaps being observed by witnesses).55 The officers investigating a crime can also focus on links between the
victim and perpetrator because it is equally difficult to mask
our movements and relationships in the physical world. These
investigative procedures, and the assumptions that underlie
them, become problematic when criminal activity is mediated
through the cyberworld.56
The model’s efficacy is further eroded by a third characteristic of cybercrime and cyberterrorism: since crime and terrorism can be automated, perpetrators can cause “harm” on a
scale that surpasses what is possible in the real-world.57 The
increase in the scale of the “harm” inflicted challenges the
model because of the sheer number of new crimes and because
they constitute a new quantum of criminal activity that is added to the real-world crime with which law enforcement must
continue to deal.58
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See Criminal Law for Cyberspace, supra note 7, at 65–66, 68–70.
See id. at 75.
See id. at 58–65.
See id. at 6.
See id. at 50–75.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 66–68; see, e.g., Davis, supra note 30, at 162–69, 182–84.
See Criminal Law for Cyberspace, supra note 7, at 66–68.
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2. External Threats
War is unambiguous in the physical world; when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, there was no doubt this was war.59
The attackers wore uniforms and used airplanes and ships, all
of which displayed Japan’s national insignia; this was one indicator of war (attack by a nation-state, not individuals).60 Another indicator was the weaponry itself, which was far beyond
the capacity of individuals to acquire and utilize.61
We may or may not have seen instances of cyberwarfare.62
We know, though, that it will not require the use of sophisticated, expensive weapons that can only be utilized by nationstates.63 Like cybercrime and cyberterrorism, cyberwarfare will
involve the use of hardware and software that are available to
anyone with a computer, Internet access and the requisite
computer expertise.64
All these factors erode the assumptions on which the three
threat categories are based.65 A cyber-attack that comes, or
seems to come, from outside a nation-state’s territory and is directed at what would be considered military targets might be
cyberwar, but it might be cybercrime or cyberterrorism.66 In
cyberspace, states lose their monopoly on war and individuals
lose their monopoly on crime and terrorism.67
This creates serious problems for countries like the United
States, which rigidly bifurcate their threat response authority
into (i) civilian (crime/terrorism) and (ii) military (war).68 The
bifurcation is predicated on the assumption that response personnel can easily distinguish crime/terrorism from war.69 That
59. At Light Speed, supra note 31, at 406.
60. Id.
61. CYBER-THREATS, supra note 7, at 75.
62. See WILSON, supra note 48, at 7–9. But see CYBER-THREATS, supra
note 7, at 85–90.
63. See generally CYBER-THREATS, supra note 7, at 75 (noting that weaponry used in traditional warfare is elaborate, and beyond the means of civilians to acquire).
64. See, e.g., Joshua E. Kastenberg, Non-Intervention and Neutrality in
Cyberspace: An Emerging Principle in the National Practice of International
Law, 64 A.F. L. REV. 43, 59–60 (2009).
65. See At Light Speed, supra note 31, at 433–38.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 441–45.
69. See id. at 441.
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premise is valid in the physical world, but, as explained below,
is problematic for conduct vectored through cyberspace.
C. CYBERSPACE AND THREAT RESPONSE
This subpart explains why the traditional threat categories
morph and blur in cyberspace and shows how the erosion of
these categories undermines the viability of the bifurcated response strategy outlined above. As this subpart explains, the
strategy implicitly assumes that would-be responders can accurately and confidently carry out the process of attribution,
which has been the first step in attack-response.
The concept of attribution is an explicit element of the laws
of war,70 and it is implicit in the laws governing crime and terrorism.71 The general concept encompasses two issues: attacker-attribution (who carried out an attack?) and attackattribution (what kind of an attack was it?). Each is examined
below.
1. Attacker-attribution
Attacker-attribution has historically been less problematic
for war than for crime or terrorism.72 The laws of war require
warring states to identify themselves; if a country breaches
that obligation, it is generally not difficult to identify the state
responsible for an act of war in the real-world.73 The clothing
military attackers wear and the equipment they use display insignia indicating their national affiliation.74 The language they
speak and the location from which an attack is launched can
also indicate the country from which it originated; in the realworld, it is relatively easy to determine the physical location
from which an attack was launched.75
Identifying those responsible for crime is usually much
more difficult.76 Criminals have a strong incentive to avoid
identification because it is generally the first step toward being

70. See, e.g., Matthew Hoisington, Note, Cyberwarfare and the Use of
Force Giving Rise to the Right of Self-Defense, 32 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
439, 451 (2009).
71. See, e.g., At Light Speed, supra note 31, at 406–09.
72. CYBER-THREATS, supra note 7, at 127.
73. Id. at 128.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 128–29.
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apprehended, convicted, and sanctioned for their misdeeds.77
Since crime control is essential for maintaining internal order,
nation-states have developed a standardized, generally effective approach for identifying those who commit crimes in their
territory.78
This criminal investigation approach “assumes activity in
the real world because, until recently, physical reality was the
only arena of crime commission.”79 As noted above, this approach focuses on finding physical evidence at a crime scene
and/or locating witnesses who saw the perpetrator.80 It assumes the perpetrator was, and perhaps still is, in the local geographical area.81 If attacker-attribution fails for one crime, officers will assume the attacker remains in the area and will
consequently be alert for the possibility that he will re-offend
and then be identified.82
Attacker-attribution for terrorism is more complicated
than attack-attribution for war but less complicated than attack-attribution for crime.83 While those who carry out a terrorist attack may not identify themselves personally, they often
identify themselves as acting on behalf of a terrorist group.84
However, “[i]f the sponsoring group does not claim credit for an
attack, the structure and style of the attack may inferentially
identify the organization responsible.”85 That may lead investigators to the individuals who carried out an attack.86 Since the
current strategy treats terrorism as a type of crime, the criminal investigation approach outlined above is often used to identify and apprehend individual terrorists.87
In analyzing how cyberspace complicates attackerattribution, it is helpful to employ an example: in 2006, a “sensitive Commerce Department bureau”––the Bureau of Industry
and Security (BIS)––suffered a “debilitating attack” on its com77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id. at 129.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 130.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
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puter systems.88 BIS was forced to disconnect its computers
from the Internet; it eventually discarded the infected computers and replaced them.89 The attack was traced to sites hosted
by Chinese Internet Service Providers (ISPs), but the attackers
were never identified.90
As we saw above, real-world attacker-attribution calculi rely on the “place” where an attack occurred or originated from in
determining attacker identity. With virtual attacks, “place”
tends to be more ambiguous and less conclusive than in realworld analyses.
a. Point of Attack Origin
The “place” of virtual attack is ambiguous because while
attacks may be routed through Internet servers located in China, this does not necessarily mean they originated in China. It
is common for online attackers to use “stepping stones”––
computers owned by innocent parties but controlled by the attacker––in their assaults.91 The “stepping stone” computers can
be anywhere in the physical world because real-space is irrelevant to activity in cyberspace.92 So while use of the Chinese
servers might mean the attacks came from China, it might not
mean that at all.93 The attacker might be in Russia or Peoria.94
What if BIS-style attacks were repeated, with each coming
from Chinese servers and targeting computers used by United
States agencies? Could we base attacker-attribution on inferences drawn from the repetitive use of what seems the same
point of origin? It would be risky to rely on mere repetition;
aside from anything else, a virtual Machiavelli might be “framing” China by routing structurally similar attacks through its
real-space.
Repetition coupled with other circumstances might support
using point of attack origin inferences to establish attacker-

88. Alan Sipress, Computer System Under Attack, WASH. POST, Oct. 6,
2006, at A21.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See JEFFREY HUNKER ET AL., INST. FOR INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE PROT.,
ROLE AND CHALLENGES FOR SUFFICIENT CYBER-ATTACK ATTRIBUTION 6
(2008), available at http://www.thei3p.org/docs/publications/whitepaperattribution.pdf.
92. See CYBER-THREATS, supra note 7, at 131–40.
93. See id.
94. See id.
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attribution. Assume that BIS-style attacks are launched
against another United States agency’s computers. Investigators trace these attacks to servers in Guangdong, China. For
two years, sporadic attacks targeting United States civilian and
government computers have been traced to Guangdong; some
say Chinese military hackers conducted the attacks, others say
Guangdong University students were responsible.95 Can we
predicate attacker-attribution inferences on the discontinuous
repetition of similar target attacks coming from the same realworld locus in China? Does the (reasonably reliable) identification of a single point of origin support the inference that the recent BIS-style attacks came from Guangdong?
For the purposes of analysis, we will assume the facts outlined above support the inference that “someone” in Guangdong
launched the hypothesized BIS-style attacks. That raises the
next question: how, if at all, does the inference that the attacks
came from Guangdong advance the process of identifying who
is responsible for them?
i.War
Point of attack origin historically played an important role
in attacker-attribution for acts of war because the targets of
such attacks usually inferred that an attack originating in another nation-state was attributable to that nation-state.96 If we
apply this logic to the scenario above, the United States could
rationally infer that the BIS-style attacks on United States
government computers were acts of war launched by China. It
could, in effect, construe the attacks as the virtual equivalent of
Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor.97 The problem with this derivative inference of responsibility lies in equating an attack inferentially launched from Chinese territory with an attack
launched by China.98
Historically, it was reasonable to equate transnational attacks with acts of war because only a nation-state could launch
such an attack.99 That is still true in the real-world, but cyberspace gives each nation-state an incremental, highly permeable

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

At Light Speed, supra note 31, at 410.
CYBER-THREATS, supra note 7, at 141–43.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 142.
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set of “virtual” national borders.100 Anyone with internet access
and certain skills can launch a cross-border virtual attack on
the cyberspace “presence” of an external nation-state.101 A virtual attack is not territorially invasive, but it produces effects
in the victim-state’s territory that are damaging in various
ways and in varying degrees.102
Point of attack origin therefore plays a more problematic
role in analyzing online warfare, which brings us to the role it
plays in the crime-terrorism calculus. While crime and terrorism are conceptually distinct, we will consider them jointly because both represent threats to internal order and both are the
product of individual actions.
ii. Crime/terrorism
Point of attack origin historically played a much more limited role in crime and terrorism attacker-attribution than in
war attribution.103 While point of attack origin can inferentially
indicate who may have been responsible for a crime or an act of
terrorism, the link between origin and attribution is much
more attenuated than in war analysis.104
The primary reason for this is that in the real-world, point
of attack origin and point of attack occurrence are often so
closely related as to be indistinguishable for crime and for terrorism.105 A crack dealer sells crack in his neighborhood; the
points of origin and occurrence of his drug crimes are functionally identical. A terrorist group operating from City A bombs a
restaurant in nearby City B; since the points of attack origin
and occurrence were separated by only a short distance, one
can argue that they are functionally identical here as well. If
there is little or no differentiation between the point of attack
origin and the point of attack occurrence, identifying the point
of origin is unlikely to markedly advance the process of identifying the attacker.106
Point of attack origin therefore tends to be one, perhaps
100. See id.
101. Id. at 142–43.
102. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 48, at 7–9 (explaining large-scale sustained online attacks on Estonian infrastructure).
103. The discussion in this Part is adapted from CYBER-THREATS, supra
note 7, at 143–61.
104. Id. at 143–44.
105. Id. at 144.
106. Id.
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minor, factor in the processes law enforcement officers use to
identify those responsible for crime and terrorism.107 It has
played a lesser role in crime/terrorism attacker-attribution because these threats to internal order have come primarily, if
not exclusively, from domestic actors.108 Domestic actors are
presumptively in the nation-state where the attack occurred,
and investigators tend to assume that they remain in the area
where it occurred.109
As crime and terrorism migrate online, point of attack
origin can assume more importance in attacker-attribution.110
As we saw above, cyberspace eliminates the need for physical
proximity between attacker and victim and creates the potential for increased differentiation between point of attack origin
and point of occurrence. In other words, it erodes law enforcement’s ability to assume an attacker is parochial.111 The viability of that default assumption still holds for real-world crime,
and can hold for real-world terrorism, but its applicability to
online crime and terrorism is increasingly problematic.112
The parochial-attacker assumption is most likely to hold
for “personal” attacks: cybercrimes and, perhaps, acts of cyberterrorism in which the perpetrator’s motives are idiosyncratically emotional.113 In these cases––for example, John uses cyberspace to stalk his former girlfriend or Jane uses it to attack
her employer––the perpetrator and victim are in the same area, but instead of using physical activity in that real-space to
conduct the attack, the perpetrator vectors it through cyberspace.114
This creates an epistemological issue: when attacker and
attacked are in the same real-space area throughout an attack
conducted online, did the attack originate in the real-space oc-

107. Id. at 145.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 146.
112. Id.
113. Id. (citing Susan W. Brenner, Should Criminal Liability Be Used to
Control Online Speech?, 76 MISS. L.J. 705 (2007)).
114. Id. (citing Paul Shukovsky, Cyberstalker Just out of Reach of Law, But
Finally, He Stops, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER (Feb. 10, 2004, 10:00 PM),
http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Cyberstalker-just-out-of-reach-of-lawbut-1136722.php).
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cupied by attacker and victim, in cyberspace, or in both?115 For
the purposes of attacker-attribution, the answer should be
both.116
In “personal” attack cases, the connections between attacker and victim mean the parochial-attacker assumption is likely
to be useful in identifying the attacker.117 So far, cybervendettas seem primarily to originate in real-world contacts between attacker and victim.118 Investigators can therefore rely
on the approach used for real-world crime and terrorism, i.e.,
focus on inferences derived from a real-world context.119 The attack, then, should be construed as originating in the real-space
occupied by attacker and victim.120
What about attacks in which the attacker is not, by any
definition, in the same real-space as the victim? In the BIS attacks, the target was in Washington, D.C., while the attackers
were (presumably) in China. An identified point of attack origin
serves a very different function in cases like this, for several
reasons.121
First, it serves an initial, essentially negative function in
attacker-attribution.122 It tells investigators that the parochialattacker assumption and derivative investigative approach
they use for real-world crime/terrorism will probably be of little
use in identifying the attackers.123 When an attack presents
functionally coterminous points of attack origin and occurrence,
we have a localized crime scene that becomes the focal point of
the investigation.124 Evidence, inferences, observations of witnesses and connections between victim and attacker all radiate
from and revolve around this unitary crime scene.125 It creates

115. Id. at 147.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. (citing Leroy McFarlane and Paul Bocij, An Exploration of Predatory Behaviour in Cyberspace: Towards a Typology of Cyberstalkers, FIRST
MONDAY (Sept. 2003), http://www.firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs
/index.php/fm/article/view/1076/996; Online Harassment/Cyberstalking Statistics, WORKING TO HALT ONLINE ABUSE, http://www.haltabuse.org
/resources/stats/index.shtml (last visited Nov. 8, 2012)).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 148.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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a comprehensible focus for the investigation and, in so doing,
makes the investigation a manageable task.126
Second, cyberspace fractures the crime-scene into shards,
the number of which depends on the particular circumstances
of an attack.127 One constant shard is the alpha point of attack
origin––the place where the attacker is physically located and
from which she launches the attack.128 Other, variable shards
are the intermediary points of transmission used in the attack;
each represents the occurrence of a constituent, spatially diverse event that contributed to the success of the ultimate attack.129 The other constant shard, the omega shard, is the place
of attack occurrence, which we examine below.130
Fracturing the crime scene into shards makes identifying
the point of attack origin and linking it to the attacker much
more difficult.131 Aside from anything else, a fractured crime
scene can result in false positives––in investigators assuming
an intermediary point of transmission of an attack is the originating point for the attack.132
Another issue that can complicate the process of backtracking through a series of incremental attack stages is the legal
process involved.133 Incremental attack stages will almost certainly involve the use of computers in different countries.134 To
gain access to the information needed to trace an attack
through those computers, law enforcement will have to obtain
assistance from government and civilian entities in the countries in which the computers were used.135 This process can be

126. Id.
127. Id. at 149.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 150–51 (citing Daniel A. Morris, Tracking a Computer Hacker,
DEP’T
OF
JUSTICE,
http://208.109.203.49/images/
U.S.
http_www.usdoj.gov_criminal_cybercrime_usamay2001_2.pdf (last updated
May 3, 2005).
134. Id. at 151 (citing Tom Young, IT Industry Core to Global E-Crime Bat(Nov.
9,
2006),
http://www.computing.co.uk/
tle,
COMPUTING
ctg/analysis/1852053/it-industry-core-global-crime-battle).
135. Id. (citing Susan W. Brenner & Joseph J. Schwerha IV, Transnational
Evidence-Gathering and Local Prosecution of International Cybercrime, 20 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 347, 354–88 (2002)).
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difficult, time-consuming, and even futile.136 The formal methods used to obtain assistance can take months or even years;
since digital evidence is fragile, it may have disappeared by the
time investigators obtain the assistance they need.137
Even if investigators obtain the assistance they need and
can trace an attack to its point of origin, this may not markedly
advance their effort to identify the attacker.138 Investigators in
the BIS case ascertained that the attacks came from servers in
China, but this information could neither directly nor inferentially establish who was responsible for the attacks or, indeed,
what kind of attacks they were.139
In sum, while point of attack origin can play a role in identifying the attackers in a cybercrime or cyberterrorism event,
its function tends to be limited, and will probably become more
so as cyber-attackers become more sophisticated about hiding
their tracks.140
b. Point of Attack Occurrence
For real-world warfare, point of attack occurrence is the
essential complement to point of attack origin: point of attack
origin tells us which country initiated war; point of attack occurrence tells us which country is the “victim.”141
As with point of attack origin, the point of attack occurrence calculus becomes ambiguous when war migrates
online.142 Consider the BIS attacks: they occurred in the United
States. What, if anything, does that tell us about who is responsible for them?143
We will assume the attacks originated in Guangdong, China.144 Can we infer that cyber-attacks originating in China and
occurring in the United States represent acts of war attributable to the Chinese government?145 Unlike real-world acts of
war, we do not have the presence of enemy personnel and ar136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 152.
141. The discussion in this Part is taken from CYBER-THREATS, supra note
7, at 156–61.
142. Id. at 156.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.

BRENNER_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

160

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

2/7/2013 10:57 AM

[Vol. 14:1

mament on United States soil.146 We have only the virtual
“presence” of signals, which traveled through cyberspace by
routine means, the same means used by civilian and government traffic every second of every day.147 The signals bear neither state insignia nor other markers of nation-state allegiance.148 Our only bases for concluding they constitute
components of an attack by China are their point of origin,
their geographic destination, and the nature of the harm they
inflicted (damage to United States government computers).149
We have already analyzed the ambiguity involved in determining point of attack origin.150 Here, the point of attack occurrence is not ambiguous; we know it occurred in the United
States.151 The ambiguity lies in the implications of this point of
occurrence.152 In the real world, the occurrence of an act of war
on Nation-State A’s territory is equivalent to a declaration of
war by the state responsible for the attack because war has historically been about territory.153 The violation of one nationstate’s territorial integrity by agents of another nation-state is
a challenge to its ability to maintain external order.154
In the real world, the singular inference to be drawn from
an attack originating in the territory of one nation-state and
occurring inside the territory of another is war.155 Real-world
trans-border attacks have been equated with war because only
nation-states could launch such attacks.156
Cyberspace changes that: we cannot infer from the mere
fact that the attacks targeted computers on United States soil
that they are the equivalent of Hitler invading Poland.157 In
utilizing point of attack occurrence in attacker-attribution, we
must modify the assumption that equates trans-border attacks
with war so it incorporates a basic reality of the online envi146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 157.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ronment: United States government and civilian computers are
attacked because they are attractive targets for criminals, terrorists, and, ultimately, perhaps, nation-states bent on war.158
Since United States computers are attractive targets for all
three categories of attackers, any of whom can launch transborder attacks, the mere fact an externally-launched attack occurs “in” the United States cannot sustain the conclusion that
the attack was an act of war on the part of the nation-state
from whose territory it originated.159
That brings us to crime/terrorism: point of attack occurrence is an integral component of attacker-attribution for
both.160 Investigations concentrate on the place where the attack occurred.161 As noted earlier, this investigative model is
based on the assumption that the players in the attack dynamic
occupied shared real-space; this assumption derives from the
fact that physical proximity is an essential prerequisite for the
commission of real-world crime or terrorism.162
Thus, point of attack occurrence plays a central role in investigating these real-world events.163 It is the most likely
source of physical evidence and eyewitness testimony that can
be used to identify an attacker and link him to the crime/act of
terrorism.164 The larger spatial context in which the crime scene resides provides a potential source of further testimony and
data that can become the basis of inferential linkages between
victim and attacker.165 The place where the attack occurs is
sometimes itself a source of inference as to the identity of an
attacker.166 If someone is murdered in a home with an armed
alarm system, this suggests the attacker knew the victim.167
Here, again, the importance of point of attack occurrence
diminishes as attacks move online.168 A real-space attacker’s
gaining entry to a home with an alarm system suggests the attacker knew the victim, but a cyberspace attacker’s gaining en-

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.
Id. at 157–58.
Id. at 159.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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try to a computer hooked to a cable modem does not.169 The
physical constraints that govern action in the real-world make
it eminently reasonable to draw certain inferences from the
place where an attack occurred; the absence of those constraints makes it problematic to predicate similar inferences on
the place where a virtual attack occurred.170 Cyberspace nullifies the influence of the three spatial dimensions that constrain
action in the real-world and, in so doing, erodes the significance
of place in attacker-attribution.171
Point of attack occurrence can still play some role in attacker-attribution for online crimes and terrorism because it is
part of a larger crime scene and will therefore contain evidence
that can be used in an attempt to track the perpetrator(s).172
Unlike a real-world crime scene, it is not self-contained; the evidence it contains is part of a sequence of digital evidence that
is strewn around cyberspace.173 Since the point of attack occurrence accounts for only part of the evidence, its role in the process of identifying the attacker is accordingly reduced.174
2. Attack-attribution
As noted earlier, attacker-attribution has historically been
problematic in the real world, at least for crime and terrorism,
but attack-attribution has not.175 This is due to the distinction
societies have drawn between internal and external threats.
Until relatively recently, the limitations of travel and state
monopolization of military-grade weaponry made it functionally
impossible for non-state actors to challenge a nation-state’s
ability to maintain its territorial integrity.176 External order
was a purely sovereign concern; nation-states challenged each
other in the international arena and resolved matters with military combat.177 Non-state actors were limited to challenging a
state’s ability to maintain internal order, i.e., by committing
crimes or acts of terrorism. This changes as activities move
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Id. at 160.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part II.C.1.
See supra Part II.C.1.
See supra Part II.C.1.
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online.
a. Real-space
Crime is easily identified because it involves the civilianon-civilian infliction of familiar categories of harm, such as
theft, murder, and arson.178 And as noted above, it tends to be
limited in scale because of the constraints physical reality imposes on action in the real-world. Crime usually involves oneto-one victimization, i.e., one perpetrator and one victim (at a
time).179
Real-world terrorism is usually easy to identify though it
often involves activity that would otherwise constitute crime.180
Real-world terrorism can usually be distinguished from crime
because (i) it seems irrational in that it has no obvious mundane motive, such as self-enrichment or revenge and (ii) the
scale on which it is committed often exceeds what we encounter
with crime.181
Real-world war is even easier to identify: when the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, no one who saw the attack could
have had the slightest doubt this was war––not crime, nor terrorism.182 The attackers wore military uniforms featuring Japan’s national insignia, flew the Japanese flag, used airplanes
and other weapons that were not available to civilians, and attacked military targets.183
b. Cyberspace
Our focus is now on identifying the nature of the BIS attacks. We begin by parsing what we know of them: they were
deliberate, orchestrated attacks, not computer malfunctions;
they targeted United States government computers and originated in China, perhaps in Guangdong, which may be associated with China’s cyberwar effort.184
The circumstances of the attacks suggest they were a sortie

178. CYBER-THREATS, supra note 7, at 76.
179. Id. at 21.
180. Id. at 76.
181. See id. at 40–41 (noting that terrorism is meant to serve ideological
purposes and make civilians feel vulnerable).
182. Id. at 75.
183. Id.
184. The discussion in this Part is adapted from At Light Speed, supra note
31, at 434–38.
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into cyberwar.185 As noted above, historically, an attack originating from one nation-state’s territory and terminating on the
territory of another presumptively constituted an act of war;186
this presumption suggests the BIS attacks were war.187 The validity of that conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the attacks targeted government computers; the nature of the target
inferentially supports the premise that the attacks were a foray
into cyberwarfare.188
While we do not know precisely what the BIS attacks were
meant to accomplish, we could logically infer that they were a
reconnaissance by China’s military, testing the security of
United States government computer systems.189 The problem is
that we cannot arrive at this conclusion with the requisite level
of confidence because the markers we must rely on take on an
ambiguity lacking in the real world.190 The fact the attacks
originated from the territory of another nation-state is a circumstance we can consider, but it carries much less weight
than in the real world, as noted above.191 The transnational aspect of the attack may, or may not, be significant; the same is
true of its originating in Guangdong and targeting computers
used by the United States government.192 For years Guangdong
has been producing hackers, and for years civilian hackers of
various nationalities have been exploring United States government computers.193 It is as possible that the attacks came
from student hackers in Guangdong as it is that they came
from the Chinese government.194
What if a BIS-style attack targeted a corporate computer

185. Id. at 434.
186. See supra Part II.C.1.b.
187. At Light Speed, supra note 31, at 435.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. (citing Is China Ground Zero for Hackers?, ZDNET (Aug. 29, 2001,
12:00
AM),
http://www.zdnet.com/news/is-china-ground-zero-for-hackers/
96486).
193. Id. (citing Colin Barker, The NASA Hacker: Scapegoat or Public Enemy?, ZDNET (July 13, 2005, 12:35 PM GMT), http://www.zdnet.com/the-nasahacker-scapegoat-or-public-enemy-3039208862/).
194. Id. (citing Is China Ground Zero for Hackers?, ZDNET (Aug. 29, 2001,
12:00
AM),
http://www.zdnet.com/news/is-china-ground-zero-for-hackers/
96486).

BRENNER_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

2/7/2013 10:57 AM

CYBER-THREATS

165

system?195 The nature of the target inferentially suggests it
was cybercrime, as we assume criminals attack other civilians.196 That conclusion would be reinforced if the attackers’ actions conformed to what we expect of cybercriminals, for example, if they extracted funds from corporate accounts or personal
information from databases.197 Since we assume civilians are
the targets of crime, not war, an attack such as this would almost certainly be construed as cybercrime.198
Relying too heavily on this assumption could be a mistake.199 The attack on a corporate entity could be cyberwar, not
cybercrime.200 China’s focus on cyberwar includes attacks on
civilian entities.201 If our default approach to attack attribution
continues to rely on the attacks-on-civilians-are-crime assumption, we will no doubt have a situation in which an act of
cyberwarfare is construed as cybercrime.202
An analogous, but perhaps less serious, problem arises if
the attack on our corporate entity is cyberterrorism.203 Cyberterrorist attacks are unlikely to be isolated incidents; a cyberterrorist event is more likely to be part of a sequence of attacks
that may be separated spatially or temporally, or both, and
that have different points of origin.204 The attack appears to be
cybercrime, and except for serial killers and the odd career robber or serial arsonist, law enforcement is not accustomed to approaching a crime as part of a sequence.205 This means the response to the components of a sequenced cyberterrorism attack
would probably be discrete and isolated; officers in different locations would respond to incidents without realizing they were
part of a larger attack.206
This problem arises because of our partitioned responsibility for responding to crime/terrorism versus warfare and be-

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. at 436.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 437.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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cause we tend to assume crime is a localized phenomenon.207 A
subsidiary factor contributing to the problem is that the markers we rely on to differentiate crime/terrorism from war in the
real world are absent or unreliable when it comes to virtual attacks.208 In the real world, we rely on three markers to determine the nature of an attack, two of which we have already discussed: (i) point of attack origin; (ii) point of attack occurrence;
and (iii) motive for an attack.209
As we have seen, the utility of the first two markers erodes
as attacks migrate online.210 The same is also true, but in a different way and for different reasons, for the third factor.211
Technology enhances our ability to inflict harm, but does not
alter the human psyche; unless and until technology transforms us into cyborgs or some other variety of post-human life,
it is reasonable to assume the motives that have historically
driven us to inflict harm will continue to account for our doing
so, on- or offline.212 Motive is and will continue to be a valid differentiating factor for cyber-attacks: profit drives most crime,
ideology drives terrorism, and nation-state rivalries have historically driven warfare.213 The difficulty arises not with our
ability to rely on established motivations as a “marker” that inferentially indicates the nature of an attack; it arises instead
with our ability to ascertain the motive behind a specific attack.214
We know what the BIS attackers did, but we cannot ascertain why they did it.215 This is likely to be true for many future
attacks as well; while the motive behind what are almost certainly routine cybercrime incidents is usually apparent (e.g.,
greed or revenge), that may not always be true.216 Terrorists,
for example, are increasingly using cybercrime to finance their
real-world efforts, which give us a mixed-motive scenario: the

207. Id.
208. Id. at 438.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. (citing Nathan Thornburgh, The Invasion of the Chinese Cyberspies, TIME, Sept. 5, 2005, at 34).
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motive for committing cybercrimes is profit, a criminal motive,
but the motive for obtaining the profit is to engage in acts of
terrorism, a noncriminal motive.217 It is also increasingly possible that nonstate actors could commit cybercrimes to obtain the
money needed to launch cyber-attacks on a nation-state.
D. IMPLICATIONS
Nation-states control internal threats by adopting laws
that proscribe certain behaviors (“crimes”) and imposing sanctions on those who engage in such behaviors.218 And, as we saw
above, they use a similar strategy to control external threats:
nation-states arm themselves in an effort to discourage other
nation-states from attacking them, and they use their military
might to repel attacks, if and when they are launched.219
The efficacy of both strategies depends on a state’s ability
to respond effectively to a threat.220 Responding requires that a
state be able to (i) identify the nature of the threat and (ii) implement measures designed to resolve it as efficiently and effectively as possible.221 As noted above, many countries—
particularly the United States—use a bifurcated response system: Law enforcement responds (only) to internal threats
(crime or terrorism), and the military responds (only) to external threats (war).222 The bifurcation is a function of both pragmatism (e.g., military weaponry is generally unsuited for civilian law enforcement purposes) and policy (e.g., a bifurcated
system is considered to be a mainstay of democracy).223
Historically, bifurcating response processes was not a problematic strategy because internal and external threats are
readily distinguishable in the physical world. Once a state determined the nature of a threat (internal or external), it took
steps to resolve it and prevent the occurrence of other, similar
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id.
Id. at 430.
See CYBER-THREATS, supra note 7, at 165–74.
The discussion of threat response tactics is adapted from CYBERTHREATS, supra note 7, at 163–99.
221. Id. at 184.
222. See id. at 164–76.
223. See THE MILITARY IN THE SERVICE OF SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY: THE
CHALLENGE OF THE DUAL-ROLE MILITARY 4–5 (Daniella Ashkenazy ed., 1994).
But see DIANA CECELIA WEBER, CATO INST, BRIEFING PAPER NO. 50, WARRIOR
COPS: THE OMINOUS GROWTH OF PARAMILITARISM IN AMERICAN POLICE
DEPARTMENTS 2 (1999) (the war on drugs encouraged the “militarization of
law enforcement in America”).
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threats. Bifurcated response processes become problematic as
threats move into cyberspace because they assume that law enforcement officers or military personnel can easily determine
whether a threat is internal or external. As we have seen, that
assumption breaks down as threat activity moves into cyberspace because the threat categories (and attendant threat identification processes) assume conduct in the physical world.
As state and non-state threat entities increasingly utilize
cyberspace in their attacks, it becomes increasingly difficult to
differentiate crime, terrorism, and warfare. As we saw above,
the indicators traditionally used to identify the various types of
attacks become less reliable as attacks migrate into cyberspace
because they assume activity in the real world. If potential responders cannot reliably ascertain the nature of a threat, they
may not respond to it, may not respond soon enough, or may
respond when they should not. In other words, the ambiguity of
online threat activity not only erodes our ability to identify
threats, it also erodes our ability to respond to them.
Assume, for example, that FBI agents discover an ongoing,
BIS-style attack on the computer system used by another federal agency, such as the air traffic control system. The agents
conclude the attacks are coming from a location in China that
is associated with both China’s military preparation for
cyberwar and university student hackers. If the attacks are cybercrime or cyberterrorism, the FBI can and must respond to
them.224 If they constitute war, the United States military must

224. As noted earlier, law enforcement’s response to cybercrime and cyberterrorism is usually ex post, i.e., officers apprehend the perpetrators, who are
arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and punished. See At Light Speed, supra note
31, at 430. The FBI can pursue this strategy if it is confident that the attacks
are cybercrime or cyberterrorism, but it might not want to wait until the attacks culminate in the infliction of massive harm on United States targets. It
might want to intervene, just as FBI agents intervene when they encounter a
real world crime in progress.
FBI agents might try to block the attacks by shutting down or sealing
off the computer systems they target, but if the target is the air traffic control
system, that solution might prove more harmful than the attacks. If we assume the FBI could somehow launch a counterattack that would block the incoming attack signals or attack and incapacitate the computers from which
they originate, we would then have to determine if such a tactic was lawful
under United States and international law.
If the targeted computers were in China, the FBI would essentially
have created a mirror image of the scenario with which the FBI agents are
dealing. That is, computers in China would be coming under attack from sig-
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respond.
Given the nature of the attacks and the potential harm involved if they continue, the FBI has little time in which to decide whether they are crime or terrorism or war. The FBI utilizes the analysis examined above, i.e., they consider the place
from which the attacks originate, the place where they occur,
and the motive. The FBI is fairly certain the attacks originate
in China, but cannot rule out the possibility they originate
elsewhere and are merely being routed through China.225 The
FBI is certain that the attacks target a United States government agency and, consequently, threaten serious harm to United States civilians.
FBI agents cannot ascertain the motive for the attack with
any certainty; there has been no extortion demand, which could
indicate the attacks are not cybercrime. The FBI cannot link
the circumstances of the attacks or the apparent sources of the
attacks to known terrorist groups or to the Chinese government. The FBI therefore has neither direct nor inferential evidence indicating the attacks are cyberterrorism or cybercrime.
Unless and until the FBI can determine they are neither, FBI
agents cannot involve United States military personnel, because of the bifurcation noted earlier, i.e., under United States
law, military personnel cannot participate in law enforcement.226
The FBI could presumably alert the military to the occurrence of the attacks and let the military conduct its own as-

nals originating in the United States, more precisely, from a federal government agency’s computers in the United States. One downside of this tactic,
then, is that it could give rise to more or less credible claims by China that the
United States had launched cyberwarfare attacks against that country.
Another alternative downside is that if the FBI were to block the signals or attack the computers from which they originate, or both, this would
constitute a crime under Chinese law, which means China could legitimately
demand that the United States turn the agents over to be prosecuted in China.
See PROJECT ON CYBERCRIME, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, CYBERCRIME
LEGISLATION—PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 10 (2008) [hereinafter PROJECT
ON CYBERCRIME], available at http://www.coe.int/t/dg1/legalcooperation
/economiccrime/cybercrime/Documents/CountryProfiles/567LEGcountry%20profile%20China%20PR%20_28%20Mar%2008_.pdf. An FBI
investigation conducted some years ago prompted such a response. See, e.g.,
FSB Hopes to Bring to Court Case against FBI Agents, INTERFAX, Oct. 10,
2002, available at 2002 WLNR 14527663; Russia: FSB Charges FBI with
Hacking, INFOPROD, Aug. 25, 2002, available at 2002 WLNR 3203882.
225. See supra Part II.C.2.b.
226. See CYBER-THREATS, supra note 7, at 17–18, 177–78.
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sessment of the nature of the attacks and need for and propriety of the military responding to them. To avoid the need to consider whether such action would violate any aspect of United
States law, we will assume the military is already aware of the
attacks and has been conducting its own attempt to ascertain
whether they are cybercrime, cyberterrorism, or cyberwarfare.
We will assume the military has only the information that is
available to the FBI, which means its analysis of the nature of
the attacks will essentially mirror that of the FBI.
Since the nature of the attacks is inconclusive, the military
will need to weigh the risk of responding (perhaps erroneously)
against the risk of not responding.227 Since war threatens a nation-state’s existence, the military may decide the risk of responding outweighs the risk of doing nothing. If it responds,
the response will constitute an act of cyberwarfare, the legality
of which depends on whether it is offensive or defensive
cyberwarfare.228
The military will argue that the response constitutes defensive cyberwarfare because they were responding to acts of
cyberwar initiated by the Chinese government. Depending on
227. The FBI faces a similar decision, but the risk of responding erroneously is not as significant in the law enforcement context as it is for the military.
See supra note 224. If FBI agents responded to the attacks by blocking signals
or attacking the computers from which they originated, that could be construed as an act of cyberwar. See supra note 224. The fact that agents of the
United States government launched the attacks would militate in favor of
finding that they constitute cyberwar, since war consists of attacks launched
by agents of a sovereign entity. But while agents of the United States government launched the attacks, the agents were not members of the U.S. armed
forces and, as we saw earlier, only the military “commits” war. See supra Part
II.A.2; At Light Speed, supra note 31, at 402, 433.
That raises another issue: since only the military can legitimately
wage war, the FBI agents might find themselves being defined as unlawful
combatants under the laws of war, which has adverse consequences. See, e.g.,
Brenner & Clarke, supra note 40, at 1022–23.
If China realized the attacks were coming from law enforcement, rather than the military, that should negate the conclusion that they constituted
warfare. If the FBI agents realized their counterattacks could be construed as
cyberwar, they could ask the Chinese to do something to resolve them. If Chinese officials did not, the FBI could alert China that they would be using selfhelp in an attempt to resolve the situation. That would presumably negate the
inference that they constituted cyberwarfare, but it would simply underscore
the fact that the FBI agents were about to embark on activity that constituted
a crime under Chinese law. See supra note 224.
228. See Brenner & Clarke, supra note 40, at 1030–31 (explaining that Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter “outlaws aggressive war”).
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the circumstances, the Chinese government may argue (perhaps quite accurately) that it was not responsible for the attacks that resulted in the United States military’s attacking
computer systems in China. If China truly was not responsible
for the attacks, the United States military’s response will constitute offensive cyberwarfare; and since offensive warfare is
unlawful under the laws of warfare, it has committed an illegal
act.229
These may not be the only scenarios the facts outlined
above can support. But I assume they suffice to illustrate my
point: a nation-state’s ability to respond effectively to a threat
ultimately depends on its ability to reliably and expeditiously
ascertain what type of threat is at issue. As the Parts above
demonstrate, when our activities migrate into cyberspace, it
becomes correspondingly difficult for nation-states to ascertain
the nature of the threats they confront. And as the examples
above illustrate, if nation-states cannot reliably ascertain the
nature of threats, their ability to respond is impaired, which
reduces the disincentives to engage in threat activity.230 That,
in turn, erodes a nation-state’s ability to deter and thereby control cyber-threats.
It is highly unlikely that the threat identification and response issues outlined above are a transient phenomenon. It is
more likely that they will increase in incidence and complexity
as our use of computer technology becomes more complex and
more pervasive. If that speculation is accurate, we have two
choices: we can continue to rely on our current threat identification and response processes for real-world threats and consign cyberspace to the status of outlaw territory, i.e., a “place”
in which no state attempts to maintain order. That option is
appealing if one assumes, as I do not, that it is possible to seg229. See id. If the U.S. military’s attacking the Chinese computers was not
deemed to be an act of war, it could be construed as a crime under Chinese
law. See PROJECT ON CYBERCRIME, supra note 224, at 10.
230. It can also reduce the effectiveness of responses by delaying them until some or all of the intended harm has been inflicted. See CYBER-THREATS,
supra note 7, at 94–98.
The scenario analyzed above simplifies the issues that arise with regard to United States response to cyber-threats in at least one respect: it assumes the only players are the Unites States military and the FBI. In reality
such an event would be likely to also involve state or local law enforcement
officers, or both, and, perhaps, agents from other federal agencies, as well as
FBI agents. The involvement of officers from additional state, local, and federal agencies would further exacerbate the command and control and response
issues involved in dealing with an attack of the type hypothesized above.
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regate cyberspace from real space; as we saw above, activity in
cyberspace has consequences for the physical world. Abandoning cyberspace to lawlessness would only increase the threat
activity originating in that domain.
The other choice is to modify our threat identification and
response processes in a fashion that improves their ability to
respond effectively to cyberthreats. Part III examines some efforts that seek to do precisely this.
III. IMPROVED THREAT CONTROL: CURRENT EFFORTS
[O]ur cyber-defenses are woefully lacking.231
The discussion in Part II implicitly assumed that cyberspace is the only factor that is eroding the efficacy of the bifurcated threat-response systems nation-states rely upon to control threats to their existence. That may be true for some
countries, but not for the United States. As noted earlier, its
arsenal of threat-control structures is larger and more complex
than those of other countries.232 Over the last century, the escalating size and complexity of the U.S. threat-control bureaucracies has increasingly come to impede the efficacy with which
the country responds to threats of various types.233
In its final report, the 9/11 Commission explained how the
balkanized federal bureaucracies severally charged with responding to terrorism and other national security threats unintentionally impeded that process by independently pursuing
their respective, often overlapping, agendas.234 In summarizing
the problems, the authors of the report noted that they “learned
of the pervasive problems of managing and sharing information
across a large and unwieldy government that had been built in
a different era to confront different dangers.”235 They also explained that the threat landscape had evolved in the years
since these institutions were created, so the country now “confronts . . . challenges that surpass the boundaries of traditional
231. Mike McConnell, To Win the Cyber-war, Look to the Cold War, WASH.
POST, Feb. 28, 2010, at B1.
232. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text. For the emergence and
early growth of bureaucracy in this country, see, e.g., James Q. Wilson, The
Rise of the Bureaucratic State, 41 PUB. INTEREST 77, 77–79, 81–91 (1975).
234. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 399–403; see also id. at 73–
102 (describing the roles of each agency).
235. Id. at xvi.
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nation-states and call for quick, imaginative, and agile responses.”236 In making that observation, the authors of the 9/11
Commission report were, of course, referring to real-space terrorism.
Members of Congress and other officials have since come to
realize that the need for such “quick, imaginative, and agile responses” is not limited to the real-space terrorism context. The
parts below therefore examine three efforts to meet this need in
the context of cyberthreats.
A. CYBER COMMANDS
This subpart examines how the U.S. military is attempting
to improve its efficacy in dealing with the cyberthreats that
currently fall within its area of responsibility.237 As I explain
below, this effort involves a series of “Cyber Commands.”
1. Creation
“On June 23, 2009, the Secretary of Defense directed the
Commander of U.S. Strategic Command to establish U.S. Cyber
Command,”238 which achieved “Initial Operational Capability”
on May 21, 2010.239 This particular Cyber Command is “a subunified command” that is “subordinate to U.S. Strategic Command” and is composed of the Air Force’s Cyber Command, the
Army’s Cyber Command, the Navy’s Fleet Cyber Command, the
Marine Corps’ Cyberspace Command, and the Coast Guard’s
Cyber Command.240
To appreciate why Cyber Command was (apparently) established, it is necessary to understand how its subsidiary
236. Id. at 399.
237. As Part II explained, the military is responsible for protecting the nation from external attacks launched by hostile nation-states.
STRATEGIC
COMMAND,
238. U.S.
Cyber
Command,
U.S.
http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/cyber_command (last updated Dec. 2011).
The U.S. Strategic Command is “a unified command” that is designed “to
adapt to the changing international political and military landscape . . . .” FreS.
STRATEGIC
COMMAND,
quently
Asked
Questions,
U.
http://www.stratcom.mil/faq (last visited Nov. 5, 2012).
239. U.S. Cyber Command, supra note 238.
240. Id. Interestingly, the Cyber Command “fact sheet” only lists the first
four entities (Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marines) as Cyber Command subunits. Id. But see U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY
OPERATING
IN
CYBERSPACE
5
(2011),
available
at
FOR
http://www.defense.gov/news/d20110714cyber.pdf (indicating that Coast
Guard Cyber Command is part of U.S. Cyber Command). I will assume the
Coast Guard Cyber Command is, indeed, a Cyber Command component.
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commands came into existence. The process began in 2005
when the Air Force amended its Mission Statement to state
that it will “fly and fight” in cyberspace, as well as in air and
space.241 In 2006 the Secretary of the Air Force announced the
development of the Air Force Cyber Command, which was to
become operational in 2007, but the date was pushed back to
October of 2008.242 At the time, it seemed the Air Force was
staking out responsibility for cyberspace, just as it had earlier
done for “air” and “space.”243 Then the Air Force put the project
on hold to “make a fresh assessment” of the proper approach to
establishing a cyber command.244 On August 19, 2009, Air
Force Cyber Command became part of the Air Force Space
Command.245
The Marine Corps’ Cyberspace Command was established
on January 21, 2010 to protect and defend “the nation’s cyberinfrastructure.”246 It “join[ed] a growing list of [Department of
Defense] agencies now tasked to support the government’s
Cyber Command effort.”247 A little over a week later—on January 29, 2010—the Navy’s Tenth Fleet, which had been an antisubmarine unit during World War II, was reactivated as the
Fleet Cyber Command.248 It “provid[es] operational support to
241. See Mitch Gettle, Air Force Releases New Mission Statement, AF.MIL
(Dec. 8, 2005), http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123013440. The prior version stated that the Air Force fought in air and space (only). See id.
242. See RICHARD MESIC ET AL., RAND CORP., AIR FORCE CYBER COMMAND
(PROVISIONAL) DECISION SUPPORT
at
iii
(2010),
available
at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG935.1.pdf; Todd Lopez,
Air Force Leaders to Discuss New ‘Cyber Command,’ AF.MIL (Oct. 5, 2006),
http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123028524.
243. See C. Todd Lopez, Cyber Summit Begins at Pentagon Nov. 16, AF.MIL
(Nov. 15, 2006), http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123032005 (noting
“[c]yberspace became an official Air Force domain, like air and space, on Dec.
7, 2005” when the new Mission Statement was introduced).
244. On Pause, But Not Abandoning, AIRFORCE-MAGAZINE.COM (Aug. 14,
2008), http://www.airforce-magazine.com/DRArchive/Pages/default.aspx (follow “2008” hyperlink; then follow “Thursday, August, 14, 2008” hyperlink).
245. Carla Pampe, Air Force Activates Cyber Numbered Air Force, 24TH AIR
FORCE (Aug. 19, 2009), http://www.24af.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123163975.
246. Alan J. McCombs, Marines Launch into Cyberspace Mission with New
(Jan.
28,
2010),
http://www.army.mil
Command,
ARMY.MIL
/article/33744/Marines_launch_into_cyberspace_mission_with_new_command.
247. Id.
248. Navy Stands Up Fleet Cyber Command, Reestablishes U.S. 10th Fleet,
(Jan.
29,
2010,
6:48
PM),
http://www.navy.mil
NAVY.MIL
/search/display.asp?story_id=50954.
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Navy commanders worldwide” for “information and computer
network operations, electronic warfare and space.”249 The Coast
Guard’s Cyber Command was created in June or July 2010.250
Its mission is to protect Coast Guard computer systems and data, to aid in Coast Guard missions, and to protect the marine
transportation system and critical infrastructure from cyberattacks.251 Finally, on October 1, 2010 the Army established its
Cyber Command that “plans, coordinates, integrates, synchronizes, directs, and conducts network operations and defense of
all Army networks.”252
To an observer, it might seem peculiar that all five branches of the United States military found it necessary to establish
a unit-specific cyber command and do so in a relatively truncated time frame. The explanation for this phenomenon lies in
249. Joseph E. Sisson, Fleet Cyber Command/TENTH Fleet: Enabling
Cyber Unity of Effort 14 (May 3, 2010) (unpublished student work, Naval War
College),
available
at
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=
U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA525307.
250. See Amber Corrin, Cyber Command Lays Groundwork for Rapid Deployment of Resources, GOV’T COMPUTER NEWS (July 9, 2010),
http://gcn.com/articles/2010/07/09/cyber-command-panel-afceasymposium.aspx; Geoff Fein, Cyber Commands Gain Traction, Services Vulnerable To Power Grid Attacks, DEF. DAILY, May 6, 2010, available at 2010
WLNR 10703214. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 240, at 5 (noting the existence of the Coast Guard Cyber Command and its inclusion in
Cyber Command).
251. A 2011 article noted that the Coast Guard Cyber Command was then
“still in its infancy and awaiting a final stamp of approval.” Eric Beidel, Coast
Guard Cyberdefense Office: Small But Mighty, NAT’L DEF. (Nov. 2011),
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2011/November/Pages/Coast
GuardCyberdefenseOfficeSmallbutMighty.aspx. More interestingly, the article
notes:
Navy ships often carry Coast Guard detachments because
the larger service can’t board vessels for law enforcement
purposes. Officials are pondering what the equivalent of
such actions would be in cyberspace. The smallest service’s
title authorities place it at the crossroads of defense, homeland security and law enforcement missions. That versatility could prove crucial to a government that is still trying to
figure out exactly how it should handle the spectrum of operations in cyberspace, officials say. After all, there may be
situations when U.S. Cyber Command just can’t pull the
trigger on a law enforcement measure, but the Coast Guard
can.
Id. This aspect of the Coast Guard Cyber Command’s mission may explain
why its role in the nation’s cybersecurity efforts has received little, if any, publicity since it was created.
ARMY
CYBER
COMMAND,
252. Army
Cyber,
U.S.
http://www.arcyber.army.mil/org-arcyber.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2012).
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two unrelated factors, one of which is that the threat of
cyberwar received a great deal of media attention in the year or
so prior to the Air Force’s revising its mission statement.253 The
publicity raised awareness of the need for a cyberwar response
effort, and “Air Force leaders” decided their branch should be
“the lead service in cyber warfare” (for reasons I speculate
about in a moment).254 This, plus the creation of the Air Force
Cyber Command, triggered a turf war among the various
branches, which resulted in the creation of five idiosyncratic,
yet substantially overlapping, cyber commands.255
That brings us to the second factor that contributed to this
state of affairs: the United States has five military branches,
each with a distinct legacy mission, because of history. Armies,
like the United States Army, evolved to fight land battles; navies, like the United States Navy, evolved to fight sea battles;256 the United States Marines evolved as an amphibious
fighting force;257 the United States Coast Guard was created to
control smuggling and has evolved into a maritime law enforcement agency that can also perform military functions;258
and the U.S. Air Force evolved to conduct military operations in
the air.259

253. See, e.g., CIA Official Says Cybersecurity Threats Evolving Faster than
Defense, INSIDE PENTAGON, (July 29, 2004), available at 2004 WLNR 82077;
U.S. Government Well Defended against Cyber-Attacks, State Says, U.S. DEP’T
OF ST. (Aug. 26, 2005), http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/
2005/08/20050826145518tjkcollub0.7742426.html#axzz28CEVskw7;
Gerald
Sonnenberg, Communicators Train to Face Enemies on Digital Battlefield,
AF.MIL (Dec. 13, 2004), http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123009398.
254. See Robert F. Dorr, New Mission Statement Isn’t Really for Airmen,
AIR FORCE TIMES, Dec. 26, 2005, at 38.
255. See id. (stating that the Air Force’s desire to be the dominant service
in cyberspace was “about turf,” specifically about its rivalry with the Navy);
Shane Harris, The Cyberwar Plan, NAT’L J., Nov. 14, 2009, at 18, 22 (explaining that the four branches “competed with one another to control the military’s
overall strategy”); Kevin Coleman, Inside the Cyber Command Turf Battle,
DEF. TECH (Aug.15, 2008), http://defensetech.org/2008/08/15/inside-the-cybercommand-turf-battle.
256. See Natasha Solce, The Battlefield of Cyberspace: The Inevitable New
Military Branch—The Cyber Force, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 293, 314 (2008).
257. See Mission, THEUSMARINES.COM, http://www.theusmarines.com/
mission (last visited Nov. 5, 2012).
258. See Missions, USCG.MIL, http://www.uscg.mil/top/missions (last visited Nov. 5, 2012).
259. See History, AIRFORCE.COM, http://www.airforce.com/learn-about
/history (last visited Nov. 5, 2012).
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This segmentation of responsibility for responding to external threats is a logical strategy in a world in which threats
are territorially based.260 In that world, the response to an external threat, e.g., the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, focuses on a clearly identifiable enemy and, at least for the United
States, has for the most part been conducted offshore. In an era
dominated by territorially-based threat activity, it was reasonable to divide the response into (i) engaging the enemy on land,
(ii) engaging the enemy at sea, (iii) engaging the enemy in and
by virtue of exploiting airspace, and (iv) ensuring the naval response effort could support the delivery of land forces when and
as needed. The Coast Guard’s role has historically involved
more law enforcement and other nonmilitary activities, but it is
officially a branch of the United States armed services and operates under the authority of the Navy when the country is at
war.261
As we saw in Part II, threats are no longer necessarily
land-based; they transcend national boundaries. The change in
this aspect of threats has consequences for the bifurcated
threat-control system on which sovereign entities continue to
rely. Aside from anything else, it raises two issues, one of which
is a subset of the other. The broader issue is whether the bifurcated external-internal262 threat response approach is still viable in the twenty-first century. If it is still viable, the second issue is how the bifurcated approach can be reconfigured to
improve the United States’ approach to defending against
cyber-threats.
We will not address the first issue because an analysis of
the overall efficacy of the bifurcated-response approach is outside the scope of this article for two reasons, the first of which
is that such an analysis cannot focus exclusively on cyberthreats. It must also encompass land-based threats and, as
noted above, the bifurcated approach remains a satisfactory
way to control these threats, which will persist.263 It would
260. See supra Part II.
261. See 14 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); see also Missions, supra note 258.
262. I shall continue to use these terms to differentiate crime/terrorism and
war even though they are not entirely accurate as threats migrate into cyberspace. See supra Part II.
263. As to why they will persist, see, e.g., Criminal Law for Cyberspace,
supra note 7, at 45–46. It is reasonable to assume, at least for the present,
that certain crimes, such as rape, assault, and theft of tangible items, will necessarily be confined to the physical world. It is also reasonable to assume that
intrasovereign conflicts will continue to emphasize kinetic force, as well as
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therefore be imprudent to decide that nation-states should jettison a strategy that is still effective against what will no doubt
continue to be, if not the most common, the most serious
threats they confront because it is not a satisfactory way to
control cyber-threats.264 Conversely, it would be equally imprudent to conclude that because the bifurcated approach is an effective way to deal with land-based threats, we should continue
to employ it for all threats, despite its relative inefficacy
against cyber-threats. There is, however, a third option: conclude that the bifurcated approach (i) is effective against landbased threats but (ii) is not, at least as it is currently configured, effective against cyber-threats, and (iii) develop a new
approach for dealing with cyber-threats.
That brings me to the other reason why we are not pursuing the broader issue noted above. My purpose in writing this
article is to analyze the extent to which the way we currently
structure the bifurcated approach actually impedes our ability
to address cyber-threats and to speculate about whether we can
modify that structure and thereby improve this approach’s efficacy against cyber-threats. This undertaking differs from the
first two options noted above, both of which focus on the overall
viability of a bifurcated approach and therefore require a zerosum resolution: we would either (i) decide that the bifurcated
approach is our only option and therefore retain it for both
land-based and cyber-threats, or (ii) decide that because it is
not effective (enough) against cyber-threats we must resort to
an alternative, presumably a unitary approach in which a single institution is responsible for controlling all threats.
As I noted in Part II.D, the first option is unacceptable because it would consign cyberspace to a state of lawlessness. As
to the second option, I, for one, do not see the need for such
drastic action.265 I think the preferable course is to concede that
the bifurcated approach, as it is currently configured, is not effective against cyber-threats and then analyze how it can be reconfigured to improve its efficacy in this regard.
cyberforce, at least to the extent that one sovereign seeks to expand its control
over physical territory and assets.
264. As to why the approach is not effective in controlling cyber-threats,
see supra Part II.
265. Relying on a unitary entity to conduct both law enforcement and military functions would violate federal law and, perhaps, the Constitution. See
CYBER-THREATS, supra note 7, at 164–76.
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I see this as the most pressing, and more manageable, of
the two issues. The remainder of this Part undertakes the first
task noted above: it reviews how the U.S. structures the bifurcated approach and analyzes the extent to which this impedes
the country’s response to cyber-threats. Part III.A.2 examines
the military, Part III.B examines law enforcement, and Part
III.C reviews proposed legislation that is designed to incorporate civilian participation into the efforts of either or both. Part
IV then speculates about how we might modify this structure
and thereby improve the bifurcated approach’s efficacy against
cyber-threats.
2. Analysis
As we saw above, the U.S. military now has six cyber
commands: one for each of the respective branches of the military, plus the overarching Cyber Command.266 As we also saw
above, each of the five branches (i) was created to carry out a
distinctive component of land-based warfare, and (ii) has
adopted a mission statement for its cyber command that summarizes what that command is intended to accomplish:
• The Air Force’s cyber command fights and flies in
cyberspace.267
• The Marine Corp’s cyber command defends the nation’s cyberinfrastructure.268
• The Navy’s cyber command provides operational
support to Navy commanders engaged in
cyberwarfare.269
• The Coast Guard’s cyber command protects the marine transportation system and critical infrastructure from cyberwarfare.270
• The Army’s cyber command plans, coordinates, and
conducts cyberwarfare.271
As noted in Part III.A.1, the legacy missions of the branches overlap, at least to some extent, when the United States is at
war because they work together to defeat the enemy. Their con266. See supra Part III.A.1. From this point forward, I will use “cyber
command” to denote one of the branch cyberunits and “Cyber Command” to
denote the overarching entity.
267. See Dorr, supra note 254.
268. See McCombs, supra note 246.
269. See Sisson, supra note 249, at 14.
270. See Beidel, supra note 251.
271. See Army Cyber, supra note 252.
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tributions are not, of course indistinguishable. In wartime four
of the branches (Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Navy)
have a specific, complementary role to play, and the Coast
Guard becomes part of the Navy.272
Logically, then, it is reasonable to assume that the respective cyber commands will play a correlate role in cyberwarfare,
i.e., each will have a distinctive contribution to make to such an
effort. But if we parse their respective missions, that does not
appear to be the case. Three of the mission statements—the Air
Force’s, the Navy’s, and the Army’s—simply state that the
branch’s cyber command will participate in cyberwarfare; they
in no way differentiate the contributions each will make to that
effort.273 The Marine Corps’ and Coast Guard’s mission statements can be interpreted the same way.274
This inferentially suggests that there is no doctrinal or operational differentiation among the roles the respective commands would play in cyberspace.275 The validity of that inference is further supported by the fact that “cyberspace” denotes
an experiential, rather than spatial, phenomenon.276 There is,
272. See supra notes 256–261 and accompanying text.
273. Cf. supra notes 267, 269, 271 and accompanying text.
274. Cf. supra notes 268, 270 and accompanying text. One could argue that
by pledging to defend or protect the country’s critical infrastructure the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard might be pledging to utilize kinetic force, as
well as cyberforce, in this regard. The other mission statements seem to contemplate only nonkinetic activity. For the present, there is, at least, a tacit assumption that cyberforce will be met only with cyberforce, to avoid the risks of
escalating a digital conflict into something more devastating. See Cyber Warfare: Rising Risks and Implications, EMERGING MARKETS ONLINE, Sept. 13,
2010, available at 2010 WLNR 18254196; Tod Leaven & Christopher Dodge,
The United States Cyber Command: International Restrictions vs. Manifest
Destiny, 12 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE 1, 18–24 (2010) (discussing responding
to and retaliation against cyber-attacks).
275. See Eric Beidel, Disjointed, Redundant Cybersecurity Programs Undermine Efforts to Protect Networks, NAT’L DEF. (July 18, 2011, 10:54 AM),
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=470;
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-421, DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
CYBER EFFORTS: MORE DETAILED GUIDANCE NEEDED TO ENSURE MILITARY
SERVICES DEVELOP APPROPRIATE CYBERSPACE CAPABILITIES 17 (2011) (“The
military services are pursuing diverse service-specific approaches to establishing cyberspace capabilities because . . . U.S. Cyber Command has . . . not fully
defined long-term mission requirements and capabilities for [them] to fulfill.”).
276. See Joseph Schmitt & Peter Nikolai, Application of Personal Jurisdiction Principles of Electronic Commerce: A User’s Guide, 27 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1571, 1577–78 (2001) (referring to William Gibson’s use of “cyberspace”
to refer to “the non-existent space where computer communication takes
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therefore, no way to parse the respective branches’ contributions to a cyberwarfare effort according to the various “dimensions” of cyberspace.
The Department of Defense created Cyber Command because it recognized this problem.277 According to a knowledgeable source, the new command was created to take “operational
control of disparate cyber-security and attack units that had
been scattered among the four military services.”278
Cyber Command has so far made little progress toward
achieving this goal.279 In 2011 the Government Accountability
Office issued a report in that was strongly critical of Cyber
Command; among other things, the report said it needs to specify “the structure and duties of the Army, Navy, Air Force and
Marine cyber components.”280 A spokesman for Cyber Complace”); WILLIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER 51 (Ace Books 2000) (describing cyberspace as a “consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators . . . . A graphic representation of data abstracted from the
banks of every computer in the human system”).
277. See U.S. Cyber Command, supra note 238 (“The Command centralizes
direction of cyberspace operations . . . .”).
278. Seymour M. Hersh, The Online Threat, NEW YORKER, Nov. 1, 2010, at
44, 46. Cyber Command’s designated tasks are to lead “day-to-day defense and
protection of [Department of Defense] information networks; coordinate DoD
operations providing support to military missions; direct the operations and
defense of specified DoD information networks and; prepare to, and when directed, conduct full spectrum military cyberspace operations.” U.S. Cyber
DEP’T
DEF.
(May
25,
2010),
Command
Fact
Sheet,
U.S.
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2010/0410_cybersec/docs/cyberfactsheet
%20updated%20replaces%20may%2021%20fact%20sheet.pdf.
279. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 275, at 17
(May 2011) (commands “are pursuing diverse service-specific approaches to
establishing cyberspace capabilities because . . . Cyber Command has . . . not
fully defined long-term mission requirements and capabilities.”); see also Army
Cyber Command, 2011 ARMY POSTURE STATEMENT (last updated Mar. 21,
2011,
3:44
PM),
https://secureweb2.hqda.pentagon.mil/
VDAS_ArmyPostureStatement/2011/information_papers/PostedDocument.asp
?id=256 (describing how the army cyber command has incorporated “existing
cyberspace forces” into a new unit, U.S. Army Cyber Command/2d Army and
in 2011 “will stand up a Cyber Brigade” to expand its capability in cyberspace).
280. Lolita C. Baldor, Report Says Pentagon Should Boost Cyber Staff,
(June
20,
2011,
5:26
PM),
AIRFORCETIMES
http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2011/06/ap-military-pentagon-shouldboost-cyber-staff-report-says-062011. As one observer noted, “fissures between
the services and even within the cyber command make it hard to come up with
timetables to update policies, response plans and technology roadmaps.” Kevin
Fogarty, Is It Time for the Pentagon to Turn Cyberwar Over to Someone Else?,
(July
29,
2011,
12:00
AM),
ITWORLD
http://www.itworld.com/node/187699?source=cotd. “The overall picture the
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mand said it was addressing these issues, but “there is currently no ‘timeline for completion.’”281
Before Cyber Command was created, some members of the
military argued that branch-specific commands could not provide an effective cyberwar response system.282 They claimed the
“cultures of today’s military services are fundamentally incompatible with the culture required to conduct cyberwarfare.”283
And they contended that the “core skills” needed to wage
cyberwar differ radically from those needed for conventional
war.284 Those who subscribed to this view believed the better
approach was to create a new, cyber-specific branch of the military and assign it overall responsibility for cyber operations,
just as the Air Force was assigned responsibility for air operations.285
I suspect that view did not prevail because it would have
required the various branches to give up their cyber commands.
Since it has for some time been apparent that cyberspace can
be used for military purposes, I suspect the five branches were
reluctant to give up the opportunity to play a role in this new
theatre of combat. I also suspect that the proposal to create a
new, cyber-specific branch of the U.S. military may not have
prevailed because it would have been difficult, if not impossible,
to implement. As we saw above, the rationale for the different
branches is that each is responsible for military activity in a
specific spatial domain in the physical world.286 While the divisions are not precise, it is far easier to parse response authority
in a spatial context than it is with regard to cyberspace.287
Cyberspace operations do not take place in a physical
GAO paints is of fragmented military organization with no clear direction or
goal to pursue in cybersecurity.” Id.
281. Tiffany Kaiser, GAO Report: Pentagon Must Provide Better Training
for New Cyber Command Security System, DAILY TECH (June 21, 2011, 12:13
PM), http://www.dailytech.com/GAO+Report+Pentagon+Must+Provide+Better
+Training+for+New+Cyber+Command+Security+System/article21963.htm.
282. See, e.g., Gregory Conti & John “Buck” Surdu, Army, Navy, Air Force,
and Cyber—Is It Time for a Cyberwarfare Branch of Military?, 12
IANEWSLETTER 14, 16 (2009), available at http://www.rumint.org/gregconti/
publications/2009_IAN_12-1_conti-surdu.pdf.
283. Id.
284. See id.
285. See id. at 17.
286. See supra Part III.A.1.
287. See supra Part III.A.1.
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place; instead, they involve activity that occurs in and through
computer technology, which is pervasive in today’s world.288 If
the Department of Defense had chosen to create a distinct
branch with exclusive combat authority in cyberspace, it would
presumably mean this branch would take command of any and
all of the other branches’ activities that involved cyberspace. It
is difficult to see how this could be a viable strategy. It would
presumably mean, for example, that members of the cyberbranch would monitor, and probably control, the other branches’ computers and online activities (i) to ensure a baseline of security and (ii) to be in a position to respond if and when the
cyberbranch believed it necessary to deter or respond to
cyberwarfare attacks. That seems to be the only way to functionally allocate operational responsibility in cyberspace to a
new, cyber-specific branch of the U.S. military.
If that is, indeed, the only way to accomplish this, then instead of participating in a carefully-defined, complementary division of responsibility, such as the one the existing branches
currently represent, the hypothesized cyberbranch would essentially subsume the other branches as to its distinct area of
responsibility. That could be problematic. It might, for example,
create clashes of authority that could have negative consequences for the United States’ ability to respond to cyberattacks.289
This might be one of the reasons the Department of Defense apparently opted, instead, to create a distinct command
that unified the cyberspace components of the five traditional
branches of the military. This approach is fraught with its own
problems, the most obvious of which is coordinating the activi288. See, e.g., At Light Speed, supra note 31, at 401 (“Cyberwarefare is the
conduct of military operations by virtual means.”).
289. Assume, say, that a hostile state’s own cyberwarriors use “cyberattacks to alter data, such as logistics plans” stored in United States military
computers. Duncan B. Hollis, An E-SOS for Cyberspace, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J.
373, 389 (2011). Assume the plans at issue were created by and are to be used
by the United States Army; also assume that the hypothesized United States
Cyber Branch is in charge of the Army’s computers when the attack strikes
them. Would Army personnel be content to stand by idly as the Cyber Branch
personnel dealt with the attack? Or would they want to participate in or take
charge of responding to the attack? Might the two have different priorities?
The Army might see preserving the integrity (and confidentiality) of the plans
as the primary objective, which would presumably involve only defensive
measures. The Cyber Branch’s main concern, on the other hand, might well be
responding to the attack, which could involve launching offensive attacks
against the attacking cyberwarriors.

BRENNER_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

184

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

2/7/2013 10:57 AM

[Vol. 14:1

ties of the five branch cyber commands. If cyberspace were divisible into spatial operational domains, Cyber Command could
function in a fashion analogous to that of one of the United
States military’s conventional Unified Combatant Commands.290 These Commands incorporate personnel from the five
military branches into a unified command with responsibility
for a specific geographical area.291 The personnel assigned to
such a Command respectively carry out the functions that are
within their branch’s unique expertise, e.g., the Navy carries
out operations at sea, the Air Force conducts aerial activities,
and so forth.292
As we saw above, cyberspace, unlike real space, cannot be
parsed into spatial domains.293 Unless that changes, Cyber
Command faces the unenviable task of trying to sort out what,
precisely, should be the respective responsibility of the Air
Force, Army, Marine, and Navy cyber commands. At the moment, it appears that at least these four cyber commands have
essentially the same mission, i.e., to conduct offensive and defensive military operations in cyberspace.294 This is not only
pointless, it is likely to be counterproductive. Unfortunately, as
we also saw above, this state of affairs seems likely to continue
for some time.295
There is yet another issue Cyber Command must resolve.
Since the task list cited earlier focuses exclusively on (i) defending the military’s assets in cyberspace and (ii) directing and
conducting military operations in cyberspace, many wondered
if the new Cyber Command was only going to be responsible for
290. See,
e.g.,
Unified
Command
Plan,
DEFENSE.GOV,
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2009/0109_unifiedcommand (last updated Apr. 27, 2011).
291. See, e.g., U.S. AFRICOM Pub. Affairs Office, Fact Sheet: United States
AFR.
COMMAND
(May
24,
2012),
Africa
Command,
U.S.
http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1644.
292. See, e.g., id.
293. See supra Part II.
294. See supra Part III.A.2; see also Kaiser, supra note 281. The Department of Defense’s Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, which it released in
July of 2011, does not address how the roles of these branches, at least, could
be structured to make them complementary. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra
note 240.
295. See supra notes 279–281 and accompanying text; see also Kathleen
Hickey, DOD’s Cyber Strategy Lacks Organization, Manpower and Funds,
COMPUTER
NEWS
(July
26,
2011),
GAO
Says,
GOV’T
http://gcn.com/articles/2011/07/26/dod-cyber-strategy-weaknesses-gao.aspx.
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protecting military assets and networks. In other words, would
Cyber Command also be responsible for protecting civilians and
civilian-owned assets?296
In the fall of 2010, the newly-appointed head of Cyber
Command, General Keith Alexander, told reporters the new
unit did “not have a role” in protecting civilian networks and
cyber-assets.297 This caused controversy because, as Part II
noted, the military’s role has historically been to protect a
state, its citizens, and their assets from external threats. If
General Alexander’s comment was transposed to the context of
kinetic warfare, it would become a declaration that in the event
of nuclear war the U.S. military will protect itself but not civilians. Since that proposition is completely inconsistent with the
military’s role in society, it is not surprising that the General,
at least to some extent, retreated from that position in a statement he made the next day.
In testifying before the House Armed Services Committee,
General Alexander prosposed that Cyber Command “could also
have a broader role in the civilian sector through protecting US
critical infrastructure networks and systems.”298 He noted,
though, that the White House “was examining the legal authority needed for Cyber Command to take responsibility for protecting civilians and civilian-owned assets.”299 A few days later,
the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland
Security300 perhaps sought to address this issue, at least in
296. Hersh, supra note 278, at 49.
297. Noah Shachtman, Military’s Cyber Commander Swears: “No Role” in
(Sept.
23,
2010,
10:00
AM),
Civilian
Networks,
WIRED.COM
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/09/militarys-cyber-commanderswears-no-role-on-civilian-networks.
298. White House Seeks Expansion of Cyber Command’s Civilian Cybersecurity Authority, INFOSECURITY (Sept. 24, 2010), http://www.infosecurityus.com/view/12744/white-house-seeks-expansion-of-cyber-commands-civiliancybersecurity-authority.
299. Id. However, Alexander later backed away from his request for additional legal authority. Ellen Nakashima, Cyberattacks Should Require Presidential Authorization, Official Says, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2012,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cyberattacks-shouldrequire-presidential-authorization-officialsays/2012/03/27/gIQA0312eS_story.html. As noted earlier, under U.S. law the
military is barred from participating in law enforcement efforts. CYBERTHREATS, supra note 7, at 164–76.
300. The Department of Homeland Security is charged with protecting citizens of the United States from internal threats, especially terrorism. See, e.g.,
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ONE TEAM, ONE MISSION, SECURING OUR
HOMELAND: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGIC PLAN
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part, by signing a memorandum of understanding that (i) gives
Homeland Security “lead responsibility for protecting the United States government’s civilian networks and critical infrastructure,” (ii) makes the Defense Department responsible for
“protecting some 15,000 military networks,” and (iii) provides
that the two will collaborate to “safeguard cyberspace against
state as well as non-state actors.”301
General Alexander’s comments and the memorandum of
understanding executed by the Departments of Defense and
Homeland Security demonstrate the doctrinal and institutional
constraints that impede the U.S.’s ability to mount a unified response to cyber-threats. The primary constraint is the bifurcation described in Part II: the military (Defense) deals with war,
while law enforcement (Homeland Security)302 deals with crime
and terrorism. Due to historical circumstance, the bifurcation

FISCAL
YEARS
2008–2013
at
2–3
(2008),
available
at
http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=235371.
301. Donna Miles, DOD, Homeland Security Collaborate in Cyber Realm,
INFOWARS.COM (June 3, 2011), http://www.infowars.com/dod-homelandsecurity-collaborate-in-cyber-realm; accord Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense
Regarding
Cybersecurity
(Sept.
27,
2010),
available
at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/20101013-dod-dhs-cyber-moa.pdf; see also
Press Release: U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Joint Statement by Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates and Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano
on Enhancing Coordination to Secure America’s Cyber Networks (Oct. 13,
2010),
available
at
http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/
pr_1286984200944.shtm; Cybersecurity: Assessing the Immediate Threat to the
United States: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec., Homeland Def. and
Foreign Operations of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 112th
Cong. 9 (2011) [hereinafter Assessing the Immediate Threat] (statement of
Sean McGurk, Director of National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center); U.S. DEP’T DEF., supra note 240, at 8 (noting the Department
of Defense’s intent to partner with other government agencies). The reference
to Homeland Security’s responsibility for protecting government civilian networks seems to mean just that. But see Assessing the Immediate Threat, supra
note 301 (noting that Homeland Security also “works with” private sector
“owners and operators” of critical infrastructure components to “bolster their
cybersecurity preparedness”).
302. I put the Department of Homeland Security in the law enforcement
category for several reasons: One is that it is a civilian, rather than military,
agency; another is that many of its responsibilities involve law enforcement or
quasi-law enforcement functions. See, e.g., Mission and Responsibilities, U.S.
DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., http://ipv6.dhs.gov/xabout/responsibilities.shtm (last
updated Feb. 22, 2012). A third reason is that the Department incorporates
agencies that perform law enforcement functions. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., supra note 300, at 38–39 (containing DHS Organizational Chart).
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implicitly assumes attacks from abroad target nation-state assets and/or personnel while crime and terrorism target civilian
assets and/or personnel.
As we saw in Part II, that is not necessarily true as threats
migrate into cyberspace. Civilians and civilian-owned assets
are already a target of cybercrime and cyberterrorism, and it
has for some time been apparent that they will also be targets
in cyberwarfare.303 The bifurcation, though, does not allow (i)
law enforcement officers to retaliate against cyberwarfare attacks or (ii) members of the military to retaliate against cybercrime and cyberterrorism. That is why General Alexander
could not assert that Cyber Command would protect civilians,
and that is why the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security found it necessary to execute the memorandum of understanding noted above.304
As matters currently stand, Cyber Command will have to
utilize the attribution processes described in Part II to determine, with the necessary level of confidence, that a given attack
was state-sponsored before it can reciprocate in kind. Civilians
and civilian assets have been targets of conventional warfare,
even though the law of armed conflict calls for minimizing attacks on noncombatants.305 But those attacks have come from
an identified, nation-state enemy, which allowed the targeted
nation-state to respond in kind, even if the attack occurred on
its territory.306
General Alexander’s primary problem, therefore, is that it
may be impossible for the military to make such a determination for a cyber-attack quickly enough for a timely response be303. See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Towards a Cyberspace Legal Regime in the
Twenty-First Century: Considerations for American Cyber-Warriors, 87 NEB. L.
REV. 712, 723 n.40 (2009); Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber Warfare and Precautions
Against the Effects of Attacks, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1533, 1551–52 (2010).
304. See supra Part II.D.
305. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 51(3), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), art. 13(3), June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
306. See, e.g., ALLAN W. KURKI, OPERATION MOONLIGHT SONATA: THE
GERMAN RAID ON COVENTRY 71–80 (1995) (describing the Battle of Britain:
“German air attacks carried out against Great Britain early in World War II”);
Richard Goldstone, The Trial of Saddam Hussein: What Kind of Court Should
Prosecute Saddam Hussein and Others for Human Rights Abuses, 27
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1490, 1502 (2004).
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cause the “markers” traditionally used to distinguish between
internal and external attacks are of little utility in the cyber
context. This is essentially a doctrinal problem, as it arises
from the practice of dividing threats into these two categories
and categorically parsing threat response authority between
them.307 But as we saw earlier, General Alexander also confronts an institutional problem: fusing six distinct cyber commands into a coordinated, coherent cyber-response effort.308 We
will return to this issue in Part IV.
As we will see below, United States law enforcement confronts a correlate doctrinal problem and operates in a far more
complex institutional structure.
B. LAW ENFORCEMENT
As we saw in Part II, law enforcement is charged with controlling the “other” threat: the threat to internal order that
arises from antisocial conduct on the part of individuals who
are “in” the territory of the state under whose authority law enforcement officers operate.309 Some countries have a national
penal code and a national police agency that enforces that
code.310 But because it is a federal state,311 the United States
has an essentially two-tiered system of penal laws and a twotiered law enforcement structure.
As to the former, the United States has fifty-two distinct

307. It also arises from the fact that our definitions of war assume traditional, kinetic conflict. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 51 (using the term “armed
attack”); Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), Article I, U.N.
GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631, at 142-143 (Dec. 14, 1974)
(using the phrase “use of armed force”). The United States has made little, if
any, progress toward reconciling the law of war and cyber-attacks. See David
Lerman, Senators Demand Answers on U.S. Cyber Warfare Policy,
BLOOMBERG, July 20, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-0720/senators-demand-answers-on-u-s-cyber-warfare-policy.html.
308. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
309. As Part II explained, nation-states control such conduct by adopting
laws that outlaw such behavior and impose sanctions on those who engage in
it.
310. See, e.g., Kuk Cho, Korean Criminal Law: Moralist Prima Ratio for
Social Control, 1 J. KOREAN L. 77, 79–95 (2001) (describing the Korean Penal
Code).
311. See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas Terrell, The Number of
States and the Economics of American Federalism, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011)
(explaining that with fifty states, the United States is the largest federation in
the world).
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criminal codes (one for each state, one for the District of Columbia and a federal criminal code).312 These codes require a
corresponding, two-tiered law enforcement structure: one tier
consists of the over 15,000 state and local agencies313 that respectively enforce state criminal codes.314 Their geographical
jurisdiction is generally linked to the nature of the agency in
which they serve: state police have jurisdiction throughout the
state, a county sheriff has jurisdiction in that county, and municipal police have jurisdiction within the territorial boundaries
of their municipality.315
The other tier is composed of agencies that enforce federal
law. Five of them—the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the

312. Paul H. Robinson & Marcus D. Dubber, The American Model Penal
Code: A Brief Overview, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 319, 319 (2007) (“Within the
United States, there are fifty-two . . . criminal codes, with the federal criminal
code overlaying the codes of each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia.”).
Title 18 of the U.S. Code is often referred to as the “federal criminal
code” because it contains the vast majority of federal criminal provisions.
Ronald L. Gainer, Federal Criminal Code Reform: Past and Present, 2 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 45, 53 (1998); Jude Pamela Mathy, Honest Services Fraud after
Skilling, 42 ST. MARY’S L.J. 645, 702 n.273 (2011) (“The Federal Criminal
Code codified in title 18 . . . .”). Other titles of the U.S. Code, however, create
additional crimes. See Bruce Zagaris, U.S. International Cooperation against
Transnational Organized Crime, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 1401, 1427 (1993) (noting
the “drug crimes in title 21 . . . of the United States Code.”); U.S. Department
of Justice Tax Division, 2008 Criminal Tax Manual, Table of Contents,
http://www.justice.gov/tax/readingroom/2008ctm/CTM%20TOC.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2012).
313. See supra note 3 (explaining that state and local law enforcement
agencies employ an estimate of over 750,000 officers). State agencies, which
are variously known as State Police, Highway Patrol or State Patrol, operate
statewide. BRIAN A. REEVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, NCJ 233982, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES 2008, at 6–7 (2011). Local law enforcement consists of county agencies, e.g., sheriff’s or county police agencies, and municipal law enforcement
agencies. Id.
314. For our purposes, “state law” includes both the laws adopted at the
state level and any laws adopted by subdivisions of a state. See, e.g., ALASKA
STAT. § 18.65.080 (2010) (stating state troopers enforce “all criminal laws of
the state”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-2.5-103(1) (2012) (stating sheriff’s authority
includes enforcing all laws of the state); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 493.190 (Lexis-Nexis 2011) (municipal officers responsible for enforcing “state and municipal laws”).
315. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 8302 (2007) (stating state police
“primary law enforcement agency within the State”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
36.28.010 (West 2003) (stating sheriff is “conservator of the peace of the county”); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8951 (West 2007) (stating municipal officer
has jurisdiction “within the territorial limits of a municipality”).
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U.S. Secret Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms
and Explosives, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement—are primarily
responsible for pursing those who violate the federal criminal
code.316 And because these agencies operate under the authority of the federal government, they have national jurisdiction,
i.e., their agents can pursue investigations anywhere that is
within the “maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the U.S.”317
and, under certain circumstances, abroad.318
It may seem that this complex enforcement structure, with
its often-overlapping federal and state jurisdiction, must inevitably generate turf wars that impede the efficient enforcement
of the law. The likelihood that rivalry will occur between state
and local law enforcement agencies is mitigated, at least to
some extent, by the fact that each has a clearly defined geographical jurisdiction within which it operates.319 This reduces,
but does not eliminate, the potential for inter-agency conflicts.320 Instances can and do arise in which, say, the State Po-

316. See CYBER-THREATS, supra note 7, at 152–53. See also, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§ 3052 (2006) (stating Federal Bureau of Investigation powers); 18 U.S.C. §§
1029(d), 1030(d)(1), 3056 (2006) (stating Secret Service authority); 18 U.S.C. §
3051 (2006) (stating Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives authority); Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 21 U.S.C. § 878 (2006) (stating Drug Enforcement Administration authority); 19 U.S.C. § 1589a (2006), 22
C.F.R. § 127.4 (2012) (stating Immigration and Customs Enforcement). Immigration and Customs Enforcement is divided into “four law enforcement divisions”, each with its own mission. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
http://www.allgov.com/agency/
(ICE),
ALLGOV.COM,
U_S__Immigration_and_Customs_Enforcement_ICE. For examples of other
agencies that play a less significant role in federal law enforcement, see
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 212750,
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, 2004 at 2 (2006).
317. 18 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
318. Federal courts presume that when Congress enacts a federal criminal
statute, it only means for the law to be enforceable within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. United States v. Corey, 232 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th
Cir. 2000). If Congress indicates that a statute is enforceable outside U.S. territory, courts will apply the law in that manner. See id. at 1170–71; see, e.g.,
18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(b) (2006) (stating extraterritorial jurisdiction under the
federal computer crime statute).
319. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 8302 (2007) (stating state police
“primary law enforcement agency within the State”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
36.28.010 (West 2003) (stating sheriff is “conservator of the peace of the county”); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8951 (West 2007) (stating municipal officer
has jurisdiction “within the territorial limits of a municipality”).
320. Funding can be a source of conflict. See, e.g., Sheriffs: State Police Du-
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lice and the County Sheriff both have jurisdiction in a given
matter,321 which can create conflicts as to who should take the
lead.322 Over the last few years, state and local agencies have
used multi-jurisdictional task forces to reduce, if not eliminate,
such conflicts.323
Historically, the more serious conflicts arose between state
and local agencies and their federal counterparts.324 There appears to have been a corresponding reduction in these conflicts
as well, a phenomenon many attribute to a spirit of greater cooperation brought on by the 9/11 attacks.325
That leaves the federal agencies, which have certainly not
plicate Our Efforts, DETROIT NEWS, September 7, 2005 at B1, available at
2005 WLNR 26971791.
321. A homicide could create an even more complicated scenario: assume
John Doe is found murdered in his home, which is in Garden City, Finney
County, Kansas. Garden City police, the Finney County Sheriff and the Kansas Highway Patrol would all have jurisdiction to investigate the crime. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 8302 (2007) (giving state-wide jurisdiction to
state officers), with WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.28.010 (West 2003) (giving
county-wide jurisdiction to county officers), and 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
8951 (West 2007) (giving jurisdiction within a municipality to municipal officers).
322. See, e.g., Reid J. Epstein, Suffolk Rejects Funds for Bomb Dog,
NEWSDAY, Dec. 23, 2010, at A15, available at 2010 WLNR 25275547. See also
Joan Vennochi, Op-Ed., Carson Beach: Whose Turf Is It?, BOS. GLOBE, June 2,
2011, at A15; Vivian Yee, Troopers Absent at City Turf Hearing, BOS. GLOBE,
June 29, 2011, at B1.
323. See, e.g., Ron Jackson, Task Force Sought for Pending Cases,
OKLAHOMAN, Dec. 2, 2009, at 7A, available at 2009 WLNR 24400863; Robert
Medley & Michael Kimball, 3 City Residents Jailed in Crime Spree,
OKLAHOMAN, November 2, 2010, at 18A, available at 2010 WLNR 21967934.
See also Anne C. Pogue, If It Weren’t for the Flip Side—Can the USA Patriot
Act Help the U.S. Pursue Drug Dealers and Terrorists Overseas, Without Overstepping Constitutional Boundaries at Home?, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
477, 481 (2005) (indicating that the use of task forces dates back to the 1970s).
324. See, e.g., Daniel Richman, The Past, Present, and Future of Violent
Crime Federalism, 34 CRIME & JUST. 377, 405 (2006) (highlighting the conflict
between local and federal enforcers in violent crime); David McLemore, Interdiction Not Answer, Officers Say, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Aug. 30, 1988, at 6A,
available at 1988 WLNR 2258214 (noting the “continuing turf battles among
federal and state law enforcement agencies”); see also Pierre Thomas, Freeh
Becomes Fifth Director of FBI, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1993, at A6 (noting that
the new director pledges to end “turf battles” among “federal, state and local
law enforcement”).
325. See Stephen D. Mastrofski & James J. Willis, Police Organization
Continuity and Change: Into the Twenty-First Century, 39 CRIME & JUST. 55,
124 (2010); Robert M. Bloom & Hillary Massey, Accounting for Federalism in
State Courts: Exclusion of Evidence Obtained Lawfully by Federal Agents, 79
U. COLO. L. REV. 381, 397 (2008). But see Dafna Linzer, In New York, A Turf
War in the Battle against Terrorism, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2008, at A1, A4.
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been immune to turf wars.326 And according to recent reports,
turf battles continue to be a problem for federal law enforcement agencies, despite their use of task forces and other, similar efforts.327 One reason why such conflicts persist among federal agencies is that, unlike their state and local counterparts,
federal agencies’ jurisdictional authority is predicated not on
geographical turf, but on what a recent report refers to as “operational turf.”328
In situations like the hypothetical noted earlier,329 in
which a crime scene falls within the State Police’s and the local
Sheriff’s geographical turf, the State Police may defer to the
Sheriff, because his office has stronger ties to that location and
the victim. That calculus does not come into play at the federal
level because, as I noted earlier, the federal law enforcement
agencies listed above all have national jurisdiction. This, as
noted above, means their turf is not linked to a specific state,
county, city, or other area. The agents employed by these agencies operate out of specific, geographically located offices,330 but
this is a matter of operational efficiency and, as such, does not
define the legitimate scope of an agency’s operations.331 That is
a function of “operational turf,” that is, of the statutes that define a given agency’s investigative authority.332
If these statutes parsed investigative authority out among
the five agencies listed above in a fashion analogous to how

326. See, e.g., Prepared Statement of Senator Chuck Grassley of Iowa,
GRASSLEY.SENATE (Nov. 18, 2009), http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news
/Article.cfm?customel_dataPageID_1502=24164; Joe Davidson, Drug Cartels
Corrupting U.S. Law Enforcement, WASH. POST, June 9, 2011, at B4.
327. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-314, LAW
ENFORCEMENT COORDINATION: DOJ COULD IMPROVE ITS PROCESS FOR
IDENTIFYING DISAGREEMENTS AMONG AGENTS 8 (2011) (noting one-third of
agents surveyed “reported experiencing disagreements over the past 5 years
with another DOJ component when determining roles and responsibilities
during an investigation.”). For more on the evolution and current state of federal agency conflicts, see KIRSTIN M. FINKLEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R41927, THE INTERPLAY OF BORDERS, TURF, CYBERSPACE, AND JURISDICTION:
ISSUES CONFRONTING U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT 19–25 (2012).
328. FINKLEA, supra note 327, at 21.
329. See supra note 321.
330. See, e.g., FBI, TODAY’S FBI 2010–2011 at 5 (2007), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/facts-and-figures-20102011/facts-and-figures-2010-2011-pdf.
331. FBI, THE FBI: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY 1908–2008 at 108 (2008).
332. See FINKLEA, supra note 327, at 21–23.
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combat jurisdiction is parsed out among the five military
branches, this would go a long way toward reducing the turf
wars that currently plague federal law enforcement. Unfortunately, the statutes rarely do this, which means agencies often
have overlapping investigative jurisdiction, which “can open
the doors” to turf battles.333 In a 2011 investigation of jurisdictional overlap among federal agencies, many agents reported
that they had encountered uncertainty and disagreements
about the appropriate allocation of investigative authority and
said these disagreements often negatively affected investigations.334 Criminals’ increasing use of cyberspace is only exacerbating the difficulties federal agents already face.335
While turf wars and overlapping or uncertain investigative
jurisdiction continue to impede U.S. law enforcement’s ability
to respond to crimes, they are not the only factors that are
eroding its ability to respond to cyber-threats. The problem law
enforcement must confront is the civilian correlate of the problem General Alexander faces:336 we can no longer assume that
attacks which appear to constitute “mere” cybercrime are just
that, i.e., are carried out by civilians who are “in” the United
States and whose motives are purely personal.337 An attack on
a financial institution might be a cybercrime committed by a
greedy United States citizen “in” the United States, but it
might, instead, be (i) a cybercrime committed by a non-United
States citizen operating from abroad or (ii) a cyber-sortie carried out by a hostile nation-state’s own cyber command.338
333. Id. at 21; see also, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra
note 327, at 1 (“[I]n a drug investigation involving a suspect who may be illegally procuring a large cache of firearms to protect the drugs, the FBI and
DEA, which both have jurisdiction over illegal drugs, as well as ATF, which is
responsible for regulating firearms, may be involved.”).
334. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 327, at 8.
335. See FINKLEA, supra note 327, at 18; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-12-876T, INFORMATION SECURITY: CYBER THREATS FACIILITATE
ABILITY TO COMMIT ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE 3–6, 10–12 (2012). See also supra
II.D.
336. See supra Part III.A.2.
337. See supra Part II.B.
338. See, e.g., John Leyden, Leaked U.S. Cables Finger Chinese Army
Hackers for Cyber-Spying, REGISTER (Apr. 18, 2011, 14:15 GMT),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/04/18/byzantine_hades_cyber_espionage.
The attack hypothesized above could also constitute (i) non-nation-statesponsored terrorism, which would clearly be a matter within law enforcement’s investigative authority; (ii) nation-state-sponsored terrorism, which
might be a matter for law enforcement but might also be considered an act of
war to be dealt with by the military; or (iii) nation-state-sponsored crime,
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If the attack hypothesized above constitutes domestic cybercrime committed by a United States citizen, it clearly falls
within United States law enforcement’s investigative authority
under the bifurcated approach outlined above.339 And the same
is true if the attack constitutes transnational cybercrime carried out by a non-citizen. As a practical matter, investigating
this type of cybercrime involves challenges law enforcement officers do not confront in purely domestic investigations,340 but
it is still their default responsibility.341
The truly problematic scenario is the one in which the attack is carried out by a hostile state’s military hackers. This
scenario is problematic for several reasons, the first and perhaps most critical of which is that the bifurcated approach assumes the nature of an attack is apparent.342 As we saw earlier,
it assumes this because in real-space there are certain “markers” that immediately differentiate an act of war from
crime/terrorism.343 As we also saw, those markers do not (necessarily) exist in cyberspace: bits and bytes do not arrive bearing national insignia nor do they constitute weaponry that only
nation-states can employ.344 The bits and bytes used to launch
a cyberwar attack of the type we are hypothesizing would begin
their voyage to their United States target from a location outside the territorial United States, but as we have seen,345 that
which would presumably be within law enforcement’s investigative authority.
At Light Speed, supra note 31, at 423; Michael J. Robbat, Note, Resolving the
Legal Issues Involving the Use of Information Warfare in the International Forum, 6 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 264, 287 (2000). See also Susan W. Brenner &
Anthony C. Crescenzi, State-Sponsored Crime: The Futility of the Economic
Espionage Act, 28 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 389, 398–401 (2006) (noting the long list of
“usual suspects” for internet economic espionage).
339. See supra Part II.A–B.
340. See generally Susan W. Brenner & Joseph J. Schwerha IV, Transnational Evidence Gathering and Local Prosecution of International Cybercrime,
20 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 347 (2002) (discussing two highprofile cybercrime cases where the FBI had to overcome legal and procedural
hurdles to gather international evidence).
341. See supra Part II.A–B.
342. See supra Part II.B–C.
343. See supra Part II.B–C. As we saw earlier, one of the markers is that
the attack is directed at a military target. For example, the 1941 attack that
brought the United States into World War II was directed at Pearl Harbor, a
U.S. naval base. World War II: Pearl Harbor, ATLANTIC (July 31, 2011),
http://www.theatlantic.com/infocus/2011/07/world-war-ii-pearl-harbor/100117.
344. See supra Part II.B.
345. See supra Part II.A–B.
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in and of itself is not enough to reliably support the inference
that an attack is an act of war.
Since cybercrime routinely originates from outside United
States territory, it would be quite reasonable for United States
law enforcement officers to assume an attack is crime, rather
than war.346 This would be their default assumption, and there
is nothing in the attack we are hypothesizing that would bring
it to the attention of the military.347 The United States military
has for decades monitored geographical vectors (i.e., United
States airspace and coastal waters) for signs of a conventional
attack, but the military does not, and cannot, monitor cyberspace in an effort to ascertain when what is ostensibly cybercrime is actually cyberwarfare.348 If it were to do so, the U.S.
military would invade what has historically and doctrinally
been law enforcement’s exclusive sphere of operations.349
This creates an opportunity for surreptitious war: a hostile
state could use cyberspace to launch attacks that were designed
to undermine the stability and viability of the United States,350
but disguise the nature of the attacks by having them originate
from a locale with no military associations and utilize tools and
technology associated with civilians, perhaps with cybercriminals.351 If a state were to do this (and for all we know, one already has),352 United States law enforcement officers would

346. Aside from anything else, the fact that the attack targets a civilian
entity inferentially suggests it is crime, not war. See id.
347. See id.
348. Aliya Sternstein, Congress, Administration Grapple with Cyber De(Apr.
11,
2011),
fense
Authority,
NEXTGOV
http://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2011/04/congress-administrationgrapple-with-cyber-defense-authority/48873 (noting that General Alexander
confirms that the U.S. Cyber Command cannot monitor civilian networks).
349. See supra Part II.B.
350. The attacks might, for example, target the U.S. financial system, in an
attempt to destabilize the nation’s economy. See, e.g., Kevin Coleman, Russia’s
TECH
(May
27,
2008),
Cyber
Forces,
DEFENSE
http://defensetech.org/2008/05/27/russias-cyber-forces (cyberwar tactics include “disrupt[ing] financial markets” and “weaken[ing] the economy of their
adversary”); see also Charles Arthur, IMF Cyber-Attack Led by Hackers Seek(June
13,
2011),
ing
‘Privileged
Information,’
GUARDIAN
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/jun/12/imf-cyber-attack-hack
(“[cyberwar] waged by governments for economic . . . purposes.”).
351. See supra Part II.B. Estonia may have been the target of a similar attack in 2007. See Scott J. Shackelford, From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber Attacks in International Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 192, 205–
06 (2009).
352. See Arthur, supra note 350 (describing various attacks on U.S. com-
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construe the attacks as cybercrime and do their best to respond, presumably after the fact.353 If the response came after
the attacks ended, then they would have inflicted the intended
damage and the United States officers would be left with the
essentially futile task of trying to track down and apprehend
the perpetrators.354 The foray into online war would have succeeded at basically no cost to the responsible state, and the
United States might never realize it had been the target of a
military attack.355
All of this has serious implications for the country’s security: the United States military has been, and is, responsible for
protecting the nation from externally-based attacks that
threaten the social and economic viability of the country. The
military’s mission, though, is limited to protecting the country
from demonstrable acts of war, i.e., from external attacks that
can be attributed to a hostile nation-state and that involve the
use of traditional military force. The military consequently has
no authority to respond to external attacks that (i) cannot be
reliably attributed to a hostile nation-state and/or (ii) only involve the use of cyberspace.356
panies potentially made by foreign states).
353. See supra note 224. If the attacks were large-scale in nature, the architects of the attacks could further conceal their true nature by making them
appear to be discrete, unrelated attacks on targets in various parts of the
country. Our hypothetical attackers might be able to exploit the highly segmented nature of state and local law enforcement to their advantage, by convincing officers in various geographical areas that they were dealing with different perpetrators in each instance. Aside from anything else, that would
enhance the attackers’ ability to disguise the event as a series of cybercrimes.
354. Scott Charney, The Internet, Law Enforcement and Security, in 2
FIFTH ANN. INTERNET LAW INSTITUTE 937, 945 (Practising Law Inst. ed.,
2001) (“[W]hat . . . if law enforcement spends months investigating a ‘cybercrime’ only to find another country is engaging in . . . information warfare? . . .
[I]t would be like sending the FBI to Hawaii on December 7, 1941 to investigate a trespass by Japan.”).
355. See, e.g., ENEKEN TIKK ET AL., COOP. CYBER DEF. CTR. OF
EXCELLENCE, INTERNATIONAL CYBER INCIDENTS: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 75
(2010),
available
at
http://www.ccdcoe.org/publications/books
/legalconsiderations.pdf (explaining that researchers investigating 2008 Georgia attacks were “unable to find” evidence of “state organisations guiding or
directing attacks” either “because there was none . . . or because involvement
by state organisations was conducted in a way to purposefully avoid attribution”).
356. See, e.g., U.N. Charter, supra note 307, at art. 51; see also Arie J.
Schaap, Cyber Warfare Operations: Development and Use Under International
Law, 64 A.F. L. REV. 121, 144–48 (2009) (noting that cyber-attacks do not
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This leaves law enforcement, which has historically responded to internal attacks involving citizen-on-citizen victimization.357 As we saw above,358 United States law enforcement
now finds it increasingly necessary to respond to external attacks that involve the online victimization of United States citizens by noncitizens. Since these attacks involve individual-onindividual victimization and since the perpetrators’ motives
and the “harms” they inflict fall within existing principles of
criminal liability, the investigation of the attacks clearly fits
within United States law enforcement’s investigative authority.359
As a practical matter, United States law enforcement officers cannot effectively investigate all or even a substantial portion of the transnational cybercrime attacks that target United
States citizens. This is in part attributable to the fact that cybercrime—both transnational and domestic—represents a new
quantum of criminal activity that is added to the traditional
criminal activity to which United States officers must continue
to respond. It is also attributable to the fact that the processes
of enforcing criminal law and bringing criminals to justice are
linked to the territorially-based authority of a specific nationstate; law enforcement officers, courts and others involved in
these systems legitimately operate only within the territory
their sovereign controls.360 There are processes by which United States law enforcement officers can obtain evidence from
abroad, but they are complex, uncertain and move at a glacial
pace.361 This circumstance and the incremental burden cybercrime creates for officers who must still respond to traditional
crimes combine to limit the extent to which U.S. law enforcement officers can pursue offshore cybercriminals.362 And this de
facto limitation on their ability to investigate external attacks
that appear to be cybercrime can create opportunities for the
type of surreptitious warfare outlined above.363
qualify as acts of war under current laws of warfare).
357. See supra Part II.A.
358. See supra Part II.B.
359. See supra Part II.B.
360. See, e.g., CYBER-THREATS, supra note 7, at 201–22.
361. See SUSAN W. BRENNER, CYBERCRIME: CRIMINAL THREATS FROM
CYBERSPACE 142–48 (2010).
362. Criminal Law for Cyberspace, supra note 7, at 80.
363. McAfee’s 2011 report outing of “Operation Shady Rat,” a five-year series of cyber-attacks on corporate and government targets, illustrates how difficult it can be to determine whether an attack is mere cybercrime or some-
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Our commitment to the bifurcated, military-law enforcement approach to threat-control makes it difficult for the United States to address this vulnerability. We cannot, for a variety
of reasons, simply expand the investigative authority of state,
local, and/or federal law enforcement officers so that their investigative authority extends outside the territorial boundaries
of the United States. Aside from anything else, that would violate the territorial sovereignty of the countries in which they
exercised this authority.364
And while the military’s mission specifically encompasses
extraterritorial threat response, we cannot, as noted above,365
involve the U.S. military in responding to cyber-attacks the
provenance of which is uncertain. The military’s mission is to
respond to a verified military attack or deter such an attack. It
is not an investigative entity as such and is therefore not qualified to pursue and apprehend cyber-perpetrators who would be
brought back to the United States and interrogated as to the
nature of a particular attack. And if U.S. military personnel
were to invade another sovereign’s territory in an effort to ascertain the nature and source of cyber-attacks targeting the
U.S. and/or to apprehend the perpetrator(s) of such attacks,
that would constitute an act of war, though the cyber-attacks
themselves would not.366
This is an obviously untenable state of affairs, which is
why in 2010 legislation was introduced into Congress that
would add another element into the threat-control dynamic: civilian participation. We will examine that legislation in the
thing more. Compare Jim Finkle, “State Actor” Behind Slew of Cyber Attacks,
REUTERS (Aug. 3, 2011, 7:17 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2011/08/03/us-cyber-attacksidUSTRE7720HU20110803?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews&rpc=71,
with Gabriel Perna, McAfee’s Rivals Scoff at Shady RAT Report, FIN.
CONTENT (Aug. 5, 2011, 16:41 PM), http://markets.financialcontent.com/
stocks/news/read/19167626/McAfee%e2%80%99s_Rivals_Scoff_at_Shady_RAT
_Report.
364. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 432(2) (1987) (“A state’s law enforcement officers may exercise their functions in the territory of another state only with the consent of
the other state.”); see also id. §§ 432 cmt. B, 433; U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
CRIMINAL
RESOURCE
MANUAL
§
267
(1997),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00267.ht
m (noting the sovereignty issues that arise when gathering evidence abroad).
365. See supra note 356 and accompanying text.
366. See supra note 307 and accompanying text.
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next subpart.
C. CIVILIANS
The first section below examines several U.S. legislative
proposals that are designed to incorporate civilians into a
cyber-threat response effort. The next section analyzes the conceptual issues raised by these proposals.
1. Legislative proposals
In 2010, several bills designed to improve the United
States’ ability to protect itself from cyber-attacks were introduced in Congress.367 One of them—the Protecting Cyberspace
as a National Asset Act of 2010 (“Protecting Cyberspace”)—was
introduced by Senators Lieberman, Collins, and Carper.368 The
Senators said the bill was intended to remedy the “disjointed
and uncoordinated” approach to cybersecurity that prevailed at
the federal level by creating “a public/private partnership to
promote national cyber security” and “prevent and respond to
cyber-attacks.”369 Among other things, it created the National
Center for Cybersecurity and Communications [NCCC] and
made the NCCC’s Director responsible for “working cooperatively with the private sector” to “lead the Federal effort
to . . . protect, and ensure the resiliency of the Federal information infrastructure and national information infrastructure
of the United States.”370
The Protecting Cyberspace bill included what became controversial provisions concerning private sector entities that
were part of the nation’s “critical infrastructure.”371 The NCCC
367. See Elizabeth Montalbano, Senate Bill Proposes Office of Cyberspace
Policy, INFO. WK. (June 14, 2010, 8:00 AM), http://www.informationweek.com/
government/security/senate-bill-proposes-office-of-cyberspac/225600464 (noting Lieberman-Collins-Carper, Kerry, and Rockefeller-Snowe bills in the Senate, Lipinski bill in the House).
368. See Emelie Rutherford, Senate Committee Oks Cybersecurity Bill on
Majority Leader’s Radar, DEF. DAILY, June 25, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR
14036808.
369. Lieberman, Collins, Carper Unveil Major Cybersecurity Bill to Modernize, Strengthen, and Coordinate Cyber Defenses, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE
ON HOMELAND SECURITY & GOVERNMENTAL AFF. (June 10, 2010),
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/majority-media/lieberman-collins-carperunveil-major-cybersecurity-bill-to-modernize-strengthen-and-coordinate-cyberdefenses (quoting Senator Collins).
370. Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act of 2010, S. 3480, 111th
Cong. § 242(f)(1)(A) (noting this is as introduced in the Senate).
371. See id. § 248. The bill incorporated the definition of critical infrastruc-

BRENNER_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

200

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

2/7/2013 10:57 AM

[Vol. 14:1

Director was required, “on a continuous . . . basis, [to] identify
and evaluate the cyber vulnerabilities to covered critical infrastructure.”372 He or she was also required to issue regulations
“establishing risk-based security performance requirements”
for securing “covered critical infrastructure against cyber vulnerabilities through the adoption of security measures” that
would satisfy requirements “identified by” the Director.373
The Protecting Cyberspace bill made the NCCC Director
responsible for ensuring that the “owners and operators of critical infrastructure” developed plans for responding to a “national cyber emergency.”374 The bill also authorized the President to declare such an emergency.375 If a President declared a
national cyber emergency, the owners and operators of critical
infrastructure components were then required to implement
their required response plans and the NCCC Director was to
“develop and coordinate emergency measures or actions necessary to preserve the reliable operation . . . of covered critical infrastructure.”376
The 2010 Lieberman-Collins-Carper legislation so provided
for the enforcement of these requirements. Each year, the owners and operators of critical infrastructure components were
required to “certify in writing to the Director” that they had deture contained in the USA PATRIOT Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e) (2006). Id. §
3(2). I.e., “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual,” that are “so vital
to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and
assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.” 42
U.S.C. § 5195c(e) (2006).
372. S. 3480 § 248(a)(1).
373. Id. § 248(b)(1).
374. Id. § 248(b)(2)(C). A national cyber emergency is defined as “an actual
or imminent action by any individual or entity to exploit a cyber vulnerability
in a manner that disrupts, attempts to disrupt, or poses a significant risk of
disruption to the operation of the information infrastructure essential to the
reliable operation of covered critical infrastructure.” Id. § 241(17). National
information infrastructure is defined as information infrastructure that is
“owned, operated, or controlled within or from the United States; or if located
outside the United States, the disruption of which could result in national or
regional catastrophic damage in the United States; and that is not owned, operated, controlled, or licensed for use by a Federal agency.” Id § 241(18). Information infrastructure is defined as “the underlying framework that information systems and assets rely on to process, transmit, receive, or store
information electronically.” Id. § 241(10).
375. Id. § 249(a)(1).
376. Id. § 249(a)(3)(A)–(B).
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veloped and implemented the security measures and response
plans required by the Protecting Cyberspace bill.377 If they did
not comply with this requirement, the NCCC Director could order them to do so and could, if necessary, bring a civil suit to
enforce such an order.378 The Director was also authorized to
evaluate the security measures and response plans submitted
by those responsible for critical infrastructure components.379
The Protecting Cyberspace bill quickly became a source of
controversy as various sources reported that it gave the President an Internet “kill switch” he or she could use to “shut down
or limit Internet traffic.”380 In an effort to address this concern,
the three sponsors of the original bill introduced a revised version—now known as the Cybersecurity and Internet Freedom
Act—in February of 2011.381 Section 2(c) of the 2011 bill said
that “[n]otwithstanding any provision of this Act . . . neither
the President, the Director of the National Center for Cybersecurity and Communications, or any officer or employee of the
United States Government shall have the authority to shut
down the Internet.”382 Aside from adding that disclaimer and
judicial review of the NCCC Director’s determination that a
particular entity constitutes critical infrastructure and is therefore required to implement the security and response measures
outlined above, the new bill was essentially a clone of its predecessor.383
On February 14, 2012, Lieberman, along with Senators
Susan Collins, Diane Feinstein, Jay Rockefeller, and Sheldon
Whitehouse, introduced the next iteration of his proposed cybersecurity legislation: S. 2105—the Cybersecurity Act of

377. Id. § 250(a)(1).
378. Id. § 250(a)(2), (c)(1).
379. Id. § 250(b).
380. Declan McCullagh, Senators Propose Granting President Emergency
Internet Power, CNET (June 10, 2010, 8:25 PM), http://news.cnet.com/830113578_3-20007418-38.html (quoting the Center for Democracy and Technology).
381. Declan McCullagh, Internet “Kill Switch” Bill Gets a Makeover, CNET
(Feb. 18, 2011), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-20033717-281.html.
382. Cybersecurity and Internet Freedom Act of 2011, S. 413, 112th Cong.
§ 2(c) (2011).
383. McCullagh, supra note 381. The review, above, of the Protecting Cyberspace and Cybersecurity and Internet Freedom Acts is cursory, out of necessity. The Protecting Cyberspace bill is 197 pages, and the Cybersecurity
and Internet Freedom Act bill is 221 pages. It is therefore neither possible, nor
necessary, to analyze each in depth. S. 3480; S. 413.

BRENNER_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

202

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

2/7/2013 10:57 AM

[Vol. 14:1

2012.384 Like its predecessors, S. 2105 made the Department of
Homeland Security primarily responsible for (i) identifying and
assessing “cyber risks” to critical infrastructure components,
(ii) working with the owners and operators of the various critical infrastructure components to develop “risk-based cybersecurity performance requirements” for those components, and
(iii) implementing those requirements.385 And like its predecessors, S. 2105 let entities that designated as critical infrastructure components subject to the Act’s requirements challenge
that designation in a civil action brought exclusively in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia.386
In May of 2011, the White House issued its own Cybersecurity Proposal, which included provisions directed at the private sector that were very similar to those outlined above.387

384. See Cybersecurity Act of 2012 (Proposed), COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.
(Feb.
2012),
http://rebecca.cfr.org/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-act-2012proposed/p27479; Cybersecurity Act of 2012, S. 2105, 112th Cong. (2012) (introduced in the Senate on Feb. 14, 2012).
On July 19, 2012, Senator Lieberman introduced S. 3414, a replacement bill—the Cybersecurity Act of 2012 (CSA2012). Cybersecurity Act of
2012, S. 3414, 112th Cong. (2012) (introduced in the Senate on July 19, 2012).
Like its predecessors, the bill was lengthy (211 pages) and covered much of the
same ground. See id. The new bill was applauded by privacy advocates, who
noted that it included provisions ensuring that the legislation did not undermine First Amendment protections of free speech, ensuring that only civilian
agencies (versus the National Security Agency) were in charge of cybersecurity
efforts, and ensuring that data would not be shared with law enforcement except in specific, limited circumstances. See Rainey Reitman & Lee Tien, New
Cybersecurity Proposal Patches Serious Privacy Vulnerabilities, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND. (July 19, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/07/newcybersecurity-proposal-patches-serious-privacy-vulnerabilities.
The new bill did not survive, however: on August 2, 2012, the
CSA2012 “fell eight votes shy” of cloture in the Senate. Gerry Smith, Cyber
Security Law Fails to Pass Senate Before Month-Long Break, HUFFINGTON
POST (Aug. 3, 2012, 11:55 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/08/02/cyber-security-law_n_1733751.html; see also Ed O’Keefe & Ellen
Nakashima, Cybersecurity Bill Fails in Senate, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2012, at
A3. Some applauded its demise. See, e.g., Jody Westby, Congress Needs to Go
Back to School on Cyber Legislation, FORBES (Aug. 13, 2012, 9:34 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jodywestby/2012/08/13/congress-needs-to-go-backto-school-on-cyber-legislation (“The Lieberman/Collins bill was a masterful
piece of deception that was intended to bamboozle businesses into believing
that the legislation was not a massive extension of regulatory authority.”).
385. See S. 2105 §§ 2, 101–106.
386. See id. at § 103(c); see also S. 413 § 254(c)(2).
387. See Legislative Language: Law Enforcement Provisions Related to
Computer Security, Enclosure to Letter from Jacob J. Lew, Dir., Exec. Office of
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The primary difference between the proposals is that the White
House plan makes the Secretary of Homeland Security responsible for developing and implementing a “national cybersecurity
incident response plan” in “collaboration with federal, state, local, territorial and tribal governments and private sector owners and operators of critical information infrastructure.”388
the President: Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to John Boehner, Speaker of the
House of Representatives and Joseph R. Biden, President of the Senate (May
12, 2011) [hereinafter White House, Cybersecurity Proposal], available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/lawenforcement-provisions-related-to-computer-security-full-bill.pdf; see also Letter from Jacob J. Lew, Dir., Exec. Office of the President: Office of Mgmt. &
Budget, to John Boehner, Speaker of the House of Representatives and Joseph
R. Biden, President of the Senate (May 12, 2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/Cybersecu
rity-letters-to-congress-house-signed.pdf. The White House proposal also included proposed revisions to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and legislation that required notice of data breaches. See White House, Cybersecurity
Proposal, supra note 387.
388. See White House, Cybersecurity Proposal, supra note 387, § 243(c)(9).
While this provision only encompasses “critical information infrastructure,” a
subsequent section of the proposal allows the Secretary of Homeland Security
to designate private entities as components of the nation’s “critical infrastructure” and to develop and enforce plans for addressing and mitigating cybersecurity risks. See id. §§ 2–5, 8. This portion of the White House plan uses the
same definition of critical infrastructure as the legislation proposed by the
Senators. Compare id. § 10(3), with supra note 371.
Although the White House proposal does not call for the creation of a
National Center for Cybersecurity and Communications or some similar entity, it does require the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to
“designate and maintain a center to serve as a focal point within the federal
government for cybersecurity with responsibilities that include the protection
of federal systems and critical information infrastructure and the coordination
of cyber incident response.” See White House, Cybersecurity Proposal, supra
note 387, § 243(c)(5).
In the wake of the CSA2012’s failure in the Senate, one of its sponsors, Senator Dianne Feinstein, urged President Obama to “use your full authority to protect the U.S. economy and the networks we depend on from future cyber attack.” Press Release, U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein, Feinstein
Calls on Obama to Protect Computer Networks from Cyber Attacks, (Aug. 28,
2012), http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2012/8/feinstein-callson-president-to-protect-critical-infrastructure-from-cyber-attacks.
Feinstein
noted that while “an Executive Order cannot convey protection from liability
that private sector companies may face,” the President and his administration
could issue “cybersecurity standards and provide technical assistance to companies willing to take voluntary steps to improve their security.” Id.
Feinstein’s letter, plus a provision in the 2012 Democratic National
Platform, caused concern among some that the Administration might resort to
executive orders as a way to implement cybersecurity measures. See, e.g., Jody
Westby, Businesses Beware: Heavy-Handed Tactics Planned for Cybersecurity,
FORBES (Sept. 7, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jodywestby/2012/09/07/
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These were not the only proposals Washington has generated in the last three years; several bills have been proposed in
the House of Representatives and either have been met with
varying receptions or are still pending.389 In July of 2011, Senator McCain, who wanted a new cybersecurity committee, noted
that federal cybersecurity legislation had so far “been drafted
by at least three committees and at least seven committees
claim some jurisdiction over the issue.”390 Senators Lieberman

businesses-beware-heavy-handed-tactics-planned-for-cybersecurity/. See also
DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., 2012 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL PLATFORM 24 (2012),
available at http://assets.dstatic.org/dnc-platform/2012-National-Platform.pdf
(“[T]he President will continue to take executive action to strengthen and update our cyber defenses.”). On September 6, 2012, one source reported that the
“White House [was] circulating a draft of an executive order aimed at protecting the country from cyber-attacks” in the absence of legislative measures.
Jennifer Martinez, White House Circulating Draft of Executive Order on CyHILL
(Sept.
6,
2012),
http://thehill.com/blogs/hilliconbersecurity,
valley/technology/248079-white-house-circulating-draft-of-executive-order-oncybersecurity.
The 2012 Republican Party National Platform also criticized the Obama Administration’s cybersecurity efforts:
The current Administration’s laws and policies undermine what
should be a collaborative relationship and put both the government
and private entities at a severe disadvantage in proactively identifying potential cyber-threats. The costly and heavy-handed regulatory
approach by the current Administration will increase the size and
cost of the federal bureaucracy and harm innovation in cybersecurity . . . .
REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., 2012 REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 41 (2012), available
at http://www.gop.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/2012GOPPlatform.pdf.
389. See, e.g., Brendan Sasso, House to Vote on Four Cyber Bills, Leaves
Out Lungren Measure, HILL (Apr. 20, 2012), http://thehill.com/blogs/hilliconvalley/technology/222833-house-to-vote-on-four-cyber-bills-leaves-out-lungrenmeasure; Nicole Blake Johnson, House Committees Approve 2 Cybersecurity
TIMES
(Apr.
18,
2012),
Bills,
FED.
http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20120418/CONGRESS01/204180305/100;
see also Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2012, H.R. 2096, 112th Cong.
(2012). Representative Michael Rogers introduced the Cyber Intelligence
Sharing and Protection Act. Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act of
2011, H.R. 3523, 112th Cong. (as introduced in House, Nov. 30, 2011). It
passed the House of Representatives on April 26, 2012, but so far has not received any action in the Senate. H.R. 3523: Cyber Intelligence Sharing and
Protection Act, GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr3523
(last visited Oct. 19, 2012). The bill has caused controversy because it allows
Internet service providers to share information with the government and each
other. See, e.g., David Kravets, House Passes Controversial Cybersecurity
Measure CISPA, WIRED.COM (Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.wired.com
/threatlevel/2012/04/house-passes-cispa.
390. Ben Pershing, On Cybersecurity, a Turf Battle, WASH. POST, July 18,
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and Collins disagreed, saying it would be “a waste of time to restart the process” when their committee had already done so
much work on the issue.391 One commentator put the bickering,
and the proliferation of cybersecurity committees and task forces, down to the fact that “lawmakers hate giving up turf.”392
Aside from establishing that turf battles are not confined
to federal and state agencies, the debate over McCain’s proposed committee demonstrated that lawmakers and law enforc-

2011, at A11 (quoting Senator McCain). McCain pointed out that “the White
House and the Energy, Commerce and Defense departments have all put forward separate initiatives on the subject” and argued that his proposed Select
Committee on Cyber Security and Electronic Leaks would “quell” the competition “for cyber jurisdiction” that had arisen among Congressional committees.
Marcus Weisgerber, U.S. Senate Debates Cyber Oversight Proposal, DEF.
NEWS
(July
19,
2011),
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?
i=7135581&c=POL&s=TOP. In June of 2011, the Speaker of the House and
the House Majority Leader announced “the formation of a new Cybersecurity
Task Force,” which would analyze cybersecurity issues and make recommendations to House Republican leaders in October 2011. See Press Release,
Speaker of the House John Boehner, Speaker Boehner & Leader Cantor Announce New Cybersecurity Task Force Led By Rep. Thornberry (June 23,
2011),
available
at
http://www.speaker.gov/News
/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=248724. Also, Senator Harry Reid earlier
introduced a bill that was designed to protect the U.S. from cyber-attack. See
Cyber Security and American Cyber Competitiveness Act of 2011, S. 21, 112th
Cong. (2011). And, in March of 2011, Congressman Jim Langevin introduced a
bill to “significantly strengthen protections against dangerous cyber threats.”
Press Release, U.S. Congressman Jim Langevin, Langevin Introduces Bill to
Strengthen Cybersecurity, Prevent Attacks (Mar. 16, 2011), available at
http://langevin.house.gov/press-release/langevin-introduces-bill-strengthencybersecurity-prevent-attacks.
For the Department of Energy’s legislative cybersecurity efforts, see
Cyber Security: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 112th Cong. 7 (2011) (statement of Patricia Hoffman, Assistant Secretary, Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, U.S. Department of
Energy). For the report of the Department of Commerce’s task force on cybersecurity, see DEP’T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE,
CYBERSECURITY, INNOVATION AND THE INTERNET ECONOMY (2011), available
at http://www.nist.gov/itl/upload/Cybersecurity_GreenPaper_FinalVersion.pdf.
I assume Senator McCain’s reference to Department of Defense cybersecurity
initiatives refers to the efforts examined in Part III.A.
391. Pershing, supra note 390 (quoting Senators Lieberman and Collins).
392. Id. In March of 2012, Senators McCain, Kay Bailey Hutchinson and
“other Republicans” introduced the “Strengthening and Enhancing Cybersecurity by Using Research, Education, Information, and Technology (SECURE IT)
Act.” Brenda Sasso, SECURE IT Act Introduced in the House, HILL (Mar. 27,
2012), http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/218421-secure-it-actintroduced-in-the-house; see also Strengthening and Enhancing Cybersecurity
by Using Research, Education, Information, and Technology Act of 2012, S.
2151, 112th Cong. (2012).

BRENNER_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

206

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

2/7/2013 10:57 AM

[Vol. 14:1

ers in Washington see cybersecurity as a matter of pressing
concern that requires innovative solutions. It is the need for,
and the complexity of developing, such solutions that accounts
for the proliferation of efforts to that end and the fact that they
have, so far, proven unproductive. Historically, when Congress
has been confronted with the need to act quickly to address a
traditional threat to national security, it has done so; in 2002,
for example, it took less than a month to adopt a resolution responding to then-President Bush’s request for authority to use
military force against Iraq.393 Congress has acted with similar
expedition on the other occasions when it was called upon to
approve a military response to an external threat.394
The problem Congress faces in dealing with cybersecurity
is that, as we saw earlier, the internal-external threat dichotomy becomes meaningless when attacks are vectored through
cyberspace. It is therefore difficult, even impossible, to ascertain with confidence whether an attack originated “outside” or
“inside” the territorial United States. Cyber-attacks are, as a
result, insidious, pervasive and enigmatic.
They are insidious because, as we have seen, a computer
that is linked to the Internet is vulnerable to infiltration or attack by online criminals, terrorists, or warriors.395 Cyberspace
effectively makes every point on the globe coterminous with, or
potentially coterminous with, the other points on the globe. Geographical space has ceased to be a source of security; the U.S.
can no longer rely on natural barriers or man-made barriers
such as NORAD396 to detect and deflect cyber-attacks from
“outside.” There is no “there” and “here,” at least not insofar as
those concepts have consequential import for a sovereign’s ability to protect its territory, its citizens and its assets.
Cyber-attacks are pervasive for a related reason, i.e., they
do not (necessarily) differentiate between “sovereign” targets

393. See Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of
2002, Pub. L. No.107–243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002).
394. See Declaration of State of War With Japan, S.J. Res. 116, 77th Cong.
(1941).
395. See, e.g., Michael Joseph Gross, Enter the Cyber-dragon, VANITY FAIR,
Apr. 2011, at 220, 234 (noting the widespread nature of attacks such as Operation Shady Rat).
396. See N. AM. AEROSPACE DEF. COMMAND, http://www.norad.mil (last
visited Nov. 7, 2012).
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and “citizen” targets.397 Cybercriminals attack individuals, private sector entities and governmental and military targets, and
the same is, or is likely to be, true of cyberterrorists.398 Conversely, it is already apparent that “civilians,” as well as “sovereigns,” will be the targets of cyberwarfare.399 Since the notion
of “inside” and “outside” threats, and the concomitant division
of targets into “civilians” and “sovereign,” becomes meaningless
in cyberspace, it is no longer reasonable, or possible, to assume
that each target category is vulnerable only to a corresponding
type of attack, i.e., that civilians are only attacked by cybercriminals and cyberterrorists and that government entities are
only attacked by nation-states. Each target category is now at
least potentially vulnerable to the full range of cyber-threats,
which, again, means the bifurcated approach to threat control
is no longer adequate.400
Finally, cyber-attacks are enigmatic because it can be difficult, if not impossible, to determine the geographical location
from which an attack was launched and/or the identity/affiliation of the attacker(s).401 This, as we saw above, further erodes the viability of the bifurcated approach,402 all of
which is why Congress, the White House, and various government agencies want to bring civilians into the cyber-threat response process.403
But while civilian involvement is clearly an essential component of an effective cyber-threat response process, it is also a
significant modification of how modern states approach internal and external security. Incorporating civilians into a state’s
cyber-threat process therefore raises both practical and conceptual issues. Our analysis, in the remainder of this Part and in
Part IV, primarily focuses on the conceptual issues.404

397. See supra Part II.B.
398. See supra Part II.B.
399. See supra Part II.B.
400. See supra Part II.B.
401. See supra Part II.B.
402. See supra Part II.B.
403. See supra Part II.B. For more on why private sector involvement is
essential for the United States’ ability to protect itself from cyber-threats, see
Brenner & Clarke, supra note 40, at 1024–39.
404. It focuses on the conceptual issues because a state must resolve them
before it can embark on integrating civilians into its cyber-threat response effort. Once it resolves the conceptual issues, the state can tackle the practical
issues.
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2. Conceptual Issues
It is clear from the proposals outlined above that the U.S.
will have to resolve two conceptual issues before it can successfully integrate civilians into a blended internal-external cyberthreat response effort: one is “recruitment,” i.e., the need for a
process that legitimately incorporates civilians into such an effort. The other issue is “management,” i.e., the need to structure and implement civilian participation in such an effort. We
will examine recruitment in this Part and take up management
in Part IV.
Recruitment may seem trivial or even irrelevant, but it is
not. While efforts to incorporate civilians into a cybersecurity
effort remain at a nascent stage, many entities are not enthusiastic about the measures outlined above. As one commentator
noted, “some private sector stakeholders have expressed concern that increased federal intervention in private cyber networks would impose excessive burdens and . . . stifle innovation
and commerce.”405 Companies also fear that governmentimposed cybersecurity standards and practices could “have adverse effects on the private sector’s ability to parry cyberattacks.”406 And some say “asking private industry to deal with
cybersecurity [i]s like having the airlines deal with air attacks.”407
The first two concerns seem to reflect businesses’ normal
reservations about excessive government regulation.408 As
such, they go less to the legitimacy of the recruitment process

405. Richard Weitz, Preventing the Next Private Sector Cyber Security
Breach, SECOND LINE DEF. (July 18, 2011), http://www.sldinfo.com/preventingthe-next-private-sector-cyber-security-breach. For similar views, see Letter
from Cisco Systems, IBM and the Oracle Corporation, to U.S. Senators
Lieberman and Collins (June 24, 2010), available at http://www.scribd.com/
doc/34006241/Cisco-IBM-Oracle-letter-re-S-3480-06-24-10.
406. Weitz, supra note 405.
407. John Eggerton, WH Cybersecurity Coordinator: Privacy, Speech Protections Are Core Tenets, BROADCASTING & CABLE (Aug. 4, 2011, 10:03 AM),
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/471972WH_Cybersecurity_Coordinator_Privacy_Speech_Protections_Are_Core_Tenet
s.php.
408. See, e.g., COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION at ix-xii (2006) (discussing regulatory costs on the private sector and its impact on financial markets),
available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_Report
REV2.pdf; Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062, 1076–77 (Wash. 1987).
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and more to the process of managing civilian participation in a
cybersecurity effort.
The third concern, though, is different. It reflects an appreciation of an issue I have written about before, i.e., that involving civilians in a cybersecurity effort transforms them into . . . something else.409 If such an effort focused only on
cyberwar, their status would shift from noncombatant to combatant;410 if it focused only on cybercrime and cyberterrorism,
their status would shift from civilian to police officer.411 In a
blended cyberwar/crime/terrorism response effort, the shift is
more generic. Civilians transform from nonparticipants into
participants, which has several implications, the most obvious
of which is that their role is no longer limited to performing civilian functions.
It also encompasses actively participating in the conduct of
hostilities.412 What, precisely, might that mean? As we saw earlier, the two cybersecurity bills and the White House’s cybersecurity proposal all specify that civilian owners and operators of
critical infrastructure components will be required to develop
response plans and implement them if the President declares a
national cyber-emergency.413 As far as I can tell, neither of the
bills nor the White House proposal explains what such a “response” entails.414 It would certainly involve defensive
measures, i.e., efforts to secure systems and withstand the ef409. See Brenner & Clarke, supra note 40, at 1024–39.
410. See id. at 1015 (law of armed conflict distinguishes “between combatants (soldiers) and noncombatants (civilians)” and makes civilians “non-actors”
who have no legitimate role in military hostilities).
411. See Criminal Law for Cyberspace, supra note 7, at 60–64 (development of police forces eliminated “citizen involvement” in crime/terrorism control and gave that task to professional law enforcement officers).
412. Brenner & Clarke, supra note 40, at 1048.
413. See supra notes 374–376, 383 and accompanying text. See also Cybersecurity and Internet Freedom Act of 2011, S. 413, 122th Cong. §§ 248(b)(3),
249(a)(3)(A) (2011); White House, Cybersecurity Proposal, supra note 387, §§
243(c)(5)(B), 243(c)(9)–(10).
414. This is perhaps not surprising, given that in August of 2011 the Government Accountability Office “told Pentagon officials to define ‘cybersecurity’
so the military services adopt the same terminology.” Aliya Sternstein, Auditors: Pentagon Budget Has Fuzzy Numbers, NEXTGOV (Aug. 1, 2011),
http://cybersecurityreport.nextgov.com/2011/08/auditors_pentagon_cyber_budg
et_has_fuzzy_numbers.php; see also Eric Chabrow, GAO: Can DoD Keep Pace
with Cyber Threats?, GOVINFOSECURITY (July 25, 2011), http://www.govinfose
curity.com/articles.php?art_id=3892 (explaining that the GAO criticized the
Department of Defense for not having “uniformly defined” what “constitutes a
cyberforce”).
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fects of a hostile attack. But it could also encompass offensive
measures, such as launching counter-cyber-strikes at an attacker; nothing in any of the proposals indicates this would be
required of the civilians involved in cybersecurity, but the U.S.
military has technologies that can launch offensive cyberstrikes.415
One could argue that participating in a purely defensive
response is not enough to transform a civilian entity from
cyber-noncombatant to cyber-combatant,416 but even if we assume for the purposes of analysis that this view is doctrinally
valid, I suspect it is also irrelevant. I, for one, do not believe a
cyber-threat control effort of the type the Senators’ bills and the
White House’s proposal seem to contemplate can be based primarily on having private sector entities, in effect, batten down
their cyber-hatches and ride out a storm of cyber-attacks. This
might be a viable approach if Cyber Command and its constituent cyber commands could supplement this defensive tactic
with offensive measures that repelled the attackers and ended
the cyber-emergency, but I find this scenario equally problematic. For one thing, it assumes a stable, identifiable cyber-field
of battle on which United States forces could confront, and defeat, an ascertainable unified opponent. As we saw earlier, that

415. See, e.g., U.S. SEC’Y OF THE AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION NO.
51-402, LEGAL REVIEWS OF WEAPONS AND CYBER CAPABILITIES 5 (2011),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afi51-402.pdf (defining “cyber
capability” as “any device or software payload intended to disrupt, deny, degrade, negate, impair or destroy adversarial computer systems, data, activities
or capabilities”). But see Aliya Sternstein, Cybersecurity: Defense Department,
GOV’T EXECUTIVE (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.govexec.com/story_page.cfm?artic
leid=48408&oref=todaysnews (noting that the newly released Department of
Defense cyber strategy focuses on defensive, rather than offensive, measures).
On a related issue, the Department of Defense has indicated that damage to
United States critical infrastructure or injury to United States citizens can
warrant the use of kinetic force in response. See Siobhan Gorman & Julian E.
Barnes, Cyber Combat: Act of War, WALL ST. J., May 31, 2011, at A1.
On a possibly related note, many U.S. companies have for years argued that they should be allowed to strike back at cybercriminals and other
attackers. See, e.g., Jeff Green, Computer Users Need “Offensive” Security,
MCAFEE SECURITY J. (McAfee, Santa Clara, Ca.), Issue 6, 2010, at 3–4, 5–8,
27–30, available at http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-securityjournal-summer-2010.pdf; see also Bruce P. Smith, Hacking, Poaching and
Counterattacking: Digital Counterstrikes and the Contours of Self-Help, 1 J.L.
ECON. & POL’Y 171, 174–78 (2005) (discussing a virus security technology developed by Symbiot that launches “‘counterstrikes’ against digital intruders”).
416. Cf. Brenner & Clarke, supra note 40, at 1026–35.

BRENNER_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

2/7/2013 10:57 AM

CYBER-THREATS

211

scenario, while not impossible, is unlikely.417
I also find this scenario problematic for another reason: I
do not see how Cyber Command and its constituent cyber
commands could possibly “defend” United States companies
from a series of sustained cyber-attacks. Aside from anything
else, I am not convinced that the various commands have the
resources needed for such an endeavor;418 there is also the fact
that, as we saw earlier, Cyber Command has not developed policies and procedures that integrate the disparate commands into a unified entity.419 But even if Cyber Command satisfactorily
addresses these and other operational issues, I do not see how
it, alone, could “defend” United States civilians from cyberattackers. As I noted above, cyber-threats, unlike their realspace counterparts, are insidious, pervasive, and enigmatic
which means a cyber-attack almost certainly would not focus
on an identifiable, stable battle-“space” and involve an ascertainable, unified opponent. And attacks would in all probability
target systems operated by private entities, at least to some extent.
If the targeted entities’ only response was to try to secure
their systems and ride out the attacks, this would either (i) be
the United States’ only response to the attack or it (ii) would be
up to Cyber Command and its constituent commands to take
offensive measures against the attackers.420 We will assume,
for the purposes of analysis, that Cyber Command and the
lesser commands are capable of, and do, implement such
measures—but to what extent? I find it difficult to believe that
Cyber Command and its constituent units would be able to
launch an offensive response against every attack being waged
on a United States company. Even if they were, the attackers
could simply end that assault and move on to another target,
which would mean that Cyber Command would eventually
have to do the same—after it had ascertained which system(s)
417. See supra Part II.B.
418. See, e.g., J. Nicholas Hoover, Senate Confirms Military Cybersecurity
Chief, INFO. WK. (May 11, 2010, 12:48 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/
news/government/security/224701513 (noting that some “details of Cyber
Command remain to be worked out, such as force size”).
419. See supra note 275 and accompanying text; see also supra note 414.
420. The utility of adding an offensive cyber-response to the scenario is
that by making the attack more risky, and perhaps more “expensive” for the
attackers, it could cause them to terminate the attack sooner than they would
otherwise. See RAOUL NAROLL ET AL., MILITARY DETERRENCE IN HISTORY 3–4
(1974).
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the attackers had moved on to.
I also see yet another complication: Would it be possible for
Cyber Command to take effective offensive (and defensive)
measures without being able to operate from within the attacked system or by utilizing resources of that system? In other
words, if a private sector entity’s computer systems were under
attack, could Cyber Command protect the company without
having access to its systems or, at a minimum, assistance from
the employees who were in charge of those systems?421 I suspect the answer will, at least in part, depend on the nature and
circumstances of the attack.422
My point is that I do not believe United States companies
will be able to rely solely on defensive measures in the event of
a cyber-attack. As opposed to the scenario above, which assumes a large-scale, coordinated attack (or series of attacks), I
suspect it is far more likely that United States targets, both
government and civilian, will come under periodic, sporadic attacks from unknown attackers, who may or may not persist
from incident to incident. If the private sector’s only role is to
hunker down and try to ride out an attack, then certain attackers, most notably nation-states, could effectively impair the
functioning of one or more sectors of the United States economy
simply by attacking the entities involved in those sectors. The
attacks would, at least to some extent, impair their ability to
conduct business as usual, which could be the attackers’ objective.
It seems, then, that civilians need to be part of a cyberresponse effort and that their role may well encompass offen421. If the employees of such a company actively assisted Cyber Command
personnel who were responding to an attack, the civilians’ status could shift
from that of noncombatant to combatant. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Martin, Adapting U.C.C. § 2-615 Excuse for Civilian-Military Contractors in Wartime, 61
FLA. L. REV. 99, 138 (2009).
422. If the attack is purely external, e.g., if it is a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack that bombards the company with traffic in an effort to
knock it offline, Cyber Command might well be able to respond without having
access to the company’s own systems. See How a “Denial of Service” Attack
Works, CNET NEWS (Feb. 9, 2000), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1017236728.html. If, on the other hand, the attack involves the infiltration of the
company’s system by, say, malware or hacking, Cyber Command might need
access to the system or the cooperation of the company’s information security
staff to deal with it. See Michael Joseph Gross, A Declaration of Cyber-War,
VANITY FAIR, Apr. 2011, at 152, 155 (“Stick a flash drive with the virus into a
laptop and it enters the machine surreptitiously . . .”).
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sive, as well as defensive, measures. The person who analogized “asking private industry to deal with cybersecurity” to
“having the airlines deal with air attacks”423 clearly recognized
that this is an implicit element of the current cybersecurity
proposals. It is not surprising that that commentator found this
result unacceptable. It is likely others have reacted similarly
because, as I explain elsewhere, for at least a century civilians
have had no responsibility for maintaining internal or external
order (unless they join the military or law enforcement).424 In
the preceding centuries, civilians bore most, if not all, of the responsibility for ensuring their societies were protected from
both internal and external threats.425 We have forgotten that;
we assume security is a matter that is to be, and will be, dealt
with by the appropriate professionals.426
The Senators’ bills and the White House’s proposal recognize that while this state of affairs may continue to prevail in
real-space, the responsibility for dealing with threats in cyberspace must be shared by the military, law enforcement, and at
least some of the civilian population.427 If nothing else, this is
evident from how Howard Schmidt, the White House’s “Cyber
Czar,”428 responded to the air-attack/cyber-attack analogy: He
indicated that “building security into systems has become a

423. See supra note 407 and accompanying text.
424. See Criminal Law for Cyberspace, supra note 7, at 60–65. See also
CYBER-THREATS, supra note 7, at 15–16, 165–69, 213–15; Brenner & Clarke,
supra note 40, at 1073–75.
425. See Criminal Law for Cyberspace, supra note 7, at 60–65; CYBERTHREATS, supra note 7, at 15–16, 165–69, 213–15.
426. See Criminal Law for Cyberspace, supra note 7, at 65–76. Indeed, our
laws reinforce that. If someone responds to a crime by conducting their own
investigation, they will be prosecuted, essentially for vigilantism. See, e.g.,
State v. Emmons, 161 P.3d 920, 926 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007); Staben v. Hernandez, No. 06cv1407-IEG(BLM), 2007 WL 2238657 at *1, *5–11 (S.D. Cal. 2007).
And as noted earlier, if a civilian engages in military combat, his or her status
changes from noncombatant to unlawful combatant. See supra notes 227 and
410.
427. See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. S909, S911 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2011) (statement of Sen. Collins) (noting that the “private sector is also under attack” in
cyberspace). Additionally, note, “The United States requires a comprehensive
cyber security strategy backed by effective implementation of innovative security measures. There must be strong coordination among law enforcement, intelligence agencies, the military, and the private sector owners and operators
of critical infrastructure.” Id.
428. See Andy Greenberg, Finally, A Cyber Czar, FORBES (Dec. 21, 2009),
http://www.forbes.com/2009/12/21/cyber-czar-named-security-business-in-thebeltway-schmidt.html.
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business imperative,” and he noted that the government needs
to “help” those who do not realize this to “understand they have
that shared responsibility.”429 Schmidt might more accurately
have said that the government needs to “help” these people
“understand that they now have that shared responsibility.”
This is the problem of recruitment. In real-space, at least
in the United States, recruitment is voluntary: we no longer
have a draft; those who are so inclined volunteer to serve in the
military.430 And law enforcement agencies hire officers from
candidates who voluntarily apply for those positions.431 The
rest of us assume that security (and, by extension, cybersecurity) is the province of those who have chosen to engage in the
processes of protecting the rest of us from hostile military forces, criminals and terrorists.
We are therefore not inclined to “get involved” in security
(or cybersecurity). This disinclination is the product of a culture
and a legal system that discourage citizens from participating
in law enforcement or military combat on the quite logical
premise that untrained civilians are only likely to impede
trained professionals in the performance of their duties.432 In
429. Eggerton, supra note 407. It is also evident from the fact that all of the
government’s Cyber Storm cybersecurity exercises have involved private sector entities working with state and federal agencies in responding to cyberattack scenarios. See Cyber Storm: Securing Cyberspace, U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/files/training/gc_1204738275985.shtm
(last visited Dec. 31, 2012).
430. See Tim Donahue, Note, The Constitutionality of Stop-Loss and Why It
Is Better for the Country Than the Draft, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 71, 78–83
(2009).
431. See, e.g., Police Recruitment and Retention Clearinghouse, RAND,
http://www.rand.org/ise/centers/quality_policing/cops.html (last visited Nov. 7,
2012).
432. See, e.g., Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 765 (Ind. 2009) (reasoning that it is best to leave the task of investigating potential criminal activity
and “deciding upon the appropriate response to trained professionals”); see also supra note 426.
The disinclination to get involved can, as one article noted, also be a
product of “ignorance” and “denial”:
Google executives reportedly believed that the American government
monitors this country’s Internet infrastructure the same way it monitors foreign military threats to keep the geographic homeland secure.
A former White House official told me, “After Google got hacked, they
called the N.S.A. in and said, ‘You were supposed to protect us from
this!’ The N.S.A. guys just about fell out of their chairs. They could
not believe how naïve the Google guys had been.”
Gross, supra note 395, at 225. This article also suggests that at least some of
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real-space security, the concern that involving lay civilians in
such activity could have a significant downside is exacerbated
by the fact that both law enforcement and military combat involve the use of physical violence.
That factor does not apply, or at least does not apply to the
same extent, when the issue is civilian involvement in cybersecurity. But this scenario has its own issues. One, as noted
above, is the so-far prevalent disinclination of civilians to become involved in any type of security effort. That disinclination
will have to be overcome if civilians, and civilian-owned entities, are to be successfully recruited into a cybersecurity effort.
But overcoming the disinclination is a delicate, difficult matter
for the leaders of the United States or, for that matter, for any
country: they would have to convince the populace that the
government cannot protect them, or their assets, from cyberthreats while, at the same time, maintaining civilian confidence in the government’s ability to protect them from other
threats.433
There is another downside for private-sector entities affected by the new cybersecurity proposals: the cost of the hardware, software, and expertise they will need to maintain the
requisite level of security. As we saw, the Senators’ bills and
the White House’s proposal require entities that are part of the
nation’s critical infrastructure to develop and implement security measures and plans for responding to a national cyberemergency.434 The entities would have to certify, every year,
that they have measures and plans in place that are adequate
to face the risks they confront; their certifications are subject to

the U.S. corporate sector’s disinclination to take responsibility for cybersecurity is the result of companies not sharing information about the cyber-attacks
they have sustained. See id. at 234 (“[T]op corporate managers—following the
advice of their lawyers—are reflexively keeping breach information secret
from other companies that are trying to defend themselves.”).
433. One article describes the prevailing corporate attitude as follows:
“What are the subconscious assumptions that companies bring to the
issue of foreign cyber-attacks on their networks?,” a senior Senate
staffer who works on cyber-issues asked. . . . “They assume that if
something bad happens government will take care of the losses. They
act like they don’t really believe that a bank could get completely taken out, or that a tech giant could get its whole lunch eaten . . . .”
Gross, supra note 395, at 234. I suspect we will see the disinclination eroded
gradually, as news outlets and other media publicize leaked information about
cyber-attacks and, in so doing, begin to cultivate attitudes similar to those
that have driven many citizens to invest in alarm systems and burglar bars.
434. See supra notes 374–379, 383, 388 and accompanying text.
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review by the official who is assigned responsibility for implementing this part of the proposed cybersecurity initiative.435
This means the companies will bear the costs of implementing these measures; there is no provision in any of the
proposals that would reimburse affected private sector entities
for the expense involved in implementing the required security
measures.436 This will only exacerbate the general disinclination companies, like other civilians, have with regard to involving themselves in cybersecurity.
And all of that creates the challenge of recruitment. In
Part IV, we will analyze the approach the U.S. government is
using in an effort to recruit civilian-owned entities into a cybersecurity effort and then examine a possible alternative approach, an extrapolation from certain historical practices.
IV. THE LIMITS OF BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL . . .
[T]he old structures . . . —state, non-state, private—
. . . break down [in cyberspace].437
In the remainder of this article, I assume, for the reasons
outlined above, that civilian participation is an essential element of an adequate, effective United States cybersecurity initiative. The focus of the analysis below is therefore not on
whether such participation is warranted but is, instead, on how

435. See, e.g., Cybersecurity and Internet Freedom Act of 2011, S. 413,
112th Cong. § 250(a)–(b) (2011).
436. And this is likely to exacerbate an attitude that prevails in some companies, i.e., the tendency to doubt the return on investment of money spent on
cybersecurity. See, e.g., Bill Brenner, Companies on IT Spending: Where’s the
ROI?, CSO (Jan. 25, 2010), http://www.csoonline.com/article/518764/companie
s-on-it-security-spending-where-s-the-roi. An article on cyberwar described a
far from atypical exchange between a corporate officer and the company’s information security personnel:
One . . . security specialist recalls a conversation with a chief financial
officer and a chief information officer of a major corporation after
finding 65 vulnerabilities in the company’s networks. . . . “What’s the
worst that can happen if we don’t fix any of these?” the C.F.O. asked.
“We have large exposure,” answered the C.I.O. “We could potentially
be attacked—”
“No, no, no. What is the financial impact if we don’t do any of these?”
“We’re not regulated or audited, so there won’t be any fines.”
The C.F.O. answered, “You get no budget,” and the topic was closed.
Gross, supra note 395, at 233.
437. Id. at 234 (quoting General Michael Hayden, former director of the
NSA and of the CIA).
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it might best be achieved.
This Part analyzes the approach the United States government is relying on to develop an adequate, effective cybersecurity initiative, i.e., the efforts reviewed in Part III, supra. As
noted earlier,438 these efforts commendably focus on remediating factors that contribute to the inefficacy with which existing
United States threat-control structures confront cyber-threats.
The problem, as I explain below, is that while the efforts are
commendable, they are also inadequate because they attempt
to “update” bureaucratic systems that were developed to control
threats that are simpler and more parochial than the ones we
now confront.439
Part IV.A puts these efforts into context by (i) tracing the
United States government’s increasing reliance on bureaucracy
and (ii) examining the historical and other factors that shaped
Weber’s views on bureaucracy. Part IV.B then analyzes the efficacy of the efforts outlined in Part III and finds them wanting.
Part V outlines a possible alternative: an approach that is
based on an older, more decentralized approach to maintaining
internal and external order.
A. BUSINESS AS USUAL
Once it is fully established bureaucracy is among those social structures which are the hardest to destroy.440
The efforts outlined in Part III are all predicated on the
bureaucratic model that has come to dominate governance in
the U.S. and elsewhere (and also plays a significant role in the

438. See supra Part II.
439. See supra Parts II, III. General Hayden, who was quoted above, seems
to agree, at least to some extent. See supra note 437. General Hayden also
stated:
We may come to a point where . . . what is permitted there is something that we would never let the private sector do in physical space.
. . . [H]ow about a digital Blackwater? . . . [W]e have privatized certain defense activities . . . and now you’ve got a new domain in which
we don’t have any paths trampled down in the forest in terms of what
it is we expect the government . . . to do.
Andrew Nusca, Hayden: “Digital Blackwater” May Be Necessary for Private
Sector to Fight Cyber Threats, ZDNET (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.zdnet.com/
blog/btl/hayden-digital-blackwater-may-be-necessary-for-private-sector-tofight-cyber-threats/53639 (quoting General Hayden during a panel discussion
in the summer of 2011).
440. MAX WEBER, ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 228 (Hans Gerth & Charles Mills
eds. & trans., Galaxy Books 1958) [hereinafter ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY].
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private sector).441 We have become accustomed to bureaucracy;
it has, in effect, become “business as usual.”
In this Part, we will engage in a rather modest exercise in
the sociology of knowledge by approaching bureaucracy as a
problematic construct. The sociology of knowledge is essentially
concerned with the “social construction of reality,” i.e., with
how the orchestrations human beings develop and then rely
upon to order their relationships with each other become perceived as having an objective reality.442 This can occur in various ways, one of which involves the process of institutionalization.443
Institutionalization begins with habitualization: with the
development of patterns of human activity that become routinized and are eventually “legitimated.”444 Legitimation is the
process by which a newly developed institution is “explained”
and justified, i.e., by which it becomes accepted as a legitimate
and even inevitable element of a social system.445 Once this
process has taken place, we will perceive the institution as a
“facticity, an opus alienum over which” we have “no control rather than as the opus proprium of” our “own productive activity.”446 In other words, we forget we created the institution for
purely practical purposes and come to regard it as an entity
that exists independently of us. This reification of institutions
can result in a society’s persisting in routinized behaviors that
have ceased to be productive and, indeed, may have become
counterproductive.447
441. See supra note 4.
442. See, e.g., PETER BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 1–
3, 89 (1st ed. 1966). The processes by which social phenomena become perceived as objective phenomena that exist separately and independently of human activity is known as reification. Id. at 82–83.
443. See id. at 45–85.
444. See id. at 85–96 (explaining legitimation).
445. See id. at 58; see also id. at 85–96.
446. Id. at 82–83.
447. See supra note 442. This can, of course, be true of bureaucracy; as an
“anonymous White House aide” noted in a memo written during the Vietnam
war, bureaucracy “tends to contort policy to existing structures rather than
adjusting structures to reflect changes in policy.” ROBERT W. KOMER,
BUREAUCRACY AT WAR: U.S. PERFORMANCE IN THE VIETNAM CONFLICT 17
(1986). See also Wilson, supra note 233, at 98 (“Any organization, and afortiori
any public organization, develops a genuine belief in the rightness of its mission . . . .”).
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That brings us to our sociology of knowledge exercise,
which will proceed in two stages: In the remainder of this subpart, we will examine the rise of bureaucracy in the United
States and the historical context in which Max Weber developed his views on bureaucracy; in the next subpart, we analyze
the role bureaucracies are playing in the United States’ efforts
to develop an effective cyber-threat control structure and consider whether the bureaucratic model of organization advances,
or impedes, this process.
As one author noted, “[d]uring its first 150 years, the
American republic was not thought to have a ‘bureaucracy,’”
but by 1925 “nearly half a million” people worked for government agencies.448 The New Deal and World War II built upon
the earlier increases in the size of United States government
bureaucracies, a phenomenon due in large part to the rise of
regulatory agencies at both the state and federal levels.449 As
one observer notes, the “growth in the size” of bureaucracy can,
to a great extent, be explained by the need for personnel to do
“routine, repetitive tasks” the completion of which was essential for various government functions.450
Since then, the increase in the number of bureaucracies
may have moderated but the persistence of bureaucracies in
U.S. governance (and in the private sector) has not.451 Max We-

448. Wilson, supra note 233, at 77. See also id. at 87–89 (tracing development of federal and state bureaucracies).
449. See, e.g., Arianne Renan Barzilay, Women at Work: Toward an Inclusive Narrative of the Rise of the Regulatory State, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER
169, 172–73 (2008); Wilson, supra note 233, at 78; see also Larry G. Gerber,
World War II and the Expansion of Government in America, 75 NAT’L F. 30
(1995); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism after the New Deal, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 421, 421–22 (1987).
James Q. Wilson ascribes much of the growth in American bureaucracy to “bureaucratic clientelism,” i.e., to the development of “clientele-oriented
departments” that arose to address the “distinctive interests” that were the
product of a “diversifying economy.” Wilson, supra note 233, at 87–91. He also
attributes it to the development of federal grants to state and local governments, which resulted in the creation of agencies to monitor the administration and implementation of those grants. See id. at 91–93.
450. See Wilson, supra note 233, at 81. As others have noted, bureaucracies
“excel[] at routine, standard tasks.” James R. Holmes & Janne E. Nolan, Render unto Caesar: Bureaucracy and Nonproliferation after the Iraq War?, 28
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 73, 79 (2004); see also Carroll Seron, The Impact of
Court Organization on Litigation, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 451, 459 n.18 (1990)
(“[A] necessary precondition for bureaucratization is the routinization of
tasks . . . .”).
451. One author attributes this, at least in part, to the development of
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ber would ascribe this persistence of bureaucracy to its efficiency; as I noted earlier,452 he believed that “[t]he decisive reason
for the advance of bureaucratic organization has always been
its purely technical superiority over any other form of organization.”453 Indeed, at one point Weber noted that the “fully developed bureaucratic mechanism compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine with the non-mechanical
modes of production.”454
Many of us, I suspect, might take issue with Weber’s views
about the inevitable efficiency of bureaucracies, if only because
of our own experiences in dealing with them. In Part IV.B, I
will do something similar, i.e., I will analyze the relative efficacy with which the bureaucracies we examined in Part III are, or
are likely to be, capable of dealing with cyber-threats. My analysis of this issue will be based on the premise that Weber’s
views on the inherent efficiency and consequent superiority of
bureaucratic organization were, in critical respects, the product
of the world in which he lived. I develop that premise in the
remainder of this Part.
Weber was born in 1864; the German Empire became a
unified state when he was six years old.455 In the next forty
years, the Empire went through a period of rapid industrialization and population growth.456 Weber consequently matured in
a country that was establishing itself as a modern nation-state
and a modern industrial power.457 He, in fact, became “a cham“self-perpetuating” agencies, i.e., to the creation of agencies that produce “a set
of political relationships that make exceptionally difficult further alteration of
that program.” Wilson, supra note 233, at 93. Wilson also notes that Georg
Simmel believed that organizations tend “to acquire the characteristics of
those institutions with which they are in conflict, so that as government becomes more bureaucratic, private organizations” will tend to “become bureaucratic as well.” Id. at 80.
452. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
453. ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY, supra note 440, at 214; see also WEBER, supra
note 1, at 337 (stating bureaucracy is the “most rational known means of carrying out imperative control over human beings”).
454. See WEBER, supra note 440, at 214.
455. See id. 3–8. See also Peter E. Quint, The Constitutional Law of German Unification, 50 MD. L. REV. 475, 478 (1991) (describing unification of the
German Empire in 1871).
456. See VOLKER R. BERGHAHN, IMPERIAL GERMANY, 1871–1914:
ECONOMY, SOCIETY, CULTURE AND POLITICS 22–37, 43–54 (1994).
457. See Tod Leaven & Christopher Dodge, The United States Cyber Command: International Restrictions vs. Manifest Destiny, 12 N.C. J.L. & TECH.
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pion of German industrialization.”458
It is therefore not surprising that Weber’s work emphasizes the shift from an older, essentially ad hoc social order based
on traditional, status-based authority to a system based on “rational” authority, i.e., on “a belief in the ‘legality’ of . . . rules
and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to
issue commands . . . .”459 Rational authority was coming to
dominate the systems around him: the newly-established German state and the corporate entities that were the architects of
the industrialism.460 It is also not surprising that Weber viewed
this new type of authority, and the bureaucracies which it created and sustained, as vastly superior to the older systems that
had gone before.461
Given all this, it is only reasonable to infer that the validity of Weber’s views as to the inherent operational superiority of
the bureaucratic form of organization depends on the context in
which the bureaucracy operates.462 His views emerged in an era
when each society, each nation-state, was a closed system, i.e.,
was subject to the constraints noted in our analysis of the bi-

ONLINE 1, 23 n.132 (2010) (“From 1848 to 1871, the unification of Germany
with Prussia brought about a Navy to Rival England, an army to rival any
power in Europe, and growing influence to rival the former Hapsburgs.”).
458. FRITZ RINGER, MAX WEBER: AN INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY 2 (2004).
459. WEBER, supra note 1, at 328. Weber identified several essential characteristics of the rational-legal, bureaucratic organization: the “organization of
official functions bound by rules;” a “specified sphere of competence” for the
bureaucracy itself and for each unit within the bureaucracy; the “organization
of offices follows the principle of hierarchy; that is, each lower office is under
the control and supervision of a higher one;” “specialized training” and “acts,
decisions, and rules” that are “formulated and recorded in writing.” Id. at 330–
32.
460. See RINGER, supra note 458, at 64–65, 220–21; see also JÜRGEN
KOCKA, INDUSTRIAL CULTURE & BOURGEOIS SOCIETY: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND
BUREAUCRACY IN MODERN GERMANY 130, 148, 156–57, 198–204 (1999);
WEBER, supra note 440, at 232 (“Everywhere the modern state is undergoing
bureaucratization.”).
461. Weber recognized that forms of bureaucratic organization had existed
for centuries. See ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY, supra note 440, at 204–24 (describing
bureaucracies in ancient Egypt, Rome, and China). He noted that these early
bureaucracies differed from the organizations emerging in the nineteenth century in various ways, the most important of which was that the latter were
based on rational-legal authority. See id. at 204–28.
462. In other words, it is reasonable to assume there will be a direct relationship between the extent to which the context is empirically and doctrinally
isomorphic to the context in which Weber developed his views on bureaucracy
and the extent to which bureaucracy functions at the level of efficiency Weber
attributed to it.
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furcated approach states use to control threats to internal and
external order.463 Weber consequently assumed a territoriallydefined nation-state, the stable boundaries and sovereign authority of which circumscribed the functioning of the bureaucracies that carried out various essential functions, including
those charged with maintaining order.464
This meant that the state could respectively assign discrete
bureaucracies a “specified sphere of competence,”465 i.e., turf,
which was exclusive to that organization, and rely on each bureaucracy to formulate and enforce the rules necessary to carry
out the functions assigned to it.466 The system was predicated
on a multi-faceted division of labor among agencies, with each
being the sole arbiter of its sphere of responsibility.467 This system therefore encompassed the bureaucracies that were respectively assigned responsibility for ensuring internal and external order, along with those that were given other functions.
Our concern, of course, is only with the bureaucracies that are
charged with maintaining order.
In Part II, we saw that our use of cyberspace erodes the
territorial integrity of nation-states and, in so doing, creates
new and difficult challenges for the organizations that are given this responsibility. The issue we now need to address is
whether bureaucracy continues to be a viable organizational
model insofar as the tasks of maintaining internal and external
order are concerned or whether it is an institution that has, at
least to some extent, outlived its utility in this regard. We take
up that issue in the next subpart.
B. THE FALLACY OF INEVITABILITY
The tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limit of its
logic . . .468

463. See supra Part II; see also WEBER, supra note 1, at 156 (modern nation-state is based on an “administrative and legal order” that “claims binding
authority, not only over the members of the state” but also “over all action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction”). Weber notes that the state is “thus a
compulsory association with a territorial basis.” Id.
464. See supra note 463.
465. WEBER, supra note 1, at 330.
466. See supra note 459; see also supra note 4 (discussing how agencies are
concerned with their own turf).
467. See supra note 4.
468. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51
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As we saw in the previous Part, bureaucracy, like all social
institutions, is a tool: a way of organizing human activity to
achieve particular results. It has no inherent validity, no inevitable superiority over other ways of organizing human endeavor.469 It is the pragmatic product of an ad hoc evolutionary process.470
And as I noted earlier, bureaucracy organizes human activity hierarchically, into a descending series of offices, each of
which is “under the control and supervision of a higher” office.471 Bureaucracy’s reliance on hierarchically ordered positions comes from the military, which adopted hierarchical organization several millennia ago.472 Like the military, modern
bureaucracy is based on a tiered organizational structure in
which tasks are allocated in order of their decreasing importance to the increasingly less important positions in the bureaucracy.473 And because authority is allocated in a similar
fashion, the functionaries in an organization carry out their duties subject to the supervision and approval of the functionaries
above them.474 As Weber approvingly noted, modern bureau-

(1921).
469. See supra Part IV.A.
470. See, e.g., BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 442, at 52 (“It is impossible to understand an institution . . . without an understanding of the historical
process in which it was produced. Institutions . . . control human conduct by
setting up predefined patterns of conduct, which channel it in one direction as
against the many other directions that would theoretically be possible.”).
See also, “[a]n institutional world . . . is experienced as an objective
reality. It has a history that antedates the individual’s birth . . . . It was there
before he was born, and it will be there after his death. This history itself, as
the tradition of the existing institutions, has the character of objectivity.” Id.
at 56–57.
471. WEBER, supra note 1, at 331; see supra note 459.
472. See, e.g., JOHN ARQUILLA & DAVID RONFELDT, SWARMING & THE
FUTURE OF CONFLICT 13–14 (2000); see also ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY, supra note
440, at 221–24 (discussing the bureaucratization of the army and organized
warfare). For non-military uses of bureaucratic organization in the ancient
world, see id. at 204 (discussing ancient Egypt, Rome, and China). The military developed hierarchical organization to meet its new goal of “achiev[ing]
advantages in mass” over an adversary. ARQUILLA & RONFELDT, supra note
472, at 13. Hierarchies let commanders create and utilize “well-articulated
formations” of troops. Id. Hierarchically organized armies therefore replaced
the melee, which was the earlier, “chaotic form of war.” Id. at 10.
473. See supra note 459; see also ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY, supra note 440, at
197 (“The principles of office hierarchy and of levels of graded authority mean
a firmly ordered system of super- and subordination” in which “lower offices
are supervised by higher ones.”).
474. See supra note 473.
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cracy has many of the characteristics of a well-functioning machine.475
Machines, as we all know, are well-suited for specific, repetitive tasks but have no ability to adapt to changing circumstances—to innovate.476 That characteristic, which bureaucracies clearly share with machines, has not been particularly
problematic for them in the decades since Weber lauded bureaucracy’s inherent supremacy over other types of organization.477
It has not been problematic, I submit, because this semimechanical, segmented organizational structure is well suited
for carrying out the routine, repetitive tasks societies have for
the most part assigned to bureaucracy over the last century.478
Or, I should say, the bureaucratic organizational structure is in
the abstract well-suited for this purpose; as a matter of historical reality, its efficacy in this regard has been eroded by various
circumstances over the last few decades, at least in the United
States.479 Some of this erosion can be attributed to structural
and/or operational flaws in the bureaucratic model of organization; others are the product of changing conditions in the environment in which bureaucracies now operate.480
The challenges emerging from cyberspace are an example
of the latter and exacerbate the former, at least as far as bureaucracies charged with maintaining order are concerned.
Given this, one might expect the United States to be experimenting with new approaches to maintaining internal and external order, at least with regard to threat activity originating
in cyberspace. That, though, is not the case: as we saw in Part
III, the federal government’s efforts to improve the country’s
475. See supra note 454 and accompanying text.
476. If, for example, the electricity goes out, my refrigerator shuts down, it
does not have the ability to find and utilize an alternative power source. And if
my coffee-maker quits working, my toaster will not be able to fill in for it.
477. See, e.g., supra note 453 and accompanying text.
478. See supra note 450 and accompanying text.
479. See supra note 4.
480. As to the former, see supra note 4. In the United States, bureaucracy
seems to have become a victim of its own success; proliferating and expanding
bureaucracies create the turf wars described earlier. See supra note 4. And the
United States’ approach to bureaucracy has increasingly displayed the tendency noted above, i.e., a propensity to over-use and over-orchestrate this concededly useful form of organization. I will return to this issue later in the text
above.

BRENNER_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

2/7/2013 10:57 AM

CYBER-THREATS

225

cyber-threat-control structure are all predicated on bureaucratic solutions. So unless we assume the federal government is descending into madness,481 there must be some rational explanation for this ostensibly illogical behavior.
There is a rational explanation for the government’s persistent reliance on bureaucracy as the strategy used to address
challenges, even when it is apparent that the challenges involve circumstances that make the use of bureaucratic solutions highly problematic. I ascribe it to what I call the fallacy of
inevitability (or, business as usual): the tendency to assume
that reified, institutionalized patterns of behavior are necessary and, indeed, inevitable.482 If a person, or an organization,
assumes that institutionalized methodologies are inevitable,
i.e., are a “given,” the person/organization will not attempt to
develop new methodologies in order to deal with new challenges. I do not mean to suggest that our hypothetical person/organization makes a conscious choice to eschew innovation; rather, institutions establish “how these things are
done”483 and, in so doing, implicitly foreclose consideration of
alternatives.484
I believe the fallacy of inevitability explains the behaviors
we reviewed in Part III. To understand why I believe that, we
need to review the behaviors in question according to the institution—i.e., military, law enforcement, and private sector—to
which they pertain.
1. The Military
We will begin, as we did in Part III, with the military. As
we saw above, the federal government initially intended to im-

481. See Albert Einstein Quotes, ALBERT EINSTEIN SITE ONLINE,
http://www.alberteinsteinsite.com/quotes/einsteinquotes.html (last updated
Jan. 8, 2012) (“‘Insanity: Doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.’ -Albert Einstein”). The true origin of this aphorism is
unclear and its attribution to Einstein is disputed. See Peter Baskerville, Did
Einstein Really Define Insanity as “Doing the Same Thing Over and Over
Again and Expecting Different Results”?, QUORA (Oct. 29, 2010), http://www.qu
ora.com/Did-Einstein-really-define-insanity-as-doing-the-same-thing-over-andover-again-and-expecting-different-results.
482. See supra note 447 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 442
and 470 (discussing the definition of reification and how conduct is controlled
by setting up predefined patterns of human conduct).
483. BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 442, at 56.
484. See id. at 51 (explaining the institutionalization of behaviors narrows
choices and, in so doing, frees us from “the burden of ‘all those decisions’”).
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prove the military’s ability to respond to cyber-threats by creating a new threat-specific bureaucracy, i.e., a cyberspace command, which would have become part of the Air Force.485 That
approach would have centralized the U.S. military’s cyberspace
operations in a single bureaucratic organization—Air Force
Cyber Command—which might, or might not, have been a good
thing. 486
This initial approach, like all the approaches we examined
in Part III.A, was predicated on the classic, Weberian tactic of
creating a dedicated bureaucracy to take responsibility for a
specific function. It would have made a cadre of Air Force
cyber-specialists responsible for controlling cyber-threats (at
least, those that fall within the military’s sphere of responsibility),487 and thereby avoided the segmented response authority
that, among other things, is an integral part of U.S. law enforcement.488 In other words, the initial approach would have
assigned cyberspace response authority to the Air Force, just as
the federal government long ago assigned maritime response
authority to the Navy and aerial response authority to the Air
Force. Since the parsing of kinetic threat response authority for
those combat domains has worked reasonably well, employing a
similar strategy for cyberspace response authority might have
been a good approach if bureaucratic response processes were
effective with regard to cyber-threats. As we saw in Parts II
and III, they are not.
The government’s initial approach to assigning cyberspace
response authority also suffered from another defect: unlike air
space and maritime space, cyberspace is not a “space.”489 Cyberspace is a global communication system of tremendous, and
continually evolving, complexity and sophistication.490 It is con485. See supra Part III.A.1.
486. See supra Part III.A.1.
487. See supra Part II.
488. See supra Part III.B; see also supra note 3 (discussing how the U.S.
law enforcement is segmented into federal, state, and local divisions).
489. See, for example, Blumenthal v. Drudge:
“[C]yberspace” is not a “space” . . . . At least not in the way we understand space. It’s not located anywhere; it has no boundaries; you can’t
“go” there. At the bottom, the Internet is really more idea than entity.
It is an agreement we have made to hook our computers together and
communicate by way of binary impulses and digitized signals . . . .
Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 48 n.7. (D.D.C. 1998).
490. See DEP’T OF DEF., DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS
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sequently impossible to segregate the myriad of activities that
create and sustain cyberspace from the real-space actors and
assets with which they interact.491 It would, therefore, have
been difficult for the Air Force Cyber Command that was the
focus of the initial approach to implement that responsibility.492
Instead of simply fighting “in” cyberspace, the proposed Air
Force Cyber Command would have been dealing with threats
that were vectored through its own computer systems plus the
systems operated by the Army, the Navy, the Marines, and the
Coast Guard, as well as with systems owned and operated by
civilians and civilian entities.493 There would therefore have
139 (2009), available at http://jitc.fhu.disa.mil/jitc_dri/pdfs/jp1_02.pdf (defining
cyberspace as “[a] global domain . . . consisting of the interdependent network
of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers”).
491. Each of the five branches of the U.S. military uses cyberspace in its
various activities. See, e.g., Joshua E. Kastenberg, Changing the Paradigm of
Internet Access from Government Information Systems: A Solution to the Need
for the DOD to Take Time-Sensitive Action on the NIPRNET, 64 A.F. L. REV.
175, 183 (2009) (“During any given twenty-four hour period the Internet is accessed over one billion times from roughly seven million [Department of Defense] owned computers.”); see also Annual Cyber Awareness Training,
MARINES.MIL (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.marines.mil/news/messages/Pages/
MARADMIN118-11.aspx (discussing the annual Cyber Awareness training
required for all Department of Defense service members); Careers, U.S. AIR
FORCE, http://www.airforce.com/careers/#s_computer (last visited Oct. 11,
2012) (listing jobs within the U.S. Air Force, some of which include cyber protection); Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Information
COAST
GUARD,
Technology
(C4IT)
Service
Center,
U.S.
http://www.uscg.mil/c4itsc/ (last modified Sept. 24, 2012) (discussing how C4IT
assists the U.S. Coast Guard by providing them the information they need);
Gerry J. Gilmore, Navy Moves to Meet Information Age Challenges, NAVY.MIL
(Oct. 2, 2009, 4:55 PM), http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=
48723 (discussing the U.S. Navy’s Fleet Cyber Command created to help protect it against cyber-threats); Network Services: Data, DEF. INFO. SYS.
AGENCY, http://www.disa.mil/services/data.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2012) (describing the Data Services portfolio); Karl Weisel, Cyber Hawks Help Keep
Network Safe, ARMY.MIL (Aug. 13, 2008), http://www.army.mil/article/11631
(discussing how the U.S. Army monitors cyber-threats). See generally Jon P.
Jurich, Cyberwar and Customary International Law: The Potential of a “Bottom-up” Approach to an International Law of Information Operations, 9 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 275, 278 (2008) (“Department of Defense . . . uses over two million
computers and more than ten thousand local area networks, most of which are
linked to . . . the larger internet.”).
492. See supra Part III.A.
493. See, e.g., David M. Hollis, USCYBERCOM: The Need for a Combatant
Command Versus a Subunified Command, JOINT FORCE Q., 3d Quarter 2010,
at 48. Additionally:
[M]ilitary operations in the cyberspace domain are radically different
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been no distinct spatial domain as to which that United States
Air Force Cyber Command would have had exclusive response
authority.
Why did the federal government abandon its initial, Air
Force Cyber Command-predicated approach to controlling
cyber-threats? My research suggests there are two, not necessarily incompatible explanations.
One is that the government decided that various factors,
including those noted above, made it impossible to follow the
until-then business as usual approach by treating cyberspace
as merely another spatially-demarcated war-fighting domain
and allocating domain-specific response authority to a single
branch of the military.494 It therefore elected to employ a generic version of the business as usual approach by assigning cyberthreat response authority to a unified command, i.e., to a command that incorporates forces from the various branches of the
U.S. military.495
from military operations in the other warfighting domains . . . [C]yberspace is an artificial construct and does not primarily exist in the natural world, while the other domains exist in nature.
Cyberwar/NETWAR will primarily be fought over network terrain
that is owned and operated by private sector entities, many of them
multinational corporations. Military operations in the cyberspace domain simultaneously include physical and logical maneuver space.
Id. at 49; see also supra note 491 (illustrating the use of cyberspace by all military branches).
494. See supra Part III.A.
495. See supra notes 290–291 and accompanying text (explaining unified
commands). By a generic version of the business as usual approach, I mean
that the government decided to treat cyber-threat control as a function assigned exclusively to the military. See supra Part II.
While it can be difficult to identify the motivations behind national
security decisions, I find support for the proposition that this is, in fact, why
the government abandoned its cyberspace-as-exclusive-Air-Force-domain approach to cyber-threat control. See, e.g., Memorandum from Robert Gates,
Sec’y of Def., to the Sec’ys of the Military Dep’ts 1 (June 23, 2009), available at
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/OSD05914.pdf (“Department
of Defense requires a command that . . . remains focused on the integration of
cyberspace operations.”); see also Hollis, supra note 493, at 51 (“Because of the
unique nature of the domain, no one Service is responsible for operations to
protect national cyberspace (unlike the other domains) . . . .”). Colonel Hollis
argued that because cyberspace is not a physical domain, cyber-threat response authority must be unified in one entity. See id. at 52. For a description
of U.S. Strategic Command, see supra notes 237–240 and accompanying text.
Hollis argued that since creating a unified combatant command is a lengthy,
time-consuming process, one that in this instance faces “internal DOD opposition,” the Department of Defense should adopt the initial, interim step of cre-
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As a result, the Air Force’s Cyber Command and the cyber
commands the other branches had established were folded into
Cyber Command, which, as we saw above, is a “subunit of U.S.
Strategic Command.”496 And as we also saw above, despite this
presumptive integration the branch cyber commands continue
to develop and field their respective, idiosyncratic cyberspace
capabilities.497
That brings us to the other explanation for why the government abandoned the initial, Air Force Cyber Commandbased approach: it capitulated to the fallacy of inevitability by
allowing each of the five branches of the U.S. military to develop its own cyber command under the aegis of the U.S. Strategic
Command’s Cyber Command.498 The capitulation was apparently a victory of turf over logic and pragmatism, a concession
to the continuation of business as usual.499
ating a “subunified command.” Hollis, supra note 493, at 49. He maintained
that this would “unify and streamline . . . military cyberspace capabilities” and
avoid a scenario in which “each individual Service develop[ed] and field[ed] an
uncoordinated and disjointed set of cyberspace capabilities.” Id. at 51. And
while Hollis was writing after the decision had been made to create Cyber
Command, he pointed out that the then-current “U.S. Government efforts to
conduct cyberdefense/cyberwar/NETWAR are badly fragmented and require . . . integration/synchronization of overall cyberspace operations. Resources to defend . . . the cyberspace domain are woefully inadequate, and
many of the resources are acquired and deployed in an unfocused and uncoordinated fashion.” Id. at 53.
496. William Jackson, DOD Creates Cyber Command as U.S. Strategic
COMPUTER
WK.
(June
24,
2009),
Command
Subunit,
FED.
http://fcw.com/Articles/2009/06/24/DOD-launches-cybercommand.aspx?Page=1; see supra Part III.A.1.
497. See supra note 495; see also Part III.A (discussing how each branch of
the U.S. military has an interest in protecting the country against cyberthreats and the difficulty in parsing out cyberspace amongst them).
498. See supra Part III.A.
499. See, e.g., Peter A. Buxbaum, US: Cyberwar Turf Battle Continues,
INTELLIBRIEFS (Aug. 30, 2008), http://intellibriefs.blogspot.com/2008/08/uscyberwar-turf-battle-continues.html (noting that the Air Force’s creating its
Cyber Command “provok[ed] a turf war with other” branches of the military);
Coleman, supra note 255 (noting the Pentagon’s possible plan to “kill” Air
Force Cyber Command and implying that the other branches, plus various civilian agencies, were competing for the funds to be spent on cyber security). A
2011 article attributed the capitulation to turf battles among the various
branches of the military. See Cyber War: Pentagon Takes on Cyber Enemies,
Other Agencies, DEF. INDUSTRY DAILY (Nov. 8, 2011, 23:30 EST),
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/cyberwar-department-defense-doctrineresponse-06931 (“Air Force made an early grab to be the dominant [branch in
cyberspace] . . . [but faced] fierce opposition from both the Army and the Navy . . . .”). As to bureaucracies inherent tendency to battle over turf, see supra
note 4.
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The result, as we saw earlier, is that we now have six
cyber-threat response bureaucracies, one for each of the five
branches of the military plus Cyber Command, which is to
weave the branch-specific commands together into a coherent,
effective response effort.500 As I write this, Cyber Command has
been in existence for over a year but has yet to establish policies and procedures that can integrate the branch commands
into a unified operational cyber-command.501 I, for one, am
skeptical both as to Cyber Command’s ability to achieve such
an integration and as to its ability to protect citizens of the U.S.
from the cyber-threats for which it has, or will have, responsibility.
My skepticism as to the first issue is the product of Cyber
Command’s current lack of progress in this area and of the fact
that the branch cyber commands seem to be pursuing their own
agendas.502 My skepticism as to the second issue is the product
of a circumstance noted earlier, i.e., that since the “markers”
traditionally used to distinguish between crime/terrorism and
war are of little utility in cyberspace, it is likely to be difficult,
if not impossible, for the military to reliably determine the nature of an attack quickly enough to allow them to launch a
timely response.503
In other words, my skepticism is the product of the limitations of bureaucracy. Cyber Command exists because the government decided that the best approach to cyber-threat control
was to create not one bureaucracy (the original Air Force Cyber
Command) but a series of bureaucracies, all but one of which is
a sub-bureaucracy operating within an already existing bu-

I also find inferential support for this assumption in the branches’
continuing efforts to develop their own, idiosyncratic cyber-operations plans.
See, e.g., Amber Corrin, Navy’s Cyber Unit Scans Horizon for New Challenges,
DEF. SYSTEMS (June 21, 2011), http://defensesystems.com/articles/
2011/06/08/cyber-defense-navy-cyber-programs.aspx; LandWarNet 2011: U.S.
Army Detail Cyber Vision 2020, SHEPHARD NEWS (Aug. 24, 2011, 6:54 PM),
http://www.shephardmedia.com/news/digital-battlespace/landwarnet-2011-usarmy-detail-cyber-vis.
500. See supra Part III.A.
501. See supra Part III.A.
502. See supra Part III.A; see also supra note 499 (discussing how the Air
Force’s Cyber Command started a turf war).
503. See supra Part III.A.1. This article will return to this issue later in
this Part.
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reaucracy.504 Cyber Command is a free-standing bureaucracy
which is, in effect, charged with taking at least partial control
of the sub-bureaucracies away from the respective military bureaucracies to which each belongs.505 In other words, Cyber
Command’s mission is essentially to create its own bureaucratic turf out of turf appropriated from each of the five branches.
It is difficult to imagine how it can succeed.506
My skepticism is also the product of another of the limitations of bureaucracy, at least when it is utilized in the context
of cyber-threat control. As we saw above, the United States’
threat-control structure is bifurcated, with law enforcement responding to crime and terrorism (internal threats) and the military responding to warfare (external threat).507 As we also saw,
this bifurcation has produced a massive series of (i) federal,
state and local law enforcement bureaucracies508 and (ii) military bureaucracies.509 The bifurcation, and the bureaucracies it
produced, and on which its operations are predicated, assumes
that it is possible to assign a “specified sphere of competence”510
to each bureaucracy. That means, as we saw earlier, that (i) the
military responds only to warfare and (ii) federal, state and local law enforcement responds only to crime or terrorism.511
This allocation of response authority, as we saw above, assumes it is possible for law enforcement and the military to be
able to parse threats according to the relevant sphere of competence into which they fall.512 In other words, it assumes military and law enforcement officials can quickly ascertain whether a threat falls within their sphere of competence. Since the
use of cyber-threats undermines, if it does not eradicate, the reliability of the factors on which each relies in making this determination, it undermines their ability to determine when a
threat falls within their area of responsibility.513
Essentially, the United States military now has a highly-

504.
505.
506.
507.
508.
509.
510.
511.
512.
513.

See supra Part III.A.1.
See supra Part III.A.1.
See supra note 4.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.A.
WEBER, supra note 1, at 330; see supra note 459.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part II.
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articulated, stove-piped514 system of response authority which
is, to say the least, exceedingly problematic when it comes to
controlling cyber-threats. Even if we assume, for the purposes
of analysis, that Cyber Command or its subordinate cyber
commands will be able to ascertain which cyber-attacks are
military in nature and which are not, they are still unlikely to
be able to respond with the speed and efficacy required to establish a viable cyber-threat control system. Like guerrilla warfare, cyber-attacks are asymmetric, i.e., they do not conform to
the model of conflict in which adversaries with reasonably
equal forces simultaneously engage in combat.515 Cyber-attacks
can be directed at diverse targets and can occur over a more or
less extended period of time; it can, therefore, be functionally
impossible for those charged with controlling such attacks to
launch a reciprocal response before the initial attack has ended.516 It can also, as we saw in Part II, be impossible for those
who are charged with cyber-threat control to identify who was
responsible for such attacks, in order to retaliate at a later
point in time.517
Given all that, it is almost certain that criminals, terrorists, and hostile nation-state cyber commands will be able to
exploit the huge, elaborately segmented network of bureaucracies described above to their advantage.518 Bureaucracies tend
to move slowly; indeed, I suspect that as a general matter, the
speed with which a bureaucracy moves is in inverse proportion

514. See supra note 4.
515. See Robert Vamosi, Guerrilla Cyber Warfare:Are We Thinking Defensively, SECURITY WK. (Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.securityweek.com/guerillacyber-warfare-are-we-thinking-defensively (“By strongly restricting who has
access to the Internet, [a party] can focus its . . . resources on a few [locations]
that may be the launch point for [a] cyber attack[] . . . [T]hese are called
asymmetric threats . . . .”); Chico Harlan & Ellen Nakashima, Suspected N.
Korean Net Attack Raises Fears, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 2011, at A1, A7
(“Cyberwarfare offers high potential for asymmetric threats, providing poor
nations with easy opportunities to inflict damage on a richer, more developed
rival.”).
516. See Christopher Williams, Stuxnet: Cyber Attack on Iran ‘Was Carried
Out by Western Powers and Israel, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 21, 2011),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/8274009/Stuxnet-Cyber-attack-on-Iranwas-carried-out-by-Western-powers-and-Israel.html.
517. See, e.g., Mark Landler & John Markoff, After Computer Siege in Estonia, War Fears Turn to Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2007, at A1.
518. See Harlan & Nakashima, supra note 515; Williams, supra note 516.
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to the size and complexity of the bureaucracy.519 If I am correct,
that does not augur well for the cyber-response effort outlined
above. Aside from anything else, it may mean that while Cyber
Command or one or more of its constituent commands are attempting to ascertain the nature and source of an attack, the
attack can proceed to completion, after which the attackers
fade into the anonymous world of cyberspace.
In the next Part, we will consider the extent to which the
fallacy of inevitability affects United States law enforcement’s
ability to respond to cyber-attacks.
2. Law Enforcement
As we saw earlier, the bureaucratization of United States
law enforcement is to a great extent the product of strictures
imposed by our federal system of government:520 law enforcement agencies are divided into two primary categories—federal
and state—and the latter is respectively subdivided into state
and local agencies.521 As we also saw, in terms of the number of
agencies and the number of officers, federal law enforcement is
much smaller than state law enforcement, taken as a whole.522
This disparity in the number and size of state and federal
law enforcement agencies is attributable to the fact that for
most of the United States’ history, crime “was seen as a uniquely local concern and the power to prosecute rested almost exclusively in the states.”523 That began to change in the “last third
of the nineteenth century,”524 as Congress increasingly used its
Commerce Clause power to criminalize conduct that had been
prosecutable only at the state level.525 This trend accelerated in
the twentieth century, in large part because automobiles made
it much easier for perpetrators to flee across state lines, thereby frustrating pursuit by state officers.526 Notwithstanding
519. In other words, the larger and more complex the bureaucracy, the
slower it responds.
520. See supra Part III.B; see also supra note 3 (discussing subdivision of
United States law enforcement).
521. See supra Part III.B; see also supra note 3.
522. See supra note 3.
523. AM. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL
LAW, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 6 (1998), available at
http://www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=17464.
524. Id. at 6.
525. See id. at 6.
526. See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization
of American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1142–44 (1995).
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that, the default responsibility for criminal law enforcement
remains with the states, which is why there is such a difference
in the relative size and staffing of state and federal law enforcement agencies.527
As we also saw above, United States law enforcement, unlike the military and private sector entities, has so far not been
the target of legislative or other efforts designed to enhance the
nation’s ability to control cyber-threats.528 As things currently
stand, then, the current law enforcement bureaucracy bears the
responsibility to control the incidence of cyber-threats that fall
within its “sphere of competence,”529 i.e., crime and terrorism.530 It is therefore useful to review the evolution of that bureaucracy, which is for the most part a legacy: the product of
two essentially independent factors.
One is, as we saw earlier, that United States law enforcement agencies operate within a prescribed geographical area:531
they all operate within the territory of the United States; the
United States’ ability to enforce its criminal law ends, for the
most part, at its borders.532 Federal law enforcement agencies’
geographical jurisdiction is essentially co-extensive with the
United States’ territorial jurisdiction.533 State and local agencies operate within the territory of the state that created them;
state agencies’ geographical jurisdiction is co-extensive with
the state’s territory, while local agencies’ geographical jurisdiction will be limited to the county, municipality or other subdivision of the state that employs them.534 Each federal, state, or
local agency is a bureaucracy because all United States law enforcement agencies were organized, or re-organized, according

527.
528.
529.
530.
531.
532.

See supra note 3.
See supra Part III.B.
See WEBER, supra note 1, at 330; see supra note 459.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part III.B.
DOYLE,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
94–166,
See CHARLES
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 1 (2012); see
also id. at 14–21 (discussing the limited extent that the United States has jurisdiction outside its territory).
533. See supra Part III.B. As we saw in Part III.B, federal law enforcement
agencies’ authorized sphere of investigation is further circumscribed by substantive jurisdictional requirements.
534. See supra Part III.B; see also supra note 3 (discussing overlap between
state and local U.S. law enforcement jurisdictions).
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to the principles Weber outlined in his work on bureaucracy.535
The result—a complex, segmented but often overlapping
series of law enforcement bureaucracies—is a well-established
phenomenon, the product of the partitioned jurisdictional response authority dictated by the United States’ distinctive federal system.536 It is also a relatively new phenomenon: the bureaucratization of United States law enforcement began in the
mid-nineteenth century, as American cities adopted the new,
hierarchically-organized, quasi-military policing model Robert
Peel had established in England.537 Until then, American law
enforcement was informal, predicated “on the medieval institutions of the constable, the night watch, and the hue and cry—
institutions that ‘drew no clear lines between public and private.’”538
Peel’s model became the dominant model of policing in the
United States,539 which brings us to the second factor: Peel’s reliance on a quasi-military model as the basis for his police forces.540 Like members of the military, law enforcement officers
wear uniforms541 and operate within hierarchically-structured
organizations that rely on military ranks and a chain of command.542 Law enforcement’s reliance on a semi-military bureaucratic structure is quite reasonable, since their mission,
like that of the military, involves conflict and the use of physi-

535. See David J. Bordua & Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Command, Control, and
Charisma: Reflections on Police Bureaucracy, 72 AM. J. SOC. 68, 70–71 (1966);
see also Daniel C. Stiles, Border Crisis: Time for A New Collective Review of
Tri-Nation Border Security, 29 TRANSP. L.J. 299, 307–08 (2002) (discussing
how United States law enforcement agencies will re-organize in order to be
able to work better with Mexico and Canada); Mark Tushnet & Jennifer Jaff,
Critical Legal Studies and Criminal Procedure, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 361, 380–
81 (1986) (discussing the implications of having a bureaucratic law enforcement agency).
536. See supra Part III.B.
537. See David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165,
1202–09 (1999).
538. Id. at 1205; see also id. at 1206 (“[S]erving as constable or watchman
was . . . an unpaid civic obligation, but in practice everyone who could afford to
hire a substitute did so . . . . Those with sufficient resources hired additional
protection, and the boundary between private guards and public watchmen
often was indistinct.”) (footnotes omitted).
539. See id. at 1206–08.
540. See id. at 1202.
541. See id. at 1207–08.
542. See id. at 1202–03; see also Bordua & Reiss, Jr., supra note 535, at 68–
69 (discussing the quasi-military quality of the law enforcement).
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cal force in a real-space context.543 The respective missions of
law enforcement and the military and the contexts in which
they respectively operate are therefore consistent with the assumptions Weber made in heralding the efficiency of the bureaucratic model of organization.544 This means that bureaucracy is a suitable organizational model when both operate in
real-space.545
But law enforcement, like the military, must now operate
in cyberspace as well as in real-space. And cyberspace creates
new challenges for law enforcement, just as it does for the U.S.
military.546 The challenges cyberspace creates for law enforcement are the converse of General Alexander’s problem,547 i.e.,
law enforcement agencies now have to deal with attacks from
abroad which can be war, crime, or terrorism.548
As I explain elsewhere, the traditional threats—crime, terrorism, and war—can morph in cyberspace,549 so what appears
to be a cybercrime is actually cyberwarfare or cyberterrorism or
a hybrid, e.g., cyberwar/crime.550 As I have also explained, cy543. See supra Part III.B.
544. See supra Part IV.A.
545. See supra Parts II, IV.A.
546. See supra Part III.B.
547. See supra Part III.A.
548. See At Light Speed, supra note 31, at 382–404.
549. See supra Part II.
550. See At Light Speed, supra note 31, at 382–404. The incident I use to
illustrate the phenomenon of morphing in cyberspace and the legal conundrums it creates occurred in 2001: Gary Lauck, a United States citizen who
lives in Nebraska, was operating websites that distributed pro-Nazi material;
distributing such material in Germany is a crime. See Susan W. Brenner, Mixing
Metaphors,
CYB3RCRIM3
(Apr.
22,
2009,
6:26
AM),
http://cyb3rcrim3.blogspot.com/2009/04/mixing-metaphors.html. Since the material was accessible in Germany, German authorities concluded that Lauck
was violating German law, i.e., was committing a crime. See id. After unsuccessfully trying to have Lauck extradited to Germany to face charges for the
sites’ content, German Interior Minister Otto Schily suggested Germany use
Distributed Denial of Service to overwhelm the sites with signals and effectively shut them down. See id.
Germany never launched such attacks, but assume, for the purposes
of analysis, that it had: what type of cyber-attack would have resulted? On the
one hand, a nation-state (Germany) would have attacked property in territory
of another nation-state (the United States), a scenario that is to some extent
analogous to Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor. See id. But unlike the Pearl
Harbor attack, Germany’s hypothesized cyber-attack would have been directed
at civilian, rather than military, targets, which to some extent undermines the
premise that it would have been an act of cyberwarfare. See id. That premise
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berspace eliminates the barriers that historically made warfare
the exclusive province of nation-states;551 it is therefore not only possible but likely that non-nation-state actors will launch
cyber-attacks that are intended to undermine the sovereign viability of a nation-state, i.e., attacks that are indistinguishable
from warfare.552
United States law enforcement agencies have traditionally
been responsible for controlling crime and terrorism.553 They
are neither authorized to, nor capable of, responding to acts of
war, including cyberwar.554 And aside from anything else, it
would not be prudent for the U.S. to alter this state of affairs
and authorize its law enforcement officers to respond to cyber-

is supported, however, by the fact that Germany’s hypothesized cyber-attack
would have violated the territorial integrity of the United States, i.e., would
have struck at the heart of the U.S. sovereignty. See id. One can, then, argue
that had the hypothesized attack happened it would have constituted
cyberwarfare. See id.
But one can also argue that if the hypothesized attack had happened,
it would have constituted cybercrime, since it was directed at property belonging to a particular civilian, was not intended to impact on a larger civilian audience, and was in no way intended to actually undermine the sovereignty of
the United States. See id. This argument is further supported by the fact that
the United States, along with a number of other countries, makes the launching of a Distributed Denial of Service attack a crime. See id. Such an attack is
treated as a crime if it is launched by a civilian and is directed either at a civilian target or at a government agency. See id. So if the United States had chosen to approach the hypothesized cyber-attack as an attack launched by Schily
as a civilian on a civilian target, then the United States could have charged
him with cybercrime and asked the German authorities to extradite him for
prosecution in the United States. See id.
551. See supra Part II.
552. See, e.g., Landler & Markoff, supra note 517; see also At Light Speed,
supra note 31, at 422–23; US Standards Body Issues Warning to Energy Sup(Aug.
8,
2011),
pliers
over
Cyber
Attacks,
INFOSECURITY
http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/view/19930/us-standards-body-issueswarning-to-energy-suppliers-over-cyber-attacks (discussing how many utility
companies were vulnerable to outside cyber-attack).
553. See supra Part II. That changed, to some extent, in the aftermath of
the 9/11 attacks. See, e.g., Thomas J. Bogar, Unlawful Combatant or Innocent
Civilian? A Call to Change the Current Means for Determining Status of Prisoners in the Global War on Terror, 21 FLA. J. INT’L L. 29, 68 (2009) (“Before 9/11, terrorism was considered a law enforcement issue, and terrorists as
criminals. Since then, terrorism abroad is considered a military matter and
terrorists as enemy combatants to be detained as such or prosecuted before military commissions.”) (footnotes omitted). The post-9/11 shift in how extraterritorial terrorists are treated may be to some extent a harbinger of the
changes that will occur in how nation-states treat transnational cybercriminals.
554. See supra Part II.
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attack without regard to whether the attack appears to be cybercrime, cyberterrorism, or cyberwarfare. This could, among
other things, allow hostile state (or hostile non-nation-state) actors to “game” the system: they launch what appears to be an
act of cyberwarfare by Nation-State X on a target in Illinois in
an effort to tempt local law enforcement officers to respond
with offensive digital force directed at Nation-State X. If the Illinois officers responded, and if Nation-State X was, in fact, not
responsible for the Illinois attack, it would mean the United
States had launched an unprovoked cyber-attack on an innocent state. If Nation-State X were to respond in kind, the incident could escalate into a real cyberwar between the two countries.555
The United States and other nation-states therefore confront both a problem and a dilemma: the problem, as we saw in
Part II, is that the ease with which cyber-attacks transcend national borders and ever-eroding utility of the “markers” countries have relied on to differentiate between internal and external threats to order make the bifurcated approach to threatcontrol increasingly problematic.
The military is charged with responding to attacks from
hostile nation-states, i.e., attacks from abroad, but it can be difficult and time-consuming to determine whether a cyber-attack
(i) is from abroad or is a domestically-based attack that has
been routed through foreign servers to disguise its true nature
and (ii) is crime, terrorism, or warfare.556 This impedes the military’s ability to respond with the speed, discrimination, and efficacy needed to deter attacks from hostile nation-states.557 Law
enforcement is charged with responding to domestic attacks
carried out by civilians, i.e., crime and terrorism, but it can be
difficult, resource-intensive, and time-consuming to determine
555. Scenarios such as this are far from implausible, as states like China
“harness[] the potential of [their] hacktivist communit[ies] for executing military operations . . . across the Web.” Dancho Danchev, China’s Blue Army:
When Nations Harness Hacktivists for Information Warfare, ZDNET (May 31,
2011, 7:17 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/security/chinas-blue-army-whennations-harness-hacktivists-for-information-warfare/8686.
556. See Statement of Deputy Assistant Attorney General Jason Weinstein
Before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology and the
DEP’T
OF
JUST.
(May
20,
2011),
Law,
U.S.
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/testimony/2011/crm-testimony110510.html; see supra Part II.
557. See supra Parts III.A.2 and IV.A.2.
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if a cyber-attack (i) is domestic or originated from abroad and
(ii) is crime, terrorism, or warfare.558 Their respective problems
interact to create uncertainty as to whether a particular cyberattack falls within law enforcement’s or the military’s “sphere
of competence.”559
Logically, this creates the possibility that in a given instance both, or neither, will respond. If neither responds, the
attacker(s) successfully targeted the United States, inflicted
some quantum of damage on its civilians and/or assets and
thereby eroded the country’s ability to maintain internal or external order.560 If both respond, this could result in an unintended escalation of the situation, e.g., if a cybercriminal attacks a United States bank and becomes the target of
retaliative action by United States law enforcement and the
United States military, the latter’s involvement could escalate
the incident to cyberwarfare.561
That brings us to the dilemma noted above: How can we
resolve the problems outlined above? The obvious, pragmatic
answer is that we should somehow combine the military and
law enforcement, at least insofar as cyber-attacks are concerned. As things currently stand, the Posse Comitatus Act of
1878 prohibits the United States military “from performing a
domestic civilian law enforcement function.”562 The Posse
Comitatus Act is one of the bulwarks of the bifurcated approach
to threat-control we examined in Part II, but it is merely the
product of legislative action; we could repeal the Act, thereby
558. See supra Part II. See Statement of Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Jason Weinstein Before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology and the Law, supra note 556 (“Investigating . . . multi-actor, multinational crimes is extremely resource intensive.”).
559. See WEBER, supra note 1, at 330; see supra note 459.
560. While an isolated failure to respond is unlikely to seriously challenge
the United States’ ability to maintain order, a repeated series of failures will
do so. See Distributed Security, supra note 29, at 691 (noting that utility of
sanctions in deterring criminal conduct is a function of the perceived risk of
being caught); see also Criminal Law for Cyberspace, supra note 7, at 60 (discussing “control by deterrence”); Harold G. Grasmick & Robert J. Bursik, Jr.,
Conscience, Significant Others, and Rational Choice: Extending the Deterrence
Model, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 837, 841 (1990) (discussing three possible costs
for committing a crime: deprivation, shame, and embarrassment); Margaret
Raymond, Penumbral Crimes, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1395, 1404 (2002) (discussing how the “threat of enforcement acts as a deterrent”).
561. See supra note 550.
562. Mark David “Max” Maxwell, The Enduring Vitality of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, 37 PROSECUTOR 34, 34 (May/June 2003); 18 U.S.C. § 1385
(2006).
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eliminating the statutory provision that bars the integration of
civilian and military personnel. Since no correlate provision
bars United States law enforcement from assisting the military,563 we should then be able to develop an integrated, law
enforcement-military cyber-threat response system, which
would presumably resolve the problems outlined above.
While that strategy has an undeniable logic, I, for one, do
not believe it is the appropriate way to approach the problems
noted above. For one thing, it contravenes the “deeply held
American principle that civilian and military spheres should be
kept distinctly separate,”564 a sentiment to which the nation’s
founders clearly subscribed.565 One could argue that the concerns responsible for Posse Comitatus and the founders’ desire
to segregate civilian and military threat control functions apply
with less urgency when conduct migrates from real-space into
cyberspace,566 but I do not find that a convincing argument.
Aside from anything else, we have already learned that what
happens in cyberspace can, and does, impact our lives in realspace so, to employ another cliché, I see this as a slippery slope,
which I, at least, would prefer to avoid.
I also have another, far more pragmatic, objection to the
possibility of fusing law enforcement’s and the military’s respective efforts to control cyber-threat: I fear the impact the fallacy of inevitability would have on such a step. Absent a dramatic and quite unanticipated change in our approach to these
matters, it is almost certain that if we embarked on such an effort it would result in our creating yet another bureaucracy: a
cyber-military-law enforcement agency.567 That would only ex563. See At Light Speed, supra note 31, at 444–55.
564. Scott R. Tkacz, In Katrina’s Wake: Rethinking the Military’s Role in
Domestic Emergencies, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 301, 307 (2006).
565. See id. at 327; see also William C. Banks, The Normalization of Homeland Security After September 11: The Role of the Military in Counterterrorism
Preparedness and Response, 64 LA. L. REV. 735, 741 (2004) (detailing the Posse Comitatus Act is “a symbol of our nation’s subordination of military to civilian control, and to the distaste of military involvement in domestic law enforcement”); Nathan Canestaro, Homeland Defense: Another Nail in the Coffin
for Posse Comitatus, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99, 99 (2003) (noting this separation is “derived from a long tradition of antimilitarism in English common
law, [it] represents the ‘traditional and strong resistance of Americans to any
military intrusion into civilian affairs.’”) (footnote omitted).
566. See, e.g., CYBER-THREATS, supra note 7, at 294.
567. We might, as I note elsewhere, refer to it as the Cyber Security Agency. See id. at 293–95.
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acerbate the problems we examined earlier, i.e., we would have
a massive, highly segmented (real-space only) military bureaucracy, a massive, highly segmented (real-space only) law enforcement bureaucracy, and a no-doubt massive, no-doubt highly segmented (cyberspace only) military-law enforcement
bureaucracy.568 This approach would merely compound the
problems we examined earlier and would suffer from yet another defect: it does not incorporate the participation of civilians, which, as I noted earlier, will be essential in developing
an effective cyber-threat control structure.569
In Part V, I argue that we need to develop a fluid, flexible,
networked approach for dealing with cyber threat. In the next
Part, I explain why civilians are an essential part of such an effort.
3. Civilians
As we saw in Part II, the bifurcated approach to threatcontrol assumes threats are readily divisible into “inside”
(crime/terrorism) and “outside” (warfare).We also saw that this
is not a viable assumption when threats are vectored through
cyberspace.570 As things currently stand, the “markers” we once
used to differentiate between private threats (crime/terrorism)
and sovereign threats (war) are of little, if any, utility when it
comes to cyberspace.571 Individuals can accomplish what was
once the sole province of nation-states, and nation-states can
use state actors or civilian nominees to carry out what appear
to be cybercrimes or cyberterrorism but are in reality attacks
designed to advance a sovereign’s covert agenda, i.e.,
cyberwarfare.572 The result, to paraphrase William Yeats, is
that things threaten to fall apart and anarchy seems a viable
prospect.573
I emphasize this to illustrate that what was once unthinkable has become a very real possibility: civilians, who became
noncombatants under the modern law of armed conflict, are
now on the front line of cyber conflict.574 Civilians have for
568.
569.
570.
571.
572.
573.

See supra Part III.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.C.2.
See Danchev, supra note 555 and accompanying text.
See WILLIAM BUTLER YEATS, The Second Coming, in THE COLLECTED
POEMS OF W.B. YEATS: A NEW EDITION 187 (Richard J. Finneran ed., 1989).
574. See, e.g., J. Ricou Heaton, Civilians at War: Reexamining the Status of
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years been the targets of cybercrime;575 civilian entities may
have been, and most certainly will be, the targets of cyberterrorism and cyberwarfare.576 This means that at least some civilians will have to participate in cyber-conflict,577 a reality the
legislative proposals we examined in Part III.C.1 all
acknowledge.
The drafters of those proposals and I consequently agree on
the need for civilian participation but part company on how
that participation is to be incorporated into a cyber-threat control structure. My goal in this Part is to explain how, and why,
the approach the proposals we examined in Part III.C.1 take to
this task is flawed in ways that will erode the efficacy of the
cyber-threat response efforts they respectively outline.
As I noted in Part III.C.1, the two Senate proposals and the
White House proposal are all lengthy and complex, in part because each deals with a variety of issues, some of which are not
directly related to integrating civilians into a cybersecurity effort.578 In this Part, we will focus only on the provisions of the
proposals that deal with this particular issue, and we will not
parse those provisions in detail. Instead, I will explain why the
general approach these proposals take to this task is flawed—
yet another product of the fallacy of inevitability.579
All of the proposals put the Department of Homeland Security (or, more precisely, a sub-bureaucracy of the Department)
in charge of ensuring that private entities involved in the operation of the nation’s critical infrastructure will establish and
then implement (i) security measures designed to improve their
Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces, 57 A.F.L. REV. 155, 157–63 (2005).
575. See BRENNER, supra note 361, at 9–37.
576. See, e.g., RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE
NEXT THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT, at xi (2010)
(“The most likely targets [of cyberwarfare] are civilian in nature . . . .”); see also id. at xiii (“[I]t is . . . the civilian population of the United States and the
publicly owned corporations that run our key national systems, that are likely
to suffer in a cyber war.”); see also At Light Speed, supra note 31, at 426–27,
454–55 (noting that civilian computers are the targets of cyberwarfare).
577. I use the generic term cyber-conflict because, as we saw above, it will
be difficult to parse attacks into cybercrime, cyberterrorism and cyberwarfare. See supra Part II.C.
578. The White House proposal, for example, includes provisions creating
new federal cybercrimes and modifying provisions of existing federal cybercrime law. See White House, Cybersecurity Proposal, supra note 387, at 1–7. It
also includes provisions governing data breach notification. See id. at 8–18.
579. See supra Part IV.B.
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ability to avoid or withstand cyber-attacks and (ii) plans for responding to cyber-attacks.580 The entities will be required to
comply with these requirements as long as their company is
deemed to be part of the nation’s critical infrastructure.581 And
as we saw in Part III.C.1, the proposals all establish a new,
Department of Homeland Security-based bureaucracy to implement these and the other requirements they impose on those
entities.
The White House and Senate proposals are therefore products of the fallacy of inevitability, i.e., they all create a new bureaucracy that is charged with enforcing the obligations to create and implement the measures noted above.582 As I explained
earlier, this approach is, as a general matter, flawed when it is
utilized in an effort to address cyber-threat.583 I believe it is also flawed in a very specific respect when it is applied to incorporating civilian participation into a cybersecurity effort; the
specific flaw is a product of the particular context in which the
approach is implemented.
In order to explain why I believe that, I need to digress
briefly to outline a modest taxonomy of bureaucracies. For the
purposes of this analysis, I will divide bureaucracies into two
types: implementary bureaucracies and regulatory bureaucracies.
Implementary bureaucracies are directly charged with carrying out certain tasks, traditionally in real-space.584 Military
organizations and law enforcement agencies are examples of
implementary bureaucracies; the hierarchical division of authority and labor that is a defining characteristic of bureaucracy facilitates their ability to carry out their respective tasks in
the physical world.585 The same is true of businesses, educational institutions, and government agencies charged with carrying out other specific tasks (e.g., FEMA and similar enti580. See supra notes 375–377 and accompanying text. As I noted earlier,
the precise nature of the plans for responding to cyber-attacks is not specified.
See supra notes 414–415 and accompanying text.
581. See, e.g., Cybersecurity and Internet Freedom Act of 2011, S. 413,
112th Cong. § 254(c)(3) (2011).
582. As we saw earlier, a sphere of competence and the creation and enforcement of rational-legal rules are essential characteristics of Weberian bureaucracies. See supra note 459.
583. See supra Part IV.A.
584. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 4, at 25 (noting that bureaucracies are
charged with carrying out certain “critical tasks”).
585. See supra Part IV.A.
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ties).586
Implementary bureaucracies are first-tier bureaucracies—
that is, they are directly responsible for carrying out functions
that are useful, if not essential, to the survival of a particular
society.587 The specific functions for which an implementary
bureaucracy is responsible act as an imperative that focuses its
efforts on, and shapes its organization for, the efficient, effective implementation of the tasks necessary for carrying out
those functions.588 When Weber approvingly described bureaucracies as machines, he was referring to implementary bureaucracy.589

586. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management Within a Theory of the Firm, 21 J. CORP. L. 657, 674 (1996) (“Taylorism and the comparable
forms of scientific management pioneered by Henry Ford and others designed
firms as highly centralized, hierarchical bureaucracies.”); see also U.S. DEP’T
OF HOMELAND SEC., FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, NATIONAL RESPONSE
FRAMEWORK 47–69 (2008), available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/
nrf/nrf-core.pdf (detailing the hierarchical organization of staff roles in the National Response Framework).
587. See supra Part IV.B.
588. See supra text accompanying notes 465–466. This, in turn, reduces the
likelihood of mission creep, in which a bureaucracy loses focus on the areas for
which it was originally given responsibility and “seek[s] to expand” its authority and activities into other areas. See, e.g., Peter B. Rutledge, Medellin, Delegation and Conflicts (of Law), 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 191, 206 (2009). As
Rutledge notes, a “precisely defined mandate reduces the opportunity” for a
bureaucracy to lose focus and begin to dissipate its efforts on tasks for which it
was not originally responsible. Id. at 206 n.74. As others have noted, bureaucratic turf battles can also result in mission creep. See, e.g., Matthew Bobby,
DoD-DHS Memorandum of Understanding Aims to Improve Cybersecurity Collaboration, HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. (Nov. 15, 2010, 12:11 AM),
http://harvardnsj.com/2010/11/dod-dhs-memorandum-of-understanding-aimsto-improve-cybersecurity-collaboration. See generally WILSON, supra note 4
(discussing what government agencies do and how they do it).
589. See supra note 475 and accompanying text. I base this assertion primarily on the fact that in his work on bureaucracy and other issues, Weber
relied on “ideal types,” rather than on particular empirical phenomena. See,
e.g., Talcott Parsons, Introduction to MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, 12–13 (Talcott Parsons ed., A. M. Henderson &
Talcott Parsons trans., First Free Press Paperback Edition 1964). Parsons explains Weber’s ideal type as follows:
The ideal type as Weber used it is both abstract and general. It does
not describe a concrete course of action, but a normatively ideal
course . . . . It does not describe an individual course of action, but a
‘typical’ one—it is a generalized rubric within which an indefinite
number of particular cases may be classified.
Id. at 13. As Parsons also noted, a Weberian ideal type “involve[s] a fixed relation between the values of the various variable elements involved” which
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Regulatory bureaucracies, on the other hand, are secondtier bureaucracies: they are charged not with directly implementing the useful or essential functions noted above but with
“regulating” how implementary bureaucracies carry out those
functions.590 The Federal Aviation Administration, for example,
“promote[s] civil aviation, promulgate[s] safety regulations, and
establish[es] and enforce[s] air traffic and navigational rules”
in the U.S.591 And the Federal Communications Commission
“regulates interstate and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable in all 50 states, the
District of Columbia, and U.S. territories.”592
As part of regulating the activities of implementary bureaucracies, regulatory bureaucracies establish—and enforce—
standards and other rules that govern the performance of the
first-tier bureaucracies.593 The regulatory bureaucracies’ charge
means that “it is limited in certain respects.” Id. My contention is that when
Weber wrote about the inherent, machine-like efficiency of bureaucracies, he
was referring to an ideal type bureaucracy that in many, if not most, respects
conformed to the model of implementary bureaucracy described above. See supra notes 471–475 and accompanying text. I also base this assertion on the
fact that the “other” type of bureaucracy—the regulatory bureaucracy discussed later in the text above—only began to emerge in the last two decades of
the nineteenth century and was therefore not well entrenched at the time Weber wrote admiringly of the “efficiency” of bureaucracies. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 233, at 94–98 (discussing the emergence of regulatory bureaucracy in
the United States).
590. See, e.g., General Information, ONT. PUB. APPOINTMENTS
SECRETARIAT, http://www.pas.gov.on.ca/scripts/en/generalinfo.asp#1 (last modified Aug. 23, 2012) (“Regulatory agencies make independent decisions (including inspections, investigations, prosecutions, certifications, licensing, ratesetting, etc.) which limit or promote the conduct, practice, obligations, rights,
responsibilities, etc. of an individual, business or corporate body.”). The description of regulatory agencies given above applies with equal validity to regulatory bureaucracies because regulatory agencies are synonymous with regulatory bureaucracies. Regulatory agencies are not, however, synonymous with
bureaucracies, as such. As noted above, implementary bureaucracies differ in
critical respects form regulatory agencies. See supra notes 587–589 and accompanying text.
591. Matthew J. Kelly, Comment, Federal Preemption by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978: How Do State Tort Claims Fare?, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 873,
876 (2000) (citing Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 103, 72 Stat. 731, 740 (1958)); see also
id. at 876–77 (describing the creation of the Federal Aviation Administration);
AVIATION
ADMIN.,
http://www.faa.gov/about/history/
History,
FED.
brief_history/ (last updated Feb. 1, 2010) (describing the history of the Federal
Aviation Administration).
592. What We Do, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, http://www.fcc.gov/what-we-do
(last visited Oct. 5, 2012).
593. See,
e.g.,
FCC
Rulemaking,
FED.
COMM.
COMMISSION,
http://www.fcc.gov/rulemaking (last visited Oct. 5, 2012). See also supra note
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is to ensure that the implementary agencies subject to their jurisdiction carry out the tasks assigned to them in a safe, effective manner.594 Regulatory bureaucracies therefore add an extra “sphere of competence” and an extra layer of rules and ruleimplementation to the implementary bureaucratic structure
Weber admired for its efficiency.595
The Department of Homeland Security-based bureaucracy
that would be created by the proposals we examined in Part
III.C.1 would be an unusual entity. On the one hand, it would
appear to be a regulatory bureaucracy: unlike the military and
law enforcement bureaucracies we examined above,596 it would
not be directly charged with protecting the United States and
its citizens from threats originating here or abroad; instead, the
proposed Department of Homeland Security-based bureaucracy
would, like the regulatory bureaucracies noted above, act as an
intermediary between the government and the civilian implementary bureaucracies which carry out various tasks that are
useful and essential for the country’s survival and prosperity.597
Unlike a regulatory bureaucracy, however, this new Department of Homeland Security-based bureaucracy would not
be charged with ensuring that the entities it oversees carry out
the civilian tasks assigned to them in a safe, effective manner—
it would instead be charged with imposing, and enforcing, an
obligation to assume an additional, unrelated task: a measure
590 and accompanying text (characterizing regulatory bureaucracies).
594. For example:
[Hawkins and Thomas draw the] rough but necessary distinction between [regulatory] “policy formation”—a “process whereby the agency
interprets and translates legislative goals into rules, standards, and
plans of action—and “implementation”—“enforcement of these agency
directives,” including the “operating routines used by field-level personnel and applied to targets of regulation, decisions about the application of regulations, and means for obtaining compliance with rules.”
Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 757 n.30 (2003) (quoting Keith Hawkins & John M.
Thomas, The Enforcement Process in Regulatory Bureaucracies, in ENFORCING
REGULATION 3, 10 (Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas eds., 1984)).
595. See supra notes 459–461 and accompanying text.
596. See supra Part II.A and Part III.A–B.
597. See supra notes 385–388 and accompanying text. The White House
and Senate proposals all include provisions concerning law enforcement and
the military’s involvement in cyber-threat control activity, but they will not be
discussed here because the focus of this discussion is on involving civilians in
this activity. See supra Part III.C.1.
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of responsibility for protecting the country from cyberthreats.598 As we saw in Part III.C.1, this entity would be responsible for identifying the private sector entities that would
be subject to this new responsibility, for working with each entity to develop the security measures and response plans noted
above and for monitoring and ensuring the continuing efficacy
and implementation of both.599
So while this agency is at least implicitly styled as a regulatory bureaucracy, it is in fact something quite different: it is
essentially the twenty-first century version of impressment.600
The proposed Department of Homeland Security agency (i)
would not be responsible for monitoring how the entities subject to its authority carry out their purely civilian functions
(unless, of course, that impacts cyber-threat control) (ii) but
would be responsible for imposing a new non-civilian function,
or set of functions, on these entities.601 That has a number of
implications, one of which is that the civilian entities which become the focus of this bureaucracy’s efforts are likely to resist,
since they are being drafted into a military-law enforcement effort of uncertain scope and possibly unlimited duration.602 The
authors of the Senate proposals clearly recognized that entities
are likely to resist being conscripted into this effort, because
they included a provision in their second bill that lets companies file a suit appealing their designation as a critical infrastructure component subject to the efforts of this new Depart-

598. See supra note 580 and accompanying text.
599. See supra note 385 and accompanying text; see also supra Part III.C
(outlining the requirements of proposed cybersecurity legislation).
600. See, e.g., Casey B. Mulligan & Andrei Shleifer, Conscription as Regulation, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 85, 88 (2005) (describing impressment as “the
forced recruitment of individuals with little or no compensation or regulation
of service terms or length”). For more on this, see Brenner & Clarke, supra
note 40, at 1049–57; Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Civilians in
Cyberwarfare: Casualties, 13 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 249, 268–82 (2010)
[hereinafter Civilians in Cyberwarfare].
601. See supra text accompanying note 598. For some thoughts as to how
this might be structured, see Brenner & Clarke, supra note 40, at 1056–62.
602. Unlike traditional military conscripts, their status would not shift entirely from civilian to member of the United States military. See Brenner &
Clarke, supra note 40, at 1056–62. It is more likely that they would devote
much of their time at work to performing their usual, civilian functions and
only be “called up” to carry out the quasi-military/law enforcement functions
on occasion. See id. at 1064–66. See also Civilians in Cyberwarfare, supra note
600, at 253–54 (suggesting a framework for separating certain aspects of civilian life from obligations of conscription).
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ment of Homeland Security bureaucracy.603
I see at least three significant flaws in the approach the
Senators and the White House are taking to the task of enhancing the U.S.’s ability to control cyber-threats.604 The first is that
their strategy relies on a pseudo-regulatory bureaucracy to
bring civilian entities into this effort instead of trying to incorporate them into what is really needed, i.e., an implementary
bureaucracy that departs in certain ways from the conventional
implementary bureaucracies on which we currently rely. We
will return to this issue in Part V.
The second flaw is that the approach proposed by the Senators and the White House simply recycles bureaucracy as the
way to improve the United States’ ability to control cyberthreats. It implicitly, and incorrectly, assumes that the strategy
nation-states rely on to control real-space threats can be effective in controlling cyber-threats.605 As we saw in Part II, while
this strategy has been effective in controlling territoriallybased threats, it is not an effective approach to controlling
cyber-threats.
That brings us to the third flaw: because it is predicated on
the efforts of a quasi-regulatory bureaucracy, the strategy proposed by the Senators and the White House takes a prescriptive approach to achieving certain conduct, i.e., implementing
cybersecurity measures and response plans. As we saw earlier,
the bureaucratic model of organization allocates authority in
diminishing increments to a hierarchically structured set of “offices”, each of which has a specialized function.606 Bureaucracies are therefore predicated on a top-down strategy in which
the “offices” with greater authority adopt and enforce rules that
impose certain requirements (i) on offices within that organization that have lesser authority or (ii) on external entities that

603. See, e.g., Cybersecurity and Internet Freedom Act of 2011, S. 413,
112th Cong. § 254(c)(2) (2011) (stating that an owner or operator of a system
or asset identified as covered critical infrastructure may file an appeal “seeking judicial review” of the entity’s “final agency action” in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia).
604. As I noted above, other members of Congress have submitted their
own cybersecurity legislative proposals. See supra notes 389–392 and accompanying text. Since those proposals are similar in at least certain respects to
the White House and Senate proposals, we will not examine them separately.
605. See supra Part II.
606. See supra note 459.
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are subject to the organization’s supervision.607 As we saw in
Part II, this model has worked well in the military and in other
organizations charged with achieving concrete objectives in real-space. It is unlikely to work well in incorporating civilians
and civilian entities into an effective cyber-threat control effort,
for several reasons.
For one thing, the bureaucracy created by the Senators’
and the White House’s proposals would not be a free-standing
bureaucracy with its own mission, discipline and esprit de
corps.608 The proposed Department of Homeland Security-based
bureaucracy would be an essentially parasitic entity that would
intrude into, interfere with and alter the otherwise routine operations of the civilian entities that were subject to its authority. The measures this Department of Homeland Security-based
bureaucracy would impose on these entities would alter their
routine functioning and mission in various ways and would, as
a result, almost certainly generate resistance.609 That means
these measures, like any prescriptive rules,610 would have to be
enforced, which can be an onerous task for any bureaucracy.
Given the highly complex, constantly evolving nature of the cybersecurity measures this agency would be imposing and the
number of civilian entities and civilians involved in the implementation of these measures, effective enforcement would be
an incredibly complex, challenging, and expensive undertaking.611
It would almost certainly be ineffective. In Part II, we saw
that the approach nation-states have traditionally taken to controlling real-space threats (crime, terrorism, and warfare) becomes increasingly ineffective as threats are vectored through
cyberspace. That discussion focused primarily on how cyberspace’s erosion of the significance of territory undermines the

607. See supra note 459. In other words, Weberian bureaucracies rely on
prescriptive rules, i.e., rules that prescribe certain behaviors and/or results
and impose sanctions for failing to comply with what is required. For more on
prescriptive rules, see Distributed Security, supra note 29, at 659, 690–91.
608. Weber emphasized the role discipline played in the effectiveness of
military bureaucracy. See ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY, supra note 440, at 261; see
also TALCOTT PARSONS, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION 507 (2d ed. 1968)
(“Above all bureaucracy involves discipline.”).
609. See, e.g., Brenner & Clarke, supra note 40, at 1058–60 (discussing the
effect on corporations of conscription of the company and its employees).
610. See supra note 607.
611. For the difficulties involved in enforcing a much simpler set of cybersecurity rules, see Criminal Law for Cyberspace, supra note 7, at 90–95.
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efficacy of this system by blurring the distinction between “inside” (crime/terrorism) and “outside” (warfare) threats. In so
doing, it implicitly demonstrated how cyberspace erodes the efficacy of the hierarchical model of organization.
As I explained elsewhere:
Technology eliminates the need, and indeed the ability, to focus on localized activity. Communication technologies . . . free us from spatial
constraints; we can communicate with anyone anywhere in the world.
New technologies generate new types of social organization, and
communication technologies have created the network. Networks tend
to displace hierarchies because hierarchical organization evolved to
deal with real-world activity; as such, it is not an effective means of
organizing technologically-mediated activities.612

Networks are lateral, fluid systems. Social networks—the
informal associations of individuals that arise in cyberspace613—usually have no fixed structure, constituency or endurance.614 They are often opportunistic, i.e., they emerge for a
more or less specific reason and dissipate when that imperative
declines or disappears.615 Social networks of whatever size and
constituency have proven quite effective in evading law enforcement and military bureaucracies.616 Their success in this
regard is, as we saw in Part II, in large part attributable to the
irrelevance of territory in cyberspace, but is also a function of
the fact that cyberspace decentralizes power.
As we saw in Part II, the threat-control model sovereigns
have employed for millennia is predicated on the assumption
that the use and/or threatened use of the sovereign’s power,
i.e., physical force, will keep threats at an acceptable level. This
assumption incorporates a subsidiary assumption: that the
sovereign will be able to use or credibly threaten to use its power against actual or potential criminals, terrorists or hostile
states. As we saw in Parts II and III, sovereigns have long re612. Distributed Security, supra note 29, at 668 (footnotes omitted). For the
link between hierarchical organization and real-world activity, see Criminal
Law For Cyberspace, supra note 7, at 78–79.
613. See About Us, ANONYMOUS ANALYTICS, http://anonanalytics.com (last
visited Oct. 6, 2012) (“Anonymous is a decentralized network of individuals . . . .”).
614. See, e.g., id.; see also Cassell Bryan-Low & Siobhan Gorman, Inside
the Anonymous Army of ‘Hacktivist’ Attackers, WALL ST. J., June 23, 2011, at
A1, A14 (“While there may be a hundred or so followers of a network on a regular basis, numbers swell into the thousands during popular campaigns.”).
615. See, e.g., Bryan-Low & Gorman, supra note 614, at A14.
616. See, e.g., id.
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lied on hierarchically organized groups (e.g., armies, law enforcement agencies) to impose or to threaten to impose their
power on actual or potential criminals, terrorists, or hostile
states. As we saw in Part III, the Senators’ and the White
House’s cybersecurity proposals attempt to do essentially the
same thing in cyberspace.
The problem, as we saw in Part II, is that there is no fixed,
identifiable target: it can be difficult if not impossible to ascertain (i) who is responsible for an attack, (ii) whether he is a
criminal, terrorist, state warrior, or non-state warrior, (iii)
where he is or was when the attack was launched, and (iv)
whether launching a responsive cyber-attack would violate
United States law, international law, or the law of another nation-state. A bureaucracy charged with making these determinations (and, if appropriate, launching a retaliatory attack)
would find the task time-consuming at best and impossible at
the worst.617 The difficulties inherent in this task are exacerbated by several factors, one of which is that the postulated bureaucracy will not confront only one enemy, only one attack at
a time. The Pentagon, for example, is attacked thousands of
times every day,618 and it is only one target. The bureaucracy
outlined in the Senators’ and the White House’s cybersecurity
proposals would be charged with protecting not only the United
States’ military and other government systems from online attacks, but also what appears to be a substantial segment of the
private sector.619 That might be a viable scenario if the attacks
fell into a single, simultaneous and relatively homogenous category, i.e., online versions of the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor.
As we saw in Part II, that will not be true; online attacks vary
in (apparent) place of origin, nature, duration, objective, and a
number of other factors.620 They can also evolve very quickly,
which would make the proposed bureaucracy’s task even more
difficult.621
617. See supra Part II.
618. See, e.g., CBS Evening News with Scott Pelley: First Look Inside the
Military’s Cyber War Room (CBS television broadcast July 14, 2011), available
at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/07/14/eveningnews/main20079585.sht
ml.
619. See, e.g., Cybersecurity and Internet Freedom Act of 2011, S. 413,
112th Cong. § 101(a) (2011).
620. See supra Part II.
621. See At Light Speed, supra note 31, at 379 n.1 (quoting THE WHITE
HOUSE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE at xii, 2 (2003)),
available at http://www.us-cert.gov/reading_room/cyberspace_strategy.pdf
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That difficulty would be further exacerbated by the Department of Homeland Security-based bureaucracy’s need to
coordinate its determinations and responses with those of
Cyber Command and, presumably, law enforcement.622 Neither
the need for, nor a method of implementing, such coordination
is included in any of the proposals; they include provisions that
allow information to be shared across these sectors, but none of
the proposals addresses how the military, law enforcement, and
private sector participants would coordinate their efforts in the
face of cyber-attacks.623 Absent such coordination, they are, at
best, likely to duplicate their respective efforts and, at worst, to
interfere with those efforts.624
I could note other problems with the proposals we examined in Part III but I believe (or at least I hope) I have made my
point: the proposals are an exercise in futility (as well as a concession to the fallacy of inevitability) because they assume a hierarchically ordered exercise of concentrated sovereign authority can be an effective threat control mechanism in a non-spatial
context in which such exercises are meaningless. In the next
Part, I outline an alternative approach, one that has its own
challenges.
V. . . . AND BEYOND?
That it have been ufed fo long, that the memory of man
runneth not to the contrary.625
My primary purpose in writing this article is to explain
why our persistent reliance on Weberian bureaucracies as the
(“Cyber-attacks cross borders at light speed . . . .”).
622. As we saw in Part III, neither of these is a unitary entity: Cyber
Command encompasses the five subordinate cyber commands and United
States law enforcement encompasses agencies at the federal, state and local
levels. See supra Part III and note 3. There would, therefore, have to be reciprocal coordination among all of these agencies and the proposed Department of
Homeland Security-based bureaucracy we examined in Part III.C.
623. See Cybersecurity and Internet Freedom Act of 2011, S. 413, 112th
Cong. § 242 (2011); White House, Cybersecurity Proposal, supra note 387.
624. If we continue to rely on the fallacy of inevitability, we could address
this state of affairs by creating an uber-cyber-threat-control bureaucracy and
charging it with monitoring and coordinating the respective efforts of these
sectors.That, of course, would only compound the problems noted above.
625. I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *76 (noting that the authority of the common law derived from its long usage).
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engines of our threat-control processes is not only problematic,
but is increasingly counter-productive. I have for years argued
that a top-down approach to cybersecurity is ultimately futile
and that we therefore need to develop an approach that is compatible with the realities of virtual-space.626
It is, of course, much easier to criticize an existing system
than to outline a viable alternative. This is particularly true
given that, as we saw earlier, we are socialized to assume the
inevitability of the institutions that surround us.627 Those institutions and the embedded routines and assumptions that maintain them are so deeply ingrained in the fabric of our lives that
it is exceedingly difficult to imagine a radically different approach to governing or educating ourselves . . . or protecting
ourselves. As I wrote this article, I tried to recall an instance in
history in which the citizens of a society realized that the viability of one of the institutions on which they relied was in an
irreversible decline and rationally set about implementing an
alternative. Since I am not intimately familiar with the occurrences in all societies throughout all the preceding millennia, I
cannot state this as a certainty, but it is my reasonably confident belief that this has not happened. What happens in practice is that the institution, and, in some instances, the society it
supports, fails (Roman Empire) or is destroyed by civil unrest
(French Revolution).
If that is true, then this article may be an exercise in futility. I, however, choose to believe that even if none of our predecessors were prescient enough to replace a failing institution
with a viable alternative, this does not mean deliberate institutional innovation is not possible. I believe it is possible; whether it will be practicable for the United States to replace the legacy threat-control system on which it currently relies is another
matter. I suspect that whether the United States succeeds in
this regard depends to a great extent on whether, and when, we
realize we have a problem. As I outlined the current state of
cyber-threat-control in this country and the proposals that have
been put forward to improve its efficacy, I was tempted to cite
the Emperor’s New Clothes;628 I cannot understand why knowledgeable people in government and in the private sector do not
626. See, e.g., Criminal Law for Cyberspace, supra note 7, at 105–06.
627. See supra Part IV.A.
628. HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN, The Emperor’s New Clothes, in
ANDERSON’S FAIRY TALES 79 (Jean Hersholt trans., 1942), available at
http://www.andersen.sdu.dk/vaerk/hersholt/TheEmperorsNewClothes_e.html.
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point out the obvious futility of the measures being proposed. I
assume they either find that politically problematic or realize it
would accomplish nothing.
That brings me back to the task at hand: how do we structure and implement a threat-control structure that can be effective enough against cyber-threats to maintain the baseline of
order we, as a society, require in order to survive and prosper?
As I explained in detail earlier, I do not believe such an approach can be based on a top-down, hierarchically organized
system.629 The networked communication system that creates
and sustains what we experience as cyberspace is essentially
an instrumental and experiential overlay that subsumes the
empirical reality in which we exist. As such, it eludes the territorially-based governance systems that have maintained order
for centuries; cyberspace is more analogous to the environment
that existed before those systems evolved, i.e., to the state of affairs that prevailed in Britain after the Roman Empire fell.
The fall of the Roman Empire left Britain with no formal
institutional structures to ensure order.630 Because human societies cannot survive without the ability to maintain a baseline
of order, and because central governance was lacking, the citizens of that time and space developed their own, “networked”
approach to maintaining order.631 Essentially, all of the adult,
able-bodied males in a community were in charge of fending off
external threats and controlling internal threats.632 The colonists brought this system with them to the United States,
where it survived into the nineteenth century, when it was re629. See note 626 and accompanying text.
630. See Criminal Law for Cyberspace, supra note 7, at 61 (“The disintegration of the Roman Empire plunged Europe into chaos; social systems that had
relied on Roman institutions were forced to resort to older measures to maintain order.”).
631. See id. at 61–62 (describing the Saxonty thingman and shire reeve
systems as the equivalent to modern law enforcement).
632. For a more detailed account of the origins and operation of this system, see, for example, CYBER-THREATS, supra note 7, at 165–75. See also
Criminal Law for Cyberspace, supra note 7 at 61–63; Brenner & Clarke, supra
note 40, at 1074–75; see, supra note 537, at 1165, 1195 (describing the community-based origins of Anglo-American law enforcement, requiring “every
adult male” to participate). If a qualified male member of the community
failed to participate in this system, he was subject to punishment. See CYRIL
D. ROBINSON ET AL., POLICE IN CONTRADICTION: THE EVOLUTION OF THE
POLICE FUNCTION IN SOCIETY 92 (1994) (“Failure to participate or the breach
of rules could result in fine or outlawry.”).
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placed by the formal institutions we rely on today.633
The community-based threat-control structure that
evolved, and proved very effective, in post-Roman Britain was
predicated on an attitude we do not share: the citizens of postRoman Britain realized they were responsible for protecting
themselves in real-space because no one else could.634 We do
not share that attitude because we are the products of a system
in which civilians are passive, i.e., have no responsibility to
protect themselves or their nation-state (unless they are conscripted into the military).635 We expect the government to protect us; we do not see ourselves as having any responsibility for
threat-control in the real or virtual worlds.
That attitude is not problematic with regard to real-space
threats. As we saw in Part II, our military and law enforcement
officers are quite capable of maintaining the baseline of order
required in the physical world. There is therefore no need for us
to assume any responsibility for this task, and there are several
reasons why we should not.636
As we have seen, it is becoming increasingly apparent that
our military and law enforcement officers cannot adequately
protect us from cyber-threats. As noted above, the Senators’
and the White House’s cybersecurity proposals recognize that
an effective cyber-threat control structure requires the participation of civilians. They recognize this but, in my humble opinion, their approach to implementing this participation errs in
two regards: it assumes civilian participation is limited to private sector entities that are part of the nation’s critical infrastructure; and it assumes that to be effective such participation
must be imposed and enforced by an external government bureaucracy.
The flaw in the first assumption is that it is based on the
erroneous proposition that cyber-threats, like crimes and acts
or terrorism and acts of war, have an identifiable dynamic and

633. See, e.g., CYBER-THREATS, supra note 7, at 165–75; Criminal Law for
Cyberspace, supra note 7, at 61–63; see also supra Part II (describing current
formal enforcement institutions).
634. See supra note 630.
635. See, e.g., At Light Speed, supra note 31, at 445–46.
636. Since order-control in the physical world entails the use of physical
force, it is not advisable to encourage, or tolerate, civilian participation in this
endeavor. Given the potentially dangerous nature of the activity involved and
often sophisticated techniques utilized by law enforcement and the military, it
is prudent to exclude civilians from this undertaking.
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an ascertainable goal. By identifiable dynamic, I mean cyberattacks are inferentially likely to be directed at high-value targets, just as banks are more likely to be robbed than churches,
terrorists are more likely to attack civilian spaces than police
stations and bombers are more likely to attack destroyers than
farms. And by having an ascertainable goal, I mean cyberattacks are inferentially designed to achieve certain ends, just
as crimes are usually intended to enrich the perpetrator, acts of
terrorism are intended to intimidate a civilian population and
acts of war are intended to undermine the viability of an opposing nation-state.637 The proposals we examined above incorporate this proposition because they are an attempt to combat
known threats. Because of that, they ignore the fact that in cyberspace, vulnerabilities are not confined to overtly high-value
targets;638 an unsecured system in a small business could be
used to launch a cascading attack that could take down a large
financial institution (or a series of such institutions). Because
almost everything in cyberspace is, or can be, linked to almost
everything else in cyberspace, any unsecured computer and/or
any unreliable or alienated employee can become the source of
an attack. To be effective, a cyber-threat control structure
needs to be as all-encompassing as possible; it should replicate
the community-based approach post-Roman British took to controlling the real-space threats they confronted.
We explored the flaw in the second assumption in Part IV.
As we saw there, relying on a mandate enforced by an external
government bureaucracy is, aside from anything else, almost
certain to generate some resistance from the civilians who are
subject to its dictates.
Logically, an effective cyber-threat control structure must
be catholic in scope and participation must be voluntary.639

637. See supra Part II.
638. See supra notes 575 and 576 and accompanying text.
639. That does not mean we could not impose sanctions on those who contumaciously refused to participate. There is precedent for such a step. See supra note 632. And as I argue elsewhere, enforcing an obligation to participate
in a general cyber-threat control effort is neither inconsistent with obligations
we otherwise impose on citizens nor should it be particularly onerous to enforce. See, e.g., Criminal Law for Cyberspace, supra note 7, at 105–07; see also
Susan W. Brenner, Toward a Criminal Law for Cyberspace: Product Liability
and Other Issues, 5 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y, Fall 2004, at i, 50–63 (describing theories of civilian responsibility in preventing cybercrime).
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That brings us back to the issue I noted earlier:640 to implement
such a structure, the government must overcome its citizens’
disinclination to become involved in any type of security effort.
But overcoming the disinclination is a delicate, difficult matter
for the leaders of the United States or, for that matter, of any
country: they would have to convince the populace that the
government cannot protect them from cyber-threats while, at
the same time, maintaining civilian confidence in the government’s ability to protect them from other threats.641
More precisely, they would have to convince the citizens of
the United States (or any other country) that the government
alone cannot protect them from cyber-threats but can still protect them from real-space threats. The goal would be to couple
reassurance (stability in the physical world) with a limited admission of vulnerability (chaos in the virtual world) and to use
the latter to recruit civilians into a cyber-threat-defense effort.642 The United States actually did something similar in the
late 1940s and early 1950s. In an attempt to prepare citizens
for a nuclear attack, the Department of Defense and a several
universities developed an initiative that was designed to reduce
Americans’ “terror” of nuclear weapons by recruiting them into
a civil defense effort that would be part of the overall national
security effort.643
640. See supra notes 432 and 433 and accompanying text.
641. One article describes the prevailing corporate attitude as follows:
You need to consider: What are the subconscious assumptions that
companies bring to the issue of foreign cyber-attacks on their networks? … They assume that if something bad happens government
will take care of the losses. They act like they don’t really believe that
a bank could get completely taken out, or that a tech giant could get
its whole lunch eaten . . . .
Gross, supra note 395, at 234 (quoting a senior Senate staffer who works on
cyberissues). I suspect we will see the disinclination eroded gradually, as news
outlets and other media publicize leaked information about cyber-attacks and,
in so doing, begin to cultivate attitudes similar to those that have driven many
citizens to invest in alarm systems and burglar bars.
642. It is unclear at this point whether the civilian participation contemplated by the Senators’ and the White House’s proposals would encompass offensive measures, as well as purely defensive measures. See generally supra
notes 415 and 420 (noting current focus on defensive measures and potential
benefits of offensive measures).
643. See, e.g., GUY OAKES, THE IMAGINARY WAR: CIVIL DEFENSE AND COLD
WAR CULTURE 33–77 (1994). As this author notes, this initiative was based on
the following premise:
The problem of protecting the United States from nuclear attack
could be solved, but only by transforming American life through the
construction of “a permanent civil defense system.” Because the na-
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The Cold War civil defense initiative was developed in response to a very different threat environment, and so cannot
serve as a template for a cyber-threat control structure that integrates military personnel, law enforcement officers, and civilians.644 But, at the very least, it established a precedent for the
type of civilian involvement in threat control outlined above.
My hope is that we can change the conversation in Washington
to eliminate the recursive reliance on the fallacy of inevitability
and move toward a more innovative, more effective approach to
twenty-first century threats.

tional security crisis was permanent, it called for a permanent civil
defense apparatus: “Like the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, civil
defense must function as long as a national security program is required.”
Id. at 49 (quoting ASSOCIATED UNIVS., INC., PART I OF THE REPORT OF THE
PROJECT EAST RIVER 9 (1952)).
644. Aside from anything else, civilians’ role in the 1950s civil defense initiative was essentially limited to palliative efforts designed to minimize the
harm inflicted by a nuclear attack. See id. at 33–77.

